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Summary 
Introduction 
The ESRI's Medium-Term Review is unique in 
presenting a comprehensive assessment of the 
prospects for tl1e Irish economy over the next 
decade. It benefits from the wide range of research 
carried out in the ESRI since its last publication in 
1994 and it takes account of latest thinking about 
the prospects for tl1e wider EU economy. The 
Review cU1alyses tl1e reasons why tl1e Irish economy 
is growing more rapidly than the rest of the EU and 
it presents a detailed forecast for the period to 
2003. The cU1alysis highlights a range of strategic 
issues which arc crucial for the long-term 
development of the economy, issues which are 
often ignored in tl1e debate on economic policy in 
Ireland. 
Demographic Change 
Chapter 2 exllillines the demographic changes 
which are transforming Ireland. The rising 
educational attainment underpins the 
transformation of society and it is having a very 
important direct effect on the economy. It is a key 
factor driving the rapid rise in female participation; 
it is affecting migration; it has an indirect effect on 
tl1e birth rate; and through enhancing the earning 
power of the population it is contributing directly 
to economic growtl1. As a result of all these 
changes, the supply of labour will grow by around 
V 
2 per cent a year in the 1990s. The rising education 
of the labour force is contributing directly at least 
0.5 percentage points a year to tl1e increase in 
productivity. 
The fall off in the birth rate and the ending of net 
emigration means that the ratio of tl1e number of 
people not working to tl10se in employment is 
falling very rapidly. From having the highest rate 
of economic dependency in the EU Ireland will 
have one of the lowest by 2010. This provides a 
window of opportunity, which may last 20 years. 
Who Put the Tiger in the Tank? 
Understanding why Ireland has grown so rapidly in 
recent years is an essential first step to forecasting 
the future. Chapter 3 exllillines the reasons for 
Ireland's current economic success. The autl10rs 
argue that no single factor, taken in isolation, can 
explain the economic turnaround. But much of 
what has happened can be captured by a relatively 
simple story. This focuses on tl1e mutually 
reinforcing effect of different domestic forces that 
were operating over quite different time-scales. The 
major long-term factors include the gradual 
accumulation of human capital - education and 
training - and tl1e success of industrial policy in 
attracting foreign investment. These developments 
have been consistently underpinned by the policies 
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of successive governments over the last 40 years. 
Among medium-term factors, the authors attach 
particular importance to the shake-up of attitudes 
and institutions as a reaction to the recession of the 
1980s. The re-establishment of fiscal control over 
that decade was also crucial. The positive trends in 
Irish wage competitiveness have also played a 
major role and have been sustained by the pay 
agreements and social partnership arrangements. 
These domestic causal factors have interacted 
favourably with several external forces including 
wider developments in the EU. 
The Context for Forecasting 
ln Chapter 4 the authors review the changing 
pattern of financial flows in recent years. They 
argue that there has been no shortage of financial 
resources to support economic growth; unusually 
the Irish company sector remains a net lender. This 
framework is also used to discuss how Irish interest 
rates and exchange rates may behave in the 
approach to EMU. 
The external environment facing the Irish economy 
over t11e next 6 years should be broadly favourable. 
As discussed in Chapter 5, while the US and UK 
economies have been growing at a satisfactory pace 
for a number of years, the rest of the EU economy 
appears to be recovering at last from recession. 
EMU membership from 1999 onwards should help 
to maintain the current relatively low interest rates 
providing a stable environment for future 
investment. 
The Central Forecast 
In Chapter 6 the Central Forecast is presented. 
This represents the best estimate of what is likely to 
vi 
happen to the Irish economy in the medium term. 
In this forecast the authors concentrate on the 
likely average growth rates for the forecast period 
rather than the very difficult task of forecasting 
turning points. The forecast is based on the 
assumption of prudent fiscal policy, wage 
moderation, and the absence of serious domestic or 
international shocks. 
The demographic dividend, from which we are 
beginning to benefit, will not last indefinitely. As a 
result, in planning the public finances in the 
medium term it is wise to provide for the 
elimination of new government borrowing to 
ensure a sustained reduction in our indebtedness. 
Because of the expected rapid growth, this 
reduction in debt would be compatible with 
increased public investment in infrastructure and 
moderate reductions in direct taxation. 
Figure: GNP - Average Annual Percentage 
Change 
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Source: Pre 1990 on ESA79 basis, post 1990 on ESA95. 
The forecast is crucially dependent on adherence to 
the current partnership agreement, and on its 
successors being at moderate levels. Current 
economic circumstances and long-term investment 
in preceding decades offer a historical opportunity 
for Irish society. It should not be wasted. 
Given these assumptions the Central Forecast 
suggests that the current exceptional rate of growth 
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in the economy is likely to continue into the next 
decade. In contrast to the past, when the potential 
growth in output appears to have been around 4 per 
cent a year, the second half of the 1990s should see 
growth at around 5.5 per cent a year (see Figure). 
While this should slow down to around 5 per cent a 
year from 2000 to 2005, it is only in the second 
-half of the next decade, when the demographic 
factors driving growth diminish in importance, that 
the potential growth in output will fall back to 4 
per cent a year or less. This implies that Ireland 
will approach the EU average standard of living 
around the middle of the next decade, probably 
exceeding that of the UK before 2005. The 
convergence will be greatly facilitated by the 
favourable movement in the rate of economic 
dependency in Ireland. 
As shown in the Table, the rate of growth in Gross 
National Disposable Income, the best available 
measure of standard of living, will be somewhat 
lower than that in GNP because of a likely fall off 
in transfers from the EU in the next decade and a 
continuing unfavourable shift in the terms of trade. 
This turnaround sees the economy in the 1990s 
moving away from "jobless growth". In the period 
1995-2000 employment should grow by an average 
of 3 per cent a year, falling back to 2 per cent a 
year in the period to 2005. This will represent an 
exceptional performance by the standards of the 
past (and by the standards of the rest of the EU) 
and it will depend on the maintenance of the strong 
competitive position of the economy. 
While in the past the rise in employment has been 
significant, the unemployment rate fell slowly. 
Over the next decade we have the prospect of very 
rapid employment growth which should make 
possible a sustained reduction in unemployment. 
This will be facilitated by the rising educational 
attainment of the labour force. From its level of 12 
per cent of the labour force in 1996, the 
unemployment rate could be expected to fall to 
around 8.6 per cent by 2000 and to 7 per cent by 
2005. However, on present trends those with very 
limited education are likely to remain seriously 
disadvantaged on the labour market. 
Table: Central Forecast, Major Aggregates 
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 1990-95 1995-00 2000-05 2005-10 
% Average Growth, % 
GNP 6.4 5.7 5.9 5.3 4.4 3.7 4.5 5.3 4.7 5.5 5.0 4.2 
Gross National Disposable Income+ 5.2 4.4 5.8 5.5 3.2 3.1 3.7 4.4 3.2 4.8 4.2 3.0 
Capital Transfers (National Resources) 
Consumption Deflator 2.2 2.1 1.9 2.1 2.2 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.4 2.1 2.1 2.2 
Employment, April 3.6 3.1 3.9 2.9 1.5 1.5 1.7 2.2 1.8 3.0 2.0 1.5 
1995 2000 2005 2010 
Balance of Payments,% of GNP 1.3 0.9 0.4 0.3 0.5 0.1 0.5 0.9 2.5 0.5 1.5 0.8 
Debt/ GNP Ratio, % 87.7 83.4 77.2 71.6 66.9 63.1 59.1 54.9 96.9 66.9 45.7 33.0 
General Government Deficit, % of GNP 1.2 1.6 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.4 0.2 2.3 0.1 -0.7 0.7 
Unemployment Rate, ILO basis,% of 11.9 10.9 9.1 8.3 8.6 8.8 8.9 8.4 12.2 8.6 7.0 5.9 
Labour Force 
vii 
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With prudent management of the public finances it 
should be possible to effectively eliminate all new 
government borrowing in the next 3 years and even 
to run a small surplus by 2005. As shown in the 
Table, this would be sufficient to reduce the debt to 
GNP ratio to around 30 per cent by the end of the 
next decade. Such a fiscal strategy is desirable in 
the light of the exceptionally favourable 
demographic trends of the next decade, a situation 
which will not last indefinitely, and it would be 
consistent with Ireland continuing to run a small 
surplus on the balance of payments. 
This benign Central Forecast seems a likely 
scenario for the future but it is quite possible that 
the economy will be thrown off course by various 
unpleasant "surprises" in the form of sudden 
changes in the economic circumstances of our 
neighbours or through domestically generated 
crises. In Chapter 6 we consider a range of possible 
shocks and we examine how our forecast would 
need to be modified if such events actually 
happened. 
The biggest danger domestically is that an 
excessive rise in expectations could feed into wage 
inflation or unsupportable demands on the 
exchequer. This would choke off the rapid growth 
at a premature stage. If wage inflation were to 
make Ireland uncompetitive, the necessary 
tightening of fiscal policy would erode much of the 
possible gain in money incomes of those at work. 
An even more serious burden would be felt by those 
who would, as a result, fail to find employment in 
Ireland, leaving them unemployed or forced to 
emigrate. 
If investment in physical infrastructure is 
inadequate, rising congestion of various forms - in 
Vlll 
the housing market, in transport, or other areas 
could damage the growth potential of the economy. 
Another possible threat would be an inappropriate 
EU response to the need to halt the global warming 
process. If measures were taken over the next 
decade which imposed a disproportionate cost on 
the Irish economy then the potential growth rate 
would be markedly reduced. 
The authors also consider the possible adverse 
impact on the Irish economy if EMU failed to go 
ahead. Given the economic and political capital 
invested in it at an EU level, there would probably 
be serious disruption of the EU economy reflected 
in a substantial rise in interest rates in countries 
such as Ireland. Experience indicates that this 
could result in the growth potential of the economy 
being temporarily reduced. 
Finally, it should be stressed that there is as much 
likelihood that the actual performance of the 
economy could prove superior to the Central 
Forecast as that it should disappoint. However, the 
possible margins for error are greater on the down-
side. A combination of an excessive rise in income 
expectations and a serious external shock could 
reduce the potential growth rate by up to 2 
percentage points over a significant period. On 
balance, it seems probable that the average growth 
in GNP over the forecast period will be in the 
range 3.5 per cent a year to 6 per cent, but in any 
one year the growth rate could fall well outside 
these limits and such fluctuations must be allowed 
for in future planning. 
The Implications 
Chapter 7 considers the implications of the 
forecasts. The falling dependency ratio represents a 
SUMMARY 
window of opportunity. Whereas the rapid tncrease 
in the supply of labour has lrnditionally been 
Ireland's "problem" it now looks like being 
Ireland's opportunity. The first priority is how to 
ensure tliat tl1e Central Forecast actually comes to 
pass. Key factors in "making it happen" are: 
• Sustaining and reinforcing the partnership 
approach to income dete1mination so tliat it 
survives the pressures from rising expectations; 
• Adequate investment must be undertaken to 
provide the infrastructure essential to future 
growth; 
• The pressures on the environment will have to 
he controlled hy an appropriate use of fiscal 
instruments such as t11xes and charges; 
• Prudent management of ilie public fimmces to 
move into surplus in tl1e next decade. 
IX 
Assuming that the success story continues what can 
we do with "tl1e Fruits of Growth". 
• Over the next decade there will probably be the 
opportunity of making an impact on major 
social problems. For example, there is a 
pressing need for measures aimed specifically 
at improving the skill levels of tl1e long-term 
unemployed; 
• The "demographic dividend" should be 
invested to provide for long-term needs. 
Ireland's "coming of age" will require a review of 
external economic strategy. The prospect of 
eventually becoming a net contributor to the EU 
will force such a change but there are much wider 
issues to be considered such as: the future of 
industrial policy, our attitude to immigration and 
how the EU should be reorganised to allow 
expansion of membership to tl1e East. 

CHAPTER 1 
Introduction 
. . . 
,w;vn KClKOJV, o u 1tru 1to'te µ011:0 Kpryyuov e 11tas; a let 1:ot 1:a 
KClK' 'Ecrn ~lACl ~peCTl µav1:Eum8at, 'm81,,ov o' o'me n nru e'mas 
'E1tOS o'vi: 'e'tEAClCTCTCls. 1 
Economic forecasters are often unjustly accused of 
prophesying endless gloom. Yet in this Review we 
forecast that the Irish economy, both in output and 
employment terms, should, in the absence of any 
major adverse shocks, continue its strong growth 
performance in the opening years of the next 
century. However, we make no pretensions to the 
wisdom of Calchas,2 rather this Review is intended 
lo present our best estimate of the likely 
development of tl1e Irish economy over the next 
decade. 
When Lee wrote his history of Ireland less than a 
decade ago one of the many interesting questions 
he aclclressecl was why tl1e Republic of Ireland was 
an economic failure. 3 Now tl1e question posed by 
outsiders looking in is why is it such a success. To 
il10se of us living tlmmgh the experience there is a 
1 
"Prophet of evil, never yet hast thou spoken to me the thing that is 
good; ever is evil dear to thy heart to prophesy, but a word of good 
ha.sl thou never yet spoken, neither brought to pass." Homer's Iliad 
(Book I: vssl06-109, 1924 eel. translated by A. T. Mmrny, Loeb 
Classical Library). 
2 
'11ic passage from the Iliad cites Agamemnon's blistering reply to 
Calchas who has just prophesied on how the Greeks should get 1id 
of the plague. Calchas' prophesy was entirely correct, but 
Agamemnon's response shows that a prophet is never loved among 
his own. Calchas' prophecy did have some nasty consequences 
because Agamemnon's embittered reaction to it led to the wrath of 
Achilles. 'I11is has modern day resonances in the Lucas Critique! 
1 Lee, .l., 1989, Ireland 1912-1985. Politics and Society, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
certain sense of bemusement at tl1is rapid reversal 
of fortunes. However, it is now becoming clear 
tl1at, whatever the causes, tl1e Irish economy is 
undergoing sometl1ing of a renaissance. The first 
task of this Review is to consider tl1e reasons for 
this apparent change in fortunes. The analysis 
presented in Chapters 2 and 3 suggest, tliat it is not 
a flash in the pan but ratl1er represents tl1e fruits of 
a strategy iliat has been pursued for a number of 
decades with considerable consistency by 
successive Irish governments. 
The issue which we consider of most importance to 
the likely future course of tl1e economy is tl1e 
supply of labour. The rapid growili in the stock of 
human capital embodied in tl1e labour force over 
tl1e past decade is likely to continue and this has 
profound implications for Ireland's future growth 
performance. In Chapter 2 we exmnine tl1e impact 
which the educational revolution and demographic 
change have had on ilie structure and dynamics of 
labour supply. 
The strong growth performance of the Irish 
economy in tl1e 1990s has significantly exceeded 
tl1at of tl1e OECD. In fact Ireland has, on average, 
recorded high growth rates over the past tl1irty 
years witl1 the notable exception of tl1e prolonged 
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recession in the 1980s. However, the structure of 
the economy and thus the determinants of this 
growth performance have been radically 
transformed during tl1is period. In Chapter 3 we 
look at the evidence on Ireland's recent growth 
performance against tl1e background of changes in 
human capital and the labour market, the increased 
openness of the economy and its impact on 
competitiveness, and the role of domestic policy 
reforms in fostering growth. 
A well functioning financial sector plays an 
essential part in sustaining economic growth. In 
Chapter 4 we discuss several important questions 
about the role of tl1e financial sector in the years 
ahead. We look at tl1e pattern of financial flows to-
day and l11e role of financial institutions within the 
financial system. We also consider the general 
implications of EMU for the balance of payments 
and l11e Central Bank reserves, together with a 
review of the alternative possibilities for the entry 
rate of l11e Irish pound into EMU. 
The major task of this Review is to formulate a 
"Central Forecast" for the Irish economy over the 
next 6 years. This forecast, presented in Chapters 5 
and 6, represents our best "guess" as to what will 
happen to the major economic aggregates, although 
past experience has shown that the one certainty is 
that future events will surprise us. In the light of 
the inevitable uncertainty about the future we also 
consider how this Central Forecast would be 
affected by possible surprises, pleasant and 
unpleasant, over the period to 2003. 
The Centrnl Forecast includes annual data out to 
tl1e year 2003. However tl1e primary function of 
this Review is l11e provision of a forecast over a 
medium-term horizon. The flavour of the forecast 
2 
is tl1erefore best captured by focusing on the 
average growth rates in different variables over the 
forecast period. These are more likely to be correct 
than the individual year on year forecasts which 
may miss the exact timing of turning points. It is 
especially important to bear this in mind in reading 
Chapter 6. 
In Chapter 5 we detail the background assumptions 
made for the forecast period. For an economy as 
open as Ireland's a key to future prospects is the 
likely development of neighbouring economies. 
Our assumptions concerning economic prospects 
for the US, the EU in general and the UK and 
Germany in particular are set out in detail.4 We 
also consider the outlook for tl1e CAP and the EU 
Structural Funds. For the domestic economy we 
spell out in Chapter 5 the assumptions which we 
have made on fiscal and monetary policy for the 
forecast period. 
We use the ESRI macroeconomic model to help 
formulate l11e Central Forecast for the Irish 
economy over the period 1998-2003. The full 
details of this forecast are given in Chapter 6. We 
provide separate forecasts for 11 different sectors as 
well as details of tl1e prospects for the major 
economic aggregates incomes, prices, 
consumption and investment, employment, the 
labour force and the balance of payments. Because 
of the growing importance of environmental issues 
we also discuss the likely demand for energy over 
the forecast period and what this implies for 
emissions of tl1e major greenhouse gas - carbon 
4 In this Chapter we use the National Institute of Economic and 
Social Research NiGEM world model to forecast the outlook for 
the world economy. 
INTRODUCTION 
dioxide. This chapter ends by considering how the 
Central Forecast may be proved wrong: we 
consider a range of different scenarios to get a feel 
for the sensitivity of our forecast to "surprises". 
The detailed discussion of t11e prospects for the 
economy to 2003 highlights medium and long-term 
issues of importance for policy makers. The final 
chapter of the Review explores these issues in some 
detail to throw light on how we can maximise the 
potential for growth and minimise the risk from 
unexpected shocks. Chapter 7 discusses the broad 
policy implications of our forecast and considers 
how best we can use the window of economic 
opportunity which we face to deal wi!11 some of our 
pressing economic and social problems. 
The Accuracy of Our Previous 
Forecasts 
In l lJ8lJ Lee was writing against t11e backdrop of an 
economy undergoing a severe recession and to 
some extent this may have coloured his writing. 
This highlights t11e danger for social scientists of 
being unduly influenced by current events and it is 
sometlling we must keep in mind in looking at the 
future from t11e vantage point of today. Even more 
Uian historians, economic forecasters have an in-
built tendency to see tomorrow as being the same 
as today. Since U1e Medium-Term Review was first 
published in l lJ86, we have nearly always erred on 
the side or pessimism t110ugh this has not stopped 
commentators viewing U1e ESRI as inveterate 
optimists! This pessimism highlights U1e poor self-
image in Ireland tlrnt has persisted t11roughout 
much of the last decade influencing economists, 
historians and politicians alike. Even if Ireland 
were trnly a tiger we would be t11e last to see it. 
3 
Before embarking on our current forecast~ it is 
useful to examine tlle track record of previous 
Review's medium-term forecasts. Besides being an 
important lesson in humility which all forecasters -
unless they be prophets ultimately face, this can 
serve to quantify the likely margin of error in the 
Central Forecast prepared for this Review. 
Figure 1 below plots the average GNP growth 
forecast~ in successive Reviews against t11e actual 
outtum. On average there is an absolute error of 
approximately 0.8 percentage points per annum in 
Figure 1.1: MTR Growth Forecasts vs. 
Outturn 
6 Averaoe Annual% Growth in Real GNP 
1985·1990 1987-1992 1988-1994 1991·1996 1992-1997 
!•outtumc:i:JReview I 
Figure 1.2: MTR Employment Forecasts vs. 
Outturn 
Averaqe Annual% Growth in Total Employment 
0 
1985-90 1987·92 1988-94 1991-96 1992-97 
!•outturn £Z1Review! 
our growth forecasts. 5 Notably these have, with t11e 
exception of the 1989 forecast, all underestimated 
5 The CSO have recently changed their national accounts 
methodology from an ESA 79 basis to the new ESA95 basis. 111is 
means that there is a methodological discontinuity in measured 
GNP growth rates between 1990 and 1991. Our forecasts in 
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tJ1e actual outturn. Figure 1.2 plots our forecasting 
record on growth in total employment. The average 
absolute error here is approximately 0.9 percentage 
points. Again all our employment forecasts 
underestimated the actual outtum. It is clear from 
the graphs that our "best" record was in the 1989 
Medium Term Review covering the period 1988-
1994. Otherwise our forecasts display a slight 
pessimistic trend. We could indeed be accused of 
prophesying "too little that is good", although our 
previous forecasts have generally been treated as 
unduly optimistic. 
While our forecasts of employment and output have 
been within reasonably narrow confidence bounds, 
our track record on forecasting the unemployment 
rate has not been as satisfactory. This is mainly due 
lo difficulties in forecasting migration flows which 
in turn are dependent on our forecasts of UK labour 
market conditions. Table 1.1 shows the average 
unemployment rate forecasts in successive Reviews 
compared to the actual outturn. The absolute error 
is on average two percentage points. Again the 
1989 Review was the only forecast which 
underestimated the actual outtum while the 1991 
Review came closest to the actual outturn. 
Although our medium-term forecasting 
performance reveals a reasonable track record, our 
year-on-year forecasts have had more difficulty in 
precisely identifying the timing of turning points in 
the economy. For instance, as can be seen in Table 
l .2, in the 1991 Review we expected growth to pick 
up in 1992 and 1993, based on our expectation that 
tlie European recovery would begin earlier than it 
previous Reviews were prepared on the old ESA 79 basis and if we 
compare them with the ESA 79 outturns the absolute eLTor is close 
to one percentage points per annu1n. 
4 
actually did, while in fact the growth pick-up 
started in 1994. Of course this delay was partly 
attributable to the impact of the currency crisis of 
late 1992. The last Review had a better year-on-
year record in predicting turning points. 
Table 1.1: Unemployment Rate: Forecast 
vs. Outturn6 
Period MTR Actual Forecast 
Forecast Outtum Error 
1986-1990 17.85 15.99 1.86 
1988-1992 18.72 15.32 3.40 
1989-1994 13.75 15.32 -1.57 
1992-1996 15.92 14.81 1.09 
1993-1997 15.98 13.90 2.08 
Casting an eye across the black bars in Figures 1.1 
and 1.2 which track actual performance, it is clear 
that, on average, the economy has been continually 
improving its performance both in output and 
employment terms over the period 1985-1997. This 
upward trend in performance may partly explain 
why Review forecasts, which have in fact tended to 
underestimate tl1e outturn, are generally treated as 
being overly optimistic at the time of publication. It 
is reassuring that other forecasters also experience 
some difficulty in predicting growtl1 rates. The 
International Monetary Fund in a recent review of 
IMF growth forecasts found tliat for the industrial 
country group as a whole, which includes tl1e USA, 
Italy, Japan, UK, Germany, Canada and France, 
the World Economic Outlook forecasts have tended 
to over- or underpredict growth by about one 
percentage point. 
6 ForecasL~ for five previous Reviews: 1986, 1987, 1989, 1991, 
1994; outturns for 1996 and 1997 are estimates. 
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Table 1.2: Comearison of Forecasts for GNP Growth Rate 
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
MTR1986 2.5 3.3 3.5 3.0 3.0 
MTR1987 -0.4 3.0 3.3 3.7 3.6 
MTR1989 4.0 7.1 5.6 4.6 4.8 3.2 
MTR1991 2.0 3.7 4.3 3.3 3.6 3.7 
MTR1994 2.4 4.3 6.9 5.7 4.6 4.8 4.7 4.5 
MTR1997 6.4 5.7 5.9 5.3 4.5 
CSO* -0.3 3.7 2.3 5.3 7.2 1.9 2.0 3.0 7.4 7.3 
* GNP growth rates: Average of output and expenditure measures. There is a discontinuity in 1991 clue to methodological revisions. 
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CHAPTER 2 
The Educational Revolution and Demographic Change 
2.1 Introduction 
In the immediate post-war years all of the countries 
in Nortl1ern Europe, witl1 ilie exception of the 
Republic of Ireland, reformed and expanded their 
educational systems. In Nortl1ern Ireland, as in ilie 
rest of 1l1e UK, a substantial programme of 
investment was undertaken, the educational system 
was upgraded and participation at both second and 
third level greatly increased. In the Republic, by 
contrast, no similar developments occurred in iliat 
period. It took approximately 20 years before this 
neglect of education in tl1e Republic was reversed. 
Since tl1e late 1960s a strategy of investing in 
education has been pursued with consistency by 
successive governments. This process was initiated 
witl1 tl1e publication of Investment in Education1 in 
1966 and tl1e introduction of free second level 
education in 1967. The development of the system 
has continued since tlrnt date and even in the 
1980s, when many other sectors suffered severe 
cut-backs, tl1e education system survived 
reasonably intact. In fact the rise in participation 
rates since 1980 has been even greater than that 
which occurred under the first 15 years of tl1e "free 
education" policy. 
1 
'I11is study was undertaken with the help of the OECD. It was 
commissioned in I 962 and published in 1966. Among it5 authors 
were P. Lynch of UCD and M. ()'Donoghue of TCD. 
Tony Fahey and John Fitz Gerald 
In looking at demographic trends in Ireland and 
their associated dependency patterns, the int1uence 
of improved education levels in the population is 
ubiquitous. It is not just that stronger economic 
performance in recent years may be partly tl1e 
consequence of ilie long-standing record of 
educational investment. It also appears that 
practically all demographic behaviours are 
intluenced by education - particularly ilie decline 
in the marriage rate, the fall in fertility, the 
growing participation of women in the labour force 
and the peculiar pattern of cyclic migration which 
has emerged among tl1e educated in Ireland in 
recent years. Rising educational attainment is still 
feeding through into the adult population - the first 
beneficiaries of free secondary education in the late 
1960s are still only in their early 40s, while tl1e 
products of the education boom of more recent 
years are still only in early adulthood. The long-
term effects of rising educational levels are thus 
still in the making. We have tried to point to some 
of these effects in the present study, but it is 
difficult to predict how the complex interactions 
which arise from improved educational levels will 
work out in tl1e future. 
When historians come to look back on the second 
half of tl1e 20th century they may well see the 
educational revolution as itself part of a wider set 
of changes in Irish society - at least as much tl1e 
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effect as the cause. However, in this chapter we 
focus on education as an important instrument for 
tl1is change tracing how it may be affecting 
marriage fertility, migration and labour force 
participation. 
While the focus of attention is on education as an 
instrument of change it must be recognised that 
there arc many other social and cultural factors 
which arc contributing to rapid change in the 
demographic structure. For example, as discussed 
in the next chapter, the opening up of Ireland to the 
ouL-;idc world since the 1950s has had profound 
economic effects. The increased cultural 
interchange with the rest of Europe is also having a 
wider impact on society. It is not our task here to 
examine these wider influences on demographic 
structure. Rather, our purpose is to document 
recent demographic trends and project future 
demographic developments, paying close attention 
to the role of education as an instrument of change. 
Mcmy of the features of tl1e demographic changes 
described here are already inevitable given tl1e 
investment in education which has already taken 
place and given tl1e pattern of births, deaths and 
emigration over the last 20 years. However, 
experience witl1 demographic forecasting in the 
past has shown it to be, if anytl1ing, even less 
reliable than economic forecasting. Probably tl1e 
single greatest cause of uncertainty in such 
forecasts for Ireland lies in the volatile nature of 
migration. For ex,unple, in tl1is Review our central 
forecast m,sumes no net migration over tl1e next 10 
years whereas less than two years ago the CSO 
foresaw the lower bound for emigration being 
8 
7,500 per year.2 The present assumption of zero 
migration could be wrong in either direction - it 
may prove to be an underestimate of either 
immigration or emigration. 
The key characteristics of tile demographic changes 
under way are: a big reduction in tl1e number of 
children; a major increase in tl1c proportion of the 
population in working age groups; a substantial 
reduction in tl1e dependency ratio, even if 
unemployment were to continue at the EU average; 
a rise in life expectancy; a rapid fall from 2000 
onwards in the net entry into the labour force. 3 
Section 2 concentrates on the wider implications of 
the educational revolution. Section 3 sets out our 
central forecast for the major demographic 
variables. Section 4 considers the implications of 
these changes for tl1e economy and Section 5 
summarises our conclusions. 
2.2 Educational Change 
Participation rates in education, while well below 
those elsewhere in Nortl1cm Europe, increased 
slowly in the period after 1945 even with no major 
change in policy. This reflected changing 
expectations among the population and the gradual 
increase in the size of the Irish middle class. The 
decision to introduce free secondary education in 
1967 confirmed this pattern and greatly 
strengthened the rate of increase in participation. 
20ne of the authors, John Fitz Gerald, was on the committee which 
advised the CSO in preparing their forecast and, at the time the 
forecast was made, the assumptions on emigration seemed 
reasonable to all involved. 
'A fuller treatment of these issues is given in Fahey, T. and J. Pitz 
Gerald, 1997, Welfare lmplicationf of Demographic Trends, Oak 
Tree Press, Dublin. Combat Poverty Agency Research Report 
Series. 
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The introduction of free second level education was 
the single most important change in educational 
policy over the last 30 years. It led to a steady 
extension of participation in education, initially 
concentrnted at second level, and more recently 
reflected in a major expansion in third level 
education. In the 1970s the school leaving age was 
raised to 15 and a limited system of grant aid to 
students attending university was introduced. Since 
the 1970s third level education has expanded 
rapidly, involving the construction of Regional 
Technical Colleges and two new universities, as 
well as a huge expansion in tl1e number of places 
provided in the existing universities. 
Set out in Figure 2.1 are details of the educational 
attainment of the male and female population in 
1994 cross-classified by year of birtl1. This shows 
how educational attainment levels have risen in 
recent cohorts hut also how they had already begun 
to rise in the cohorts which pm;sed through the 
educational system prior to tl1e late 1960s. 
For those born 65 years ago who arc now at 
retirement age, approximately two-thirds left 
school with only primary education and less tlrnn 
10 per cent had the benefit of tllird level education. 
Apprenticeships and on-the-job training would 
have added to the range of skills in this cohort, but 
this would have provided only partial 
compensation for the low levels of formal 
education. On average women have been slightly 
better educated than men in the Republic 
throughout the last two generations but, as can be 
seen from Figure 2.2, tl1e gap has been relatively 
small. 
For those horn in tl1e late 1960s, that is, those who 
were aged 25 to 30 in 1994, early school leavers 
9 
were down to only 10 per cent of the cohort, with 
around 60 per cent having at least a Leaving 
Certificate and around a quarter having some form 
of third level education. 
Figure 2.1: Educational Attainment by Year 
of Birth, Males 
<1930 1935-3!1 1945 .49 l 955·59 1965-69 
1930-35 1940-44 1950-54 1960-64 
Source: L.:ibour Force Survey1 1994 
Figure 2.2: Educational Attainment by Year 
of Birth, Females 
% of totol livlnu in Ireland 
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Soorce: Labour Force Survey, 1994 
However, the educational system continues to 
develop and the cohort leaving school in September 
1995 showed very much higher participation rates 
in third level education than the cohort leaving 
education five years previously.4 At present 
between 40 per cent and 50 per cent of those 
leaving the educational system have experienced 
third level education and over 80 per cent of tl1e 
population have reached Leaving Certificate 
standard .. This further rise in participation in the 
1990s is quite striking and it is has raised Irish 
4McCoy, S. and B. J. Whelan, 1996 The Economic Status of 
School-Leavers 1993-1995, Deparment of Ente1prise and 
Employment, May. 
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pmticipation m education up to levels reached in 
some of tJ1e more developed economies and above 
those currently experienced in the UK. 5 
Much of ilie policy advice over the last 10 years 
concerning t11e problem of structural 
unemployment has concentrated on the need to 
reduce the numbers leaving ilie educational system 
with no qualifications. Figure 2.3 shows the 
considerable success that has been achieved in this 
area and this has important labour market 
implications which me discussed later in this 
Review. The numbers who me still failing to 
achieve a minimum of a junior certificate on 
leaving formal education, while small, represent a 
fairly concentrated group which has multiple social 
problems and further progress with this group is 
likely to prove difficult in ilie future. 
Figure 2.3: Educational Attainment of the 
Labour Force 
80 
60 
40 
20 
0 1991 2001 2011 
Source: Labour Force Su rvevs and ESRI Forecast 
_ i;;;lThird Level 
IIIILeavinq Cert. 
DJunior Cert. 
IZlPrimarv 
[n forecasting future trends in educational 
attainment it is assumed that there will be a small 
additional increase in pmticipation at third level 
together wit11 a small reduction in numbers with 
only a junior certificate. It is assumed that t11e 
proportion leaving with no qualifications remains 
50ECD, Education at a Glance 1996. 
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constant at its current low level. The resulting 
forecasts for the educational attainment of the 
labour force to t11e yem 2011 me shown in Figure 
2.3. (The assumptions on migration which also 
affect these figures me discussed later.) By that 
date under 10 per cent of t11e labour force will have 
had only a primary education and t11e proportion 
with a third level education will be approaching 40 
per cent. This Figure illustrates how, even after a 
number of decades of investment in education, the 
impact of the continuing change in the level of 
human capital will affect the economy and society 
for some considerable time. The policy of 
upgrading the educational system takes many years 
to change society and the economy; it can not be 
seen as a "quick fix" solution to economic and 
social problems. 
In this chapter we have concentrated on 
participation rates and qualifications attained; we 
have not considered tJ1e "quality" of t11e education 
received. This would go far beyond the scope of 
t11is study. However, the data published in OECD 
op. cit. suggest tJ1at ilie quality of the education 
provided in Ireland is broadly comparable wit11 that 
available elsewhere. While expenditure per pupil at 
first and second level may be lower tlian in some 
other developed countries, this appears to have 
been offset by a number of factors, principally 
because fmnily and pupil motivation has been high. 
In the past, especially in rural meas, there was a 
low opportunity cost of education - pupils had 
nothing else to turn to, and tlleir pments, from long 
experience, were convinced that education was the 
surest way to succeed. 
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2.3 Demographic Change 
The model of demographic behaviour which we use 
is driven by education. We know the educational 
attainment of tl1e existing adult population and we 
forecast how the educational participation of future 
cohorts will evolve. The resulting forecast for the 
educational attainment of the adult population over 
the next 10 years is not very sensitive to the 
assumptions on participation as rates are already 
quite high and most unlikely to fall. 
Having determined the educational attainment of 
t11e population, education specific marriage rates 
are applied to determine tl1e proportion of women 
in different age groups who are married. (In the 
past women wit11 t11ird level education were less 
likely to get married.) In turn, fertility is affected 
by the changing numbers of women, married and 
single, in t11e 20 to 40 age group. In developing t11e 
model we have had to rely heavily on the changing 
pattern of behaviour in the past. What is urgently 
needed is further research into why t11ese changes 
arc taking place, an understanding which would 
give a stronger basis for forecasting behaviour in 
the future. 
We tl1en apply marriage and age specific fertility 
rates to t11e population of women to determine the 
number of birt11s each year. While there is evidence 
that marriage is declining in importance as a factor 
determining fertility and labour market behaviour, 
we do not have information on fertility classified by 
educational attainment which might allow a more 
sophisticated approach to forecasting. 
Life expectancy is assumed to rise roughly in line 
with t11e forecasL~ included in tl1e CSO Population 
Forecast publication. The improvement is assumed 
to occur primarily in the population aged over 40. 
11 
Net migration is modelled as a function of relative 
economic conditions in Ireland and in external 
labour markets (especially in the UK).6 The macro-
economic model is used in deriving t11e net 
migration figure. However, within the net 
migration figure t11ere are significantly greater 
gross tlows in either direction. We make 
assumptions on t11e age pattern of tl1e gross flows 
and on tl1eir educational attainment to arrive at tl1e 
ultimate impact on tl1e population. 
Labour force participation by women is greatly 
influenced by the level of education attained. The 
level of educational attainment also has an impact 
on male labour force participation. 
Marriage Rate 
Traditionally Ireland had a very low marriage rate: 
many never married and those who did so married 
at a relatively late age. Restricted access to 
1rnuriage was a vital factor in controlling tl1e birth 
rate after tl1e famine.7 However, in tl1e 1960s tl1e 
marriage rate increased rapidly (Figure 2.4). 
Increasing proportions of successive cohorts of tl1e 
population married and the mean age at marriage 
fell for both males and females. The marriage rate 
peaked in tl1e early 1970s and it has fallen quite 
rapidly since then, especially since 1981. 
6 Obviously a huge range of other non-economic factors have 
played an important role in determining migmtion patterns. 
7Walsh, B.,1968, Some Irish Population Problems Reconsidered, 
Dublin: The Economic and Social Research Institute, General 
Research Series, Paper No. 42. 
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Table 2.1: Proeortion of Poeulation Married by Level of Education 
per cent of cohort 
Females Males 
Primary Inter Leaving 3rd Level Primary Inter Leaving 3rd Level 
15-19 0.3 0.2 0.2 
20-24 20.0 18.7 5.9 
25-29 60.7 62.5 54.6 
30-34 78.5 85.7 78.9 
35-39 86.5 91.0 87.0 
40-44 90.9 93.2 90.7 
45-49 91.8 93.9 92.0 
50-54 92.6 94.9 90.3 
55-59 90.8 91.8 89.2 
60-64 88.6 92.7 86.4 
65+ 85.9 82.2 78.4 
Source: Labour Force Survey, 1994 
Figure 2.4: Marriage Rate 1970-1995 
8 Marriages per thousand 
Source: Vital Statistics 
Table 2.1 shows the proportion of men and women 
married at different ages in 1994 cla-ssified by the 
level of education completed. This shows that the 
proportion of the older age groups (over 60) ever 
married is lower than for the 40 to 60 age group. 
This reflects the low marriage rate for those of 
"marriageable age" up to the 1960s. It is 
interesting that the lower incidence of marriage is 
particularly pronounced for those older women 
who have third level education. This may reflect 
the particularly difficult choice which faced highly 
educated women in the pre-1970 era. They had to 
choose between pursuing a career or marrying and 
12 
1.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 
4.3 7.4 6.4 2.5 1.8 
37.0 38.4 42.9 32.4 25.9 
70.1 62.4 73.3 69.6 66.2 
79.3 74.7 83.9 82.7 82.9 
83.6 78.6 86.6 89.1 88.6 
86.6 80.7 90.3 88.7 86.1 
84.2 80.2 90.4 93.2 89.1 
82.8 75.6 89.5 92.9 85.6 
72.3 75.4 89.2 91.4 87.4 
55.6 74.7 90.0 90.3 80.0 
having children. The gap between the proportion of 
women with higher education who are married and 
the proportion of all other women who are married 
is somewhat smaller for the 30 to 60 age group but 
it is, none the less, significant, reflecting a 
continuing tension for such women. 
Not surprisingly, for men and women in their 20s 
the pursuit of higher education tends to rule out 
early marriage and this is reflected in a 
substantially lower proportion being married m 
1991. As shown in Table 2.1, for men in the older 
age groups the position is rather different. In 
Ireland in earlier decades men certainly did not 
face a choice between having a career and 
marrying. Instead it would appear to be men with 
only primary education who had the lowest 
incidence of marriage (see Table 2.1). This may 
reflect differing patterns of behaviour among the 
rural, predominantly fanning population, 
compared to the urban population in earlier 
decades. The tradition that marriage could only be 
undertaken where the husband had inherited or had 
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the prospect of inheriting the farm may have been a 
further factor affecting the incidence of marriage 
among older men in rural areas. 
Figure 2.5: Proportion of Women Ever 
Married, by Age 
100 r-
0
;("-0 --------------
25-29 30-34 
I······· 1991 -2011 I 
Source: Census of Population and ESRI Forecast 
As shown in Figure 2.5, even with the recent 
decline in the marriage rate for women in their 
20s, the rate to-day for those aged 25-29 is not that 
different from what it was in 1961. Among women 
aged 30 and over, a significantly greater proportion 
are married now tlrnn waB tl1e case 30 years ago. It 
remains to be seen whether the proportions never 
marrying will rise again in the future or whether 
tlle pattern of postponing marriage until after age 
30 will continue. 
Rese::u-ch suggests that the rise m educational 
attainment has played a minor direct role in the 
falling marriage rate over the last 15 years. 8 For 
the future tl1e rising proportion of the population 
who are going on to third level education will 
contribute to a further fall in the marriage rate. The 
changes which we are observing are probably 
driven by many different factors which are 
interacting to produce tl1e changing roles of women 
and men in society. Changing expectations as a 
8 Fahey and Fitz Gerald, 1997, op. cit. 
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result of increased education as well as wider 
cultural change are clearly important. 
In Figure 2.5 we show our forecast for tl1e 
proportion of women married by age in 2011. Here 
we have assumed tlrnt changing patterns of 
educational participation and changing cultural 
factors will see some furtl1er postponement of 
marriage. However, we continue to assume that tl1e 
bulk of the population do get married at some stage 
in tl1eir lives so tlrnt what we are forecasting is a 
postponement of marriage rather than an 
abandonment of it as a social institution. 
Fertility 
The decline in the birtl1 rate has been one of the 
most important of tl1e demographic changes to 
occur in Ireland in recent years. The year 1980 
recorded the highest total number of birtl1S in tl1e 
country in tl1e present century (at 74,388). By t11e 
end of tl1e 1980s, however, the total had fallen to 
the lowest on record at 51,669 in 1989. Since then 
it has fallen further to around 48,000 in 1995, 
representing a decline of more tl1an a tl1ird in a 
decade and a half. The related birtl1 rate (per 
thousand of the population) is shown in Figure 2.6. 
For most of tl1e present century, Ireland has had 
exceptionally high fertility rates by the standard of 
the rest of Europe. In tl1e 1960s and 1970s, the 
large child population which resulted from high 
fertility was a major contributor to t11e 
exceptionally high age-dependency levels then 
experienced in Ireland. Today, Irish fertility is no 
longer exceptional, though it still belongs cU11ong 
those countries at tl1e upper edge of tl1e range of 
fertility patterns found in Europe. For the 
foreseeable future Irish fertility, in common with 
that of other western countries, seems likely to 
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stabilise below t11e level which would ensure the 
natural replacement of the population. 
In the past, marriage patterns were a central 
intluence on trends in fertility. Today, this is much 
less so as the link between marriage and the 
decision to have children is now much weaker. 
Many women have children outside marriage and 
many married women have few or no children. It is 
probable that both maniage and child-hearing 
decisions are affected by changes in the role of 
women in society, with a far greater participation 
in the labour force by women of all ages. This 
change in participation is itself partly driven by the 
change in the educational attainment of tl1e 
population. Unfortunately, data are not currently 
available which would allow us to examine the 
pattern of fertility by the social class or educational 
attainment of t11e motl1er. Such data could help 
throw light on t11e underlying causes of tl1e rapidly 
changing pattern of behaviour in the field of 
mmriage and fertility. 
Fi ure 2.6: Birth Rate: 1960-2010 
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The rise in unmarried parenthood in recent decades 
has occurred mainly among mothers aged under 
25. While overall fertility among young mothers 
declined during the 1980s, it was marked by a 
sharp "retreat from marriage" among that group -
the majority of births to mothers under age 25 now 
occur outside marriage. Among mothers in their 
late twenties and thirties, by contrast, the vast 
majority of births occur within marriage. It also 
appears tlrnt many mothers who begin family 
formation outside of marriage in tl1eir teens or 
early twenties subsequently marry as they grow 
older. The decline in the role of marriage in family 
formation, therefore, is concentrated in the em·liest 
stages of family formation and among those who 
begin child-bearing at a young age. Marriage 
retains its traditional place in family formation 
among those who have their first birth after age 25. 
It is also important as a somewhat delayed option 
among those who have their first birth outside 
marriage at a young age. While the role of 
marriage in family formation is changing, it would 
be easy to underestimate its continuing significance 
for family life in Ireland, even among tl10se who 
begin their families outside of marriage. 
The different place of marriage in fmnily formation 
among younger and older mothers just noted is 
probably closely related to education and tl1e labour 
market prospects associated with it. Young women 
who leave school early have poor job prospects and 
thus are more inclined to become mothers at an 
early age. Perhaps more importmltly, tl1e fat11ers of 
tl1eir children are likely to be in similar 
circumstances and so may be perceived by young 
women as having little to offer by way of financial 
security - tlms the reluctance mnong young 
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mothers to marry them. 9 Better educated women 
are more likely to defer family formation until they 
have secured their labour market position and 
many choose not to have children at all. Well-
educated women have always had lower marriage 
rates, so that their growing presence in the 
population tends to push overall marriage rates 
downwards. The increasing share of well-educated 
women mnong those of marriageable age thus goes 
some way towards explaining the decline in 
marriage rates in recent years. Better-educated 
women who do have children are more likely to 
have partners who are themselves reasonably 
secure in jobs - and thus to be more attractive as 
potential lmsbcmds and supporters of children. This 
helps explain the lower rate of unmarried 
parenthood mnong better educated women. 
In forecasting fertility we have modelled separately 
the behaviour of married and single women. We 
have assumed that there is a continuing rapid 
decline in fertility of married women in their 20s 
reflecting the increased participation in education. 
However, we have assumed that there is little 
change in fertility for women in their 30s. It is 
possible that the rise in educational attainment 
could see an even more rapid decline in fertility of 
women in their 20s as they establish their careers 
in the labour market and that tllis could be 
counterbalanced by a rise in fertility in their 30s. 
However, in the absence of research on the factors 
driving fertility it is exceptionally difficult to 
forecast future patterns of behaviour. 
9 Hannan, D., and S. O'Riain, 1993, Pathways to Adulthood in 
Ireland: Causes and Consequences of Success and Failure in 
Transitions anwng Irish Youth, Dublin: The Economic and Social 
Research Institute General Research Se1ies Paper No. 161. 
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Figure 2.7 shows the Total Fertility rates (TFRs) 
for a number of other EU countries in the early 
l 990s. 10 This shows how Ireland's current fertility 
rate lies within the range of experience of these 
other countries. In Sweden fertility fell to low 
levels in the 1970s recovering to the current 
position where fertility there is now at the top of 
the EU league. In Southern Europe - Italy, 
Portugal, Spain and Greece - fertility began to fall 
much later and is still at a very low level. There is 
no single explanation for these diverse trends 
which could help inform our forecast for Ireland. 
Postponement of having children was certainly a 
factor in Sweden but it was only one of many 
factors. The advent of more parent-friendly policies 
there in the 1980s may have helped facilitate the 
recovery in fertility. However, it is clear that in 
forecasting fertility each country's experience must 
be considered separately. 
Figure 2.8: Total Fertility Rate 
1961 1966 1971 1981 1986 1991 1996 2001 2006 2011 
Source: Census of Population and Vital Statistics 
10Toe Total Fertility Rate is an artificial measure of the number of 
children the average women could expect to have if she 
experienced the bilth rate observed over all age groups in a 
particular year. In practice, average completed fam.ily size may 
prove rather different if, for example, bi1ths are temporaiily 
postponed or other factors intervene to produce essentially 
temporary changes in fe1tility. 
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Figure 2.9: Births to Single Mothers 
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While t11crc is some sign tl1at the long-term fall in 
t11e fertility rate in Ireland (Figure 2.8) may have 
been halted in ilie last 2 years we feel iliat iliis is 
likely to be only temporary. We have assumed that 
the fertility rate will continue to decline over tl1e 
next 1() years to a level of 1.6 children per motl1er 
in t11e middle of the next decade. This would lie 
between t11e upper and the lower bounds of the 
CSO forecast published in 1995. The resulting 
implications for the total number of birtl1S and for 
tJ1e birt11 rate are shown in Table 2.2. Because of 
t11e relatively large size of tl1e female population of 
child-bem-ing age, the number of birtl1S remains 
relatively high even as tl1e TFR falls , as shown in 
Figure 2.8. 
As shown in Figure 2.9, since ilie late 1970s iliere 
has been a rapid rise in tl1e proportion of births to 
single mot11crs. Today they account for a quarter of 
all births. Unfortunately, we do not have 
satisfactory information on ilie educational or 
social background of iliese mothers so it is difficult 
to mrnlyse the implications of these trends for 
labour market behaviour or for ilie demand for 
social services. We do not know to what extent 
these women and ilieir children lack the support of 
the failiers and how long iliey are likely to remain a 
sep;m1te fmnily unit. It is clear iliat a substantial 
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proportion of such moiliers have in the past 
subsequently married. 
Table 2.2: Assumptions on Fertility, Births, 
Deaths and life Exeectanc~ 
1996 2001 2006 2011 
Total Fertility 1.88 1.75 1.63 1.61 
Rate 
Births (Thousand) 49.5 47.7 45.6 45.7 
Birth Rate (per 13.7 12.9 12.1 11.8 
Thousand) 
Deaths 30.3 31.6 31.5 31.9 
(Thousand) 
Death Rate (per 8.4 8.5 8.3 8.2 
Thousand) 
Male Life 73.3 74.0 74.7 75.4 
Expectancy 
Female Life 78.6 79.4 80.2 81.1 
Expectancy 
Life Expectancy 
Increases in life expect,mcy have been one of tl1e 
factors contributing to population ageing in ot11er 
countries. One of tl1e reasons for t11e slower rate of 
population ageing in Ireland has been t11e limited 
increase in life expectancy at older ages which has 
occurred in this country. Life expectm1cy mnong 
older people in Ireland is now among the lowest in 
ilie western world (excluding a number of eastern 
European countries which recently have 
experienced catastrophic declines in life 
expectancy). 11 In tl1e early part of the present 
century, Ireland not only had a compm·atively high 
overall life expectancy by ilie standards of tl1e day, 
it also had reasonably high levels of life expectancy 
mnong older people. 12 
Since ilie 1920s, life expectancy at birth has 
increased greatly in Ireland - from 57 years in 
II Fahey, T. and P. MutTay, 1994. Health and Autonomy Among 
the Over-65s in Ireland. Dublin: Na1ional Council for the Elderly. 
IZ General Report, Census of Population 1926. 
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1926 to 72 ye&s in 1991 for males and from 58 to 
78 years for women over the same period (Figure 
2.10). However, by far the largest share of this 
increase has been due to declines in mortality in 
childhood and early adulthood. Life expectancy 
increases at older ages have been very slight, 
principally because life expectancy for older men 
has scarcely increased at all (Figure 2.11). In 1986, 
life expectancy for men at age 65 (which was 12.6 
years) was m&ginally lower than it had been in 
1926 (when it was 12.8 years). Over the same 
period, life expectancy for women at the same age 
increased by only 2.8 ye&s (from 13.4 in 1926 to 
16.2 in 1986), a very modest increase by the 
standards of other countries. While mortality rates 
among children in Ireland &e now among the 
lowest in the world, mortality rates among older 
people are comparatively high and constitute one of 
tl1e more important failures in public health in this 
country. 
Older age mortality showed significant 
improvement in tl1e late 1980s. In the period 1986-
1991, life expectm1cy in Ireland increased by 0.8 of 
a year in t11e case of men at age 65 and by 0.9 of a 
year in the case of women at tlmt age. For men, tJ1is 
Wcl'> an historically novel increase (and is reflected 
in Figure 2.11 by the sudden upward movement at 
the end of the trend-lines for males) and in the case 
of women represented a stronger rate of 
improvement than had occurred previously. 
However, these recent improvements still leave life 
expectcmcy in Ireland below the average of its EU 
neighbours (Figure 2.10). 
In forecasting the future we follow the pattern 
assumed by the CSO in making their population 
projections seeing a significant improvement in life 
expectm1cy for both men and women over the next 
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20 years (Figure 2.13). The CSO projections see 
life expectancy in Ireland rising over the next 30 
years towards the highest levels seen in Europe to-
day.13 However, a further rise can be expected in 
the best European figures from to-day's levels 
leaving Ireland's relative position more-or-less 
unchanged. 
Figure 2.10: Life Expectancy at Birth, 1991 
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In spite of the improvement in life expectancy the 
overall number of people aged over 65 will grow 
relatively slowly over tl1e next 15 ye&s because of 
the continued impact on the population profile of 
the emigration of the 1950s. Figure 2.13 shows our 
forecast for the change in the numbers aged over 
65 and aged over 80 between 1996 and 2011. 
While rising more rapidly than the population as a 
13 To date in the 1990s, the assumption of rising life expectancy is 
confinned by the pattern of the death rate. 
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whole, the change in numbers will still leave the 
old-age dependency ratio in 2011 very low by EU 
standards. 
Figure 2.12: Female Life Expectancy 
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Figure 2.13: Change in Numbers over 65 
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Migration 
lncon-ect migration a~sumptions have been the 
single most important source of en-or in previous 
demographic projections for Ireland. The history of 
large-scale emigration in Ireland goes back to the 
18th century, but wide fluctuations in migration 
rates have occurred over that period and migration 
patterns have become even more unpredictable in 
recent decades. While other European countries 
also experienced extensive net emigration up to the 
1930s (e.g. Norway), Ireland has been exceptional 
in Western Europe in experiencing substantial net 
emigration in the post-war era. In the 1950s 
emigration peaked with up to a third of the cohort 
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of potential labour market entrants leaving for 
employment elsewhere. The economic recovery of 
the 1960s saw a fall off in emigration and in the 
early 1970s the flow waB reversed (Figure 2.14) a~ 
many of those who left in the 1950s returned. 
However, there waB a continuing, though much 
reduced, outt1ow of those entering the labour 
market which was masked by the inflow of 
returned emigrants. 
Figure 2.14: Net Emigration 
With the deterioration in economic circumstances 
in the 1980s there was a return to significant net 
emigration. This emigration reached a peak in the 
late 1980s. However, the exceptional performance 
of the Irish economy in the 1990s has seen the 
pattern of net emigration once again reversed to be 
replaced by a small level of net immigration in the 
intercensal period 1991-96. 
Economic research has shown that net migration 
from Ireland is sensitive, not only to labour market 
circumstances in Ireland, but also to labour market 
circumstances in the markets where migrants 
traditionally go. 14 In the post-war years tl1is has 
14 Walsh, B., 1974, "Expectations, Information and Human 
Migration: Specifying an Econometric Model of Irish Migration", 
Journal of Regional Science, Vol. 14. Honohan, P., 1992, "The 
Link Between Irish and UK Unemployment", Quarterly Economic 
Commentary, Spring, Dublin: Tbe Economic and Social Research 
Institute. 
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been predominantly the UK. The models estimated 
on the post-war data suggested that migration has 
tended to he outwards where the Irish 
unemployment is more than 4 percentage points 
above the level in the UK and inwards where it 
falls below that level. The peak in emigration in 
the late 1980s was driven as much by the improved 
labour market circumstances in the UK as by the 
problems on the domestic labour market. Many of 
those who left already had jobs in Ireland but they 
felt their employment prospects would be better in 
the UK. 
However, this traditional model has not proved a 
very good guide to migration patterns in recent 
ye;u-s. While in the latest version of this model 
sep,mtte migration equations for men and women 
st.ill fit the data for tl1e last 20 years (witl1 the 
equilibrium difference between tJ1e Irish and the 
UK unemployment rates still remaining at 4 per 
cent for both women and men) there is no certainty 
that it will hold good in the future in the face of 
major changes in the Irish labour force. 
In the late 1960s between 10 per cent and 15 per 
cent of the cohort in their late teens or 20s left 
(Figure 2.15). 15 The proportion was somewhat 
higher for those with third level education but the 
difference in propensity to emigrate across the 
different levels of educational attainment was 
relatively small. By contrast, in the late 1980s up to 
20 per cent of those with tl1ird level education 
appear to have emigrated while under 5 per cent of 
those aged 15 to 29 with only primary education 
left. Figure 2.16 illustrates this contrast between 
the late 1960s and the late 1980s: in the late 1960s 
"These figures are, pe1forcc, estimates based on some interpolation 
of past Census data. 
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two-thirds of emigrants had at most an 
Intermediate Certificate level of education whereas 
in the late 1980s they accounted for under 20 per 
cent of emigrants and about a third of emigrants 
had a third level education. 
Figure 2.15: Proportion of 15-29 Cohort 
Emigrating by Education Achieved 
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Figure 2.16: Education of Emigrants aged 
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Figure 2.17: Females who have Resided 
Abroad 
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Figure 2.18: Comparative Unemployment 
Rates by Educational Attainment, 1994 
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However, while the better educated have more 
recently accounted for a disproportionate share of 
emigrants there is evidence that a much higher 
proportion of such emigrants subsequently return to 
Ireland. Figure 2.17 shows the proportion of men 
and women in 1991 who had previously lived 
abroad for at least a year. This shows that for the 
adult population as a whole over 10 per cent of 
men and women had lived abroad and had 
returned. However, for those with a third level 
education aged 40 and over, 30 per cent had such 
experience. This very high rate of return for the 
best educated emigrants is important in dispelling 
fears of a "brain drain". As discussed in Chapter 3, 
in returning these former emigrants bring with 
them enhanced skills and experience. 
Looking to tl1e future it seems likely tlrnt the model 
or behaviour which explained migration in tl1e past 
will prove less reliable. Figure 2.18 shows that in 
] 994 the rate of unemployment for those with no 
educational qualifications was substantially higher 
in Ireland tlrnn in the UK. It would appear that for 
this group the 4 percentage point gap between tl1e 
UK and Irish unemployment rates is no longer 
relevant. This partly reflects tl1e reversal in the 
1980s of tl1e position in previous decades when the 
UK welfare system was more generous tlrnn tl1e 
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Irish. 16 Figure 2.18 also shows that there was no 
difference in the low unemployment rates for 
graduates in the UK and Ireland in tl1at year. This 
would suggest that for tl10se with a good education 
they will expect similar labour market prospects in 
Ireland to those available elsewhere in the EU. For 
those with very limited education they have become 
increasingly dependent on the Irish welfare system 
and external labour market development~ are 
increasingly irrelevant to them. 
As discussed later, in the light of the changing 
pattern of educational attainment it seems likely 
that the equilibrium gap between the Irish and the 
UK unemployment rates will narrow. However, 
given the prospective rate of growth in employment 
in Ireland (Chapter 6) it seems likely that tl1is trend 
will still be consistent with zero net migration out 
to 2005. Thereafter, if economic growth were to 
continue above tl1e rate experienced elsewhere in 
the EU (as in the Central Forecast) tl1ere could he 
significant net immigration of around 7,000 a year 
to 2010. 
However, as discussed later in Chapter 6, 
considerable uncertainty surrounds this forecast. 
The rapid rate of growth in Ireland and the 
character of some of the employment being 
generated now seems to attract in a greater number 
of immigrants, some not of an Irish background. A 
rise in unskilled wage rates might make 
employment in Ireland attractive to some 
categories of unskilled workers elsewhere in the 
EU while still not being sufficient to make 
employment worthwhile for those eligible for Irish 
16 Callan, T. and H. Sutherland, 1997, "Income Supports in Ireland 
and the UK", in T. Callan (ed.) Income Support and Work 
Incentives: Ireland and the UK. Policy Research Se1ies No. 30. 
Dublin: The Economic and Social Research Institute. 
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welfare rates. This might stimulate migration into 
Ireland of marginal workers from other EU 
countries, such as those originating in poorer, non-
EU countries who do not have full EU citizenship 
rights. The Irish welfare system may also prove 
attractive in t11e future for immigrants who can 
qualify for assistance. 
As discussed in Chapter 6, while our Central 
Forecast envisages some net immigration after 
2005, it may well be t11e case that the slow-down in 
t11e growth in labour supply will result in rising 
labour costs and a related slow-down in the growth 
in output and employment. This could obviate the 
need for such net immigration. 
As we move into the next decade, the stock of Irish 
emigrants abroad, which received a considerable 
boost in t11e late 1980s, will be ageing and they 
may by then have settled permanently in their new 
country of residence. This could also result in a 
drying up of returned emigrants. Whether they 
would he replaced by immigrants of similar skills 
who are not of Irish origin remains doubtful. 
Clearly, a range of issues concerning the factors 
driving migration remain to be researched. Until 
they are, the forecast for migration will remain t11e 
single most uncertain aspect of our demographic 
projections. 
Population 
The assumptions set out above provide the 
backdrop to our forecast for t11e population out to 
2011 described in Table 2.3. This Central Forecast 
sees the population rising to 3.89 million in 2011. 
While this is within t11e range foreseen in t11e 
CSO's projections published 2 years ago, the 
structure of t11e population is rather different. The 
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biggest single difference between these figures and 
the CSO forecasts arises from the changed 
assumptions on migration. The CSO figures 
assumed a lower bound for migration of 7,500 out 
to 2006 where we are assuming zero net migration 
over the period. 
Figure 2.19 shows how t11e population structure 
will look in 2011. The assumption on migration is 
that there is a continued constant immigration of 
children (with their parents) over the period. These 
would be families formed abroad by former 
emigrants from an earlier period. While this has 
been an important feature of Irish migration 
experience in t11e past, it could prove different in 
the next decade as the stock of former emigrants 
still resident abroad falls. This assumption explains 
the fact that, even with a substantial fall in fertility 
and a reduction in the number of birt11s, the 
numbers of children in Ireland may not show as 
rapid a decline as might otherwise have been 
expected. 
The effects of the "baby boom" of the 1970s can be 
seen in the cohort which will be aged 30 to 39 in 
2011 (Figure 2.19). This cohort is currently aged 
15 to 24 and it has benefited from tl1e high birth 
rate of the 1970s and t11e low rate of emigration of 
families in the intervening years. The size of this 
cohort relative to all others will continue to 
influence the Irish population profile for decades to 
come. 
The very rapid fall off in the population aged over 
70 in 2011 (currently aged over 55) reflects not 
only expected mortality in t11e intervening years but 
more importantly t11e continuing effects of t11e very 
high level of emigration in the 1950s. This means 
that t11e number of people in the retired age groups 
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( over 65) will remain relatively low for another 20 
years. 
Table 2.3: Poeulation Structure by Age 
Age 1991 1996 2001 2006 2011 
<15 941 864 803 766 746 
15-24 602 635 624 569 532 
25-44 959 1002 1055 1105 1143 
45-64 622 705 799 897 969 
>65 403 415 424 445 495 
Total 3526 3621 3704 3782 3886 
Figure 2.19: Population Structure by Age, 
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2.4 Economic Implications 
Labour Force Participation 
The most important economic manifestation of 
these demographic changes will be their effect on 
the potential labour force in Ireland. The growth in 
the potential labour force in the future will be 
affected by demographic change through three 
different channels: natural increase; migration; and 
changes in participation, especially by women. We 
have already considered migration so here we will 
concentrate on natural increase and on factors 
affecting labour force participation. 
Participation by married women in the labour 
force, as measured in conventional statistics in 
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Ireland, has traditionally been very low by 
European standards but has risen steadily in recent 
years. 17 Underlying the change in behaviour has 
been the change in the educational composition of 
the population and of the female population in 
particular. As discussed earlier, the bulk of women 
in the older age groups had only primary or limited 
secondary education. However, among those in 
their late 20s today, the vast majority have at least 
completed secondary education and for the cohort 
leaving school this year the proportion entering 
third level education may be as high as 50 per cent. 
It has been established for Ireland that the labour 
market18 return to education has been high. 19 As a 
result, as women's educational attainment has risen 
so too has tl1eir potential financial gains from 
participating in the labour force. Jn addition, 
higher levels of education may have helped 
produce a cultural change where women have 
become more disposed to remain in the labour 
force, or to return to it as their children grow older. 
Labour force participation by women with only 
primary education is very low and has shown 
relatively little change since 1988. The biggest 
change has occurred in participation rates for 
women with education to Leaving Certificate level 
(Figure 2.20). The increase in participation rates is 
17There are indications, however, that those statistics exaggerate 
the increase which has occurred in married women's labour force 
participation since the 1960s, principally because they seriously 
understate the level of such pmticipation in the earlier portion of 
that period (Fahey, T., 1992. "Review Article", The Economic 
and Social Review, Vol. 24, No. 2; Fahey, T., 1990. "Measuring 
the Female Labour Supply: Conceptual and Procedural Problems 
in Irish Official Statistics", The Economic and Social Review Vol. 
21, No. 2). 
18The return to the individual rather than the social rate of return. It 
does not take account of the wider costs and benefits to society. 
19 BmTett, A., T. Callan and B. Nolan, 1997, "The Earnings 
Distribution and Returns to Education in Ireland, 1987-1994". 
Dublin: Economic and The Social Research Institute, mimeo. 
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especially high (20 percentage points) for those in 
Lheir 30s and 40s. It is clear that a significant 
number of women in this category who had 
dropped out of work at an earlier stage in their 
CcU'eer returned to t11e labour force between 1988 
and 1994. 
Figure 2.20: Female Labour-Force 
Participation by Education Level 
Completed - Leaving Certificate 
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Figure 2.21: Female Labour-Force 
Participation by Education Level 
Completed - Third Level 
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Figure 2.22: Labour-Force Participation of 
Women Aged 29-34 
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For women with third level education (Figure 2.21) 
Lhe participation rate was already high in 1988. For 
married women in this category under the age of 
40, 60 per cent were already in Lhe labour force in 
1988. The biggest change has occurred among 
women with higher education in their early 40s. 
Between 1988 and 1994 the participation rate for 
this group rose by around 20 percentage points 
indicating that a significant number of such 
women, who had been out of the labour force in 
1988, had returned to it by 1994. 
The compound effects of differences in 
participation rates by education combined with the 
increase in the average educational attainment of 
the female population accounts for about a third of 
Lhe rise in female participation since the early 
1980s.20 However, Lhere remains a major growth in 
participation which is not accounted for by 
educational change, especially for those women 
who have completed second level education. 
Studies of the issue of female labour force 
participation show a range of other factors, 
including potential earnings and the social welfare 
system, have contributed to Lhe change in 
participation rates since 197I.21 
In the past marriage played an important pmt in 
determining female participation - participation 
rates were much higher for single than for married 
women. However, between 1981 and the early 
1990s, this pattern changed radically in that t11e 
2
°Fahey and Fitz Gerald, 1997, op. cit. 
21 Callan, T. and B. Farrell, 1991. Women's Participation in the 
lri,rh Labour Market. Dublin: National Economic and Social 
Council. Callan T. and A. Wrenn, 1994, Male-Female Wage 
Differentials: Analysis and Policy frsues, General Research 
Series, Paper No. 163. Dublin: The Economic and Social Research 
Institute. Walsh, B.,1993, "Labour Poree Participation and the 
Growth of Women's Employment, Ireland 1971-1991", The 
Economic and Social Review, Vol. 24, No. 3. 
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presence of children rather than marriage became 
the crucial factor affecting participation. As shown 
in Figure 2.22, by 1992 the participation rates for 
those without children, whether married or single, 
was almost identical, while the participation rate 
for single women with children (30 per cent) was 
below that of married women with children (40 per 
cent). [n other words, mothers had much lower 
participation rates than women who had no 
children, irrespective of marital status. 
Figure 2.23: Projected Change in Labour 
Force 1997-2011 
35 Thousands 
30 
25 
20 
15 
10 
5 
0 
1997 2000 2003 2006 2009 
!•Natural Increase oFemale Part1c1pat1on ETilmm1grat1on1 
100 
90 
80 
70 
60 
Figure 2.24: Male Labour-Force 
Participation by Education Level 
Completed - Primary 
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Over the next 15 years the rise in female 
participation will account for over a quarter of the 
increase in labour supply (Figure 2.23). This 
increase is in addition to the natural increase in the 
female labour supply at existing participation rates 
and, as discussed in Chapter 3, it is an important 
factor in Ireland's exceptional rate of growth. 
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For males, as with females, there has been a slow 
reduction in the participation rate below the age of 
25, primarily because of rising participation in 
education. There is also a long-term decline in the 
participation rate of males aged 55 and over. This 
decline can be observed among males across all 
levels of educational attainment, though it is most 
marked for males with only a primary education 
(Figure 2.24). This trend towards earlier retirement 
can be observed in other European countries. In the 
case of Ireland an additional factor contributing to 
this trend JS the declining importance of 
agriculture; traditionally farmers who are owner 
occupiers have remained active on their farms later 
than would be the case for employees working in 
other sectors of the economy. 
As shown in Figure 2.24, over the period 1988 to 
1994 there has been a significant reduction in 
labour force participation by those aged 25 to 40 
with only a primary education. For all other 
categories of males in t11at age group, including 
those with only an Intermediate Certificate, there 
was little change in participation over tl1at period. 
This fall in participation coincides with an increase 
in the unemployment rate across all age groups for 
males with only a primary education. This suggests 
that males in this category may have faced a 
growing problem of discouragement which is 
reflected in greater detachment from the labour 
force. 
The natural increase in tl1e labour supply in Ireland 
will remain high over the next decade (Figure 
2.25) reflecting the very high birth rate of the 
1970s. While the growtl1 in tl1e labour force was 
halted in the late 1980s by the rise in emigration 
this factor is not expected to play a major role in 
the period to 2005. However, from the middle of 
THE EDUCATIONAL REVOLUTION AND DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGE 
the next decade the natural increase will fall off 
rapidly as t11e effects of t11e down-turn in the birth 
rate in the early 1980s feeds through, and in our 
Central Forecast we assume that there will be 
some net immigration helping maintain labour 
force growth at over 1 per cent a year till 2010 
(Figure 2.25). 
Figure 2.25: Annual Average Percentage 
Change in the Labour Force 
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Figure 2.26: Female Unemployment by 
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In the next chapter we consider the importance of 
rising human capital in explaining t11e current 
buoyancy of the Irish economy through increasing 
the output and earnings of the labour force. 
However, it will also affect the economy tJ1rough 
increasing the potential employability of new 
labour market entrants. There is extensive evidence 
that educational attainment has a major effect on 
an individual's prospects on the labour market. 
Since the early 1980s young labour-market entrants 
with a minimal level of education have fared very 
poorly on the labour market. Figures 2.26 and 2.27 
show the unemployment rates in 1994 for men and 
women in their 20s with different levels of 
education. These figures show a very clear pattern 
with those with third level education showing low 
levels of unemployment. In the 1980s t11e lower 
levels of unemployment for tJ10se with better levels 
of education were partly attained through 
emigration. Young labour-market entrants with a 
good education moved to the UK or elsewhere if 
they could not get employment in Ireland which 
iliey deemed appropriate to their skills. In ilie 
1990s tl1e improved labour market situation has 
seen tl1em obtaining satisfactory employment in 
Ireland. 
As discussed at tl1e beginning of tl1is chapter, over 
the next 15 years iliere will be a major change in 
the average educational attainment of ilie 
population as a whole and of the labour force in 
particular. This will mean that the bulk of new 
labour market entrants will have at least a Leaving 
Certificate. Past experience suggests that such 
labour market entrants will not remain unemployed 
in Ireland. They will either obtain employment in 
Ireland or in other parts of the EU. In our Central 
Forecast, discussed later, we see them obtaining 
satisfactory employment in Ireland. 
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ll' the education-specific unemployment rates for 
19% were applied to the changing educational 
composition of the labour force, this would suggest 
that the changing educational attainment of the 
population alone would reduce the average 
unemployment rate by 0.3 percentage points a year, 
or 3 percentage points between 1996 and 2006. 
Obviously, many other factors will prove important 
in detennining the ultimate change in the 
unemployment rate over that period, but this 
provides a crude illustration of the potential impact 
or rising educational attainment on the 
unemployment rate. 
Dependency 
In exmnining the implications of population 
change for the economy, the starting assumption is 
that all human populations consist of some who are 
dependent, in that they cannot produce sufficient 
output to support tl1emselves, and others who not 
only produce enough to support themselves but 
also, lo varying degrees, generate a surplus which, 
in principle at least, is capable of meeting tl1e 
needs of tl1ose who are dependent. The composition 
and relative size of tl1e dependent and productive 
segments of tl1e population determine its 
dependency level. Thus defined, this can be 
quantified in vm·ious ways, most simply by 
establishing tl1e numerical balance which exists 
between the dependent and productive population 
segments - how many dependants there are per 
producer or per person employed. We refer to this 
as economic dependency. However, it is also useful 
lo consider what we refer to as age dependency, 
where the numbers of children and tl1e elderly are 
expressed as a ratio of the numbers of adults. 
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The division of populations into dependent and 
productive segments is, of course, a simplification. 
Dependence and productivity are two ends of a 
continuum rather than two sides of a clearly 
evident boundary. At one end of this continuum are 
the highly productive workers who generate output 
far beyond tl1eir own needs, in the centre are those 
who produce enough to support themselves but no 
otl1ers, and at tl1e otl1er end are those (such as 
small children or extremely dependent elderly) who 
are completely unable to support themselves. 
Furthermore, tl1e continuum has breadth as well as 
lengtl1: at each point along the way, one will find 
different kinds of production or dependence, 
tl1ough it may be difficult to grade tl1em in a 
consistent manner. Thus, while a year-old infant 
and a 75 year old witl1 Alzheimer's disease may be 
both extremely dependent, their support needs may 
be so different as to make it difficult to say how 
similar or different tl1eir dependency levels are. 
Likewise, a housewife looking after a family and 
the average industrial worker are both productive. 
However, they differ greatly in tl1e nature, and 
possibly in the level, of tl1eir productivity and it 
would be difficult to establish fully how similar or 
how different their productivity is. 
Figure 2.28: Age Dependency Ratio 1960-
2010 
50 % of total 
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Figure 2.29: Economic Dependency 
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Nevertheless, despite the simplification involved in 
dividing the populations into the dependent and the 
productive, the underlying idea has a strong 
appeal, and it is important to an understanding of 
the recent economic history of Ireland. The 
measures which result, though crude, can be 
helpful in thinking about the welfare implications 
of demographic trends. 
Much of the concern about a demographic "crisis" 
in western countries has arisen from worsening 
dependency trends. Ireland is in the unusual 
position that its dependency levels are improving 
and are likely to be lower in 30 years time than 
they were at various points in the last 30 years. The 
proportion of young people in the population, 
which remained fairly constant between 1960 and 
the mid-1980s beg,m to fall rapidly in the last 10 
years, and it will continue to fall over the coming 
15 years (Figure 2.28). The proportion of elderly in 
ti1e population, which remained very stable since 
1960, will not show a major change till after 2010. 
When taken together, !11ese trends mean that, 
having had a high percentage of !11e population in 
the inactive age groups for 30 years, this position is 
now changing quite rapidly in a favourable 
direction. 
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Since the 1960s, Ireland has had economic 
dependency levels (defined as ti1e numbers not 
working in the population compared to the 
numbers actually in paid employment) that were 
extraordinarily high by the standards of other 
western countries (Figure 2.29). In the early part of 
that period, Ireland's high dependency was caused 
mainly by the contraction in the active population 
as a result of young-adult emigration in the 1950s, 
coupled with a moderately high fertility rate and an 
elderly population that was large by the standards 
of the time. By the 1980s, the active population had 
recovered in size (partly because of return 
migration mnong those who had left in earlier 
decades), even ti1ough the child population had 
also grown rapidly. However, apart from a brief 
favourable period in the 1970s, economic 
dependency remained exceptionally high because 
of a combination of high unemployment and low 
labour force participation rates within the 
population in the active ages. 
The mid-1980s witnessed peak levels of economic 
dependency. At that time, a small work force was 
supporting a very large child population, a very 
large number of unemployed and a reasonably 
large elderly population. The number of women in 
home duties was also very large. The majority of 
women in home duties should be counted as 
economically productive rati1er tiian dependent and 
as important providers of support within fmnilies. 
However, as an informal economic activity, 
housework is untaxed and does not contribute 
directly to public revenues. In addition, it is likely 
that a certain proportion of women in home duties 
were underemployed or "hidden" unemployed. 
The trend in economic dependency began to tum in 
a positive direction in the mid to late 1980s. The 
MEDIUM-TERM REVIEW: 1997-2003 
numbers in the dependent age groups began to fall 
and, at tl1c same time, the numbers at work began 
to grow, so that the dependency balance improved 
considerably. This positive trend is likely to 
continue, especially over the next 10 to 15 years, so 
that economic dependency will be markedly lower 
in tl1e next decade than at any time since the 
1960s. At the peak of economic dependency in the 
mid-1980s, there were nearly 230 dependants for 
every 100 workers. According to the Central 
Forecast, this ratio will have fallen to 125 
dependants per 100 workers by the year 2010, well 
below the current EU average. Even though a 
certain degree of population ageing is likely to 
have occurred over that period, labour force growth 
will also mean a slight decline in ilie number of 
elderly dependants per 100 workers from 35 in 
1986 to 28 in 2010. 
The combination of unfavourable conditions which 
created the extreme dependency levels of ilie 1960s 
through to the 1980s are now passing away and are 
unlikely to recur in as extreme a form at any point 
over tl1e next tl1ree decades. Ireland is thus now 
moving into a new era of easing dependency 
burdens, no matter how those dependency burdens 
are defined or measured. On the basis of the 
forecasts of the age-structure of the population used 
in the present study, the improving trend in 
dependency in Ireland may last only up to the 
middle or end of the next decade and then may 
begin to reverse. However, even allowing for this 
turnaround, dependency levels in 30 years time are 
likely to he lower than those being experienced at 
present and are likely to be considerably below 
those of the recent past. This again reinforces the 
view tlrnt even in the long term, the outlook as far 
as dependency is concerned is a great deal more 
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favourable than the record has been over recent 
decades. 
Many western countries are now becoming worried 
about the dependency levels they may experience in 
the future as a result of demographic trends. In an 
Irish context, the point to note about such concerns 
is that they are much more a matter of the past 
railier tlrnn of the future. Ireland in the 1980s has 
already experienced a dependency scenario which 
was more extreme ilian that which other countries 
fear may now lie before them. It would require an 
unlikely combination of high unemployment, 
resurgent fertility and continuing rapid growth in 
the elderly population to raise economic 
dependency levels in other European countries to 
the level experienced in Ireland in the mid-1980s. 
If those countries wish to imagine what high 
dependency looks like and what effects it might 
have on living standards, public expenditure and so 
on, they need look no further than Ireland in the 
1980s for an illustration. The improvement in 
Ireland's dependency levels which is now emerging 
serves simply to bring Ireland back into line with 
the dependency levels which have been common in 
other countries in the recent past, and in that sense 
there is nothing unusual in those levels. However, 
the timing of Ireland's downward movement in 
dependency is exceptional since it coincides with a 
period of general upward movement in dependency 
in other countries. Thus, it is tl1e direction of 
present trends in dependency in Ireland, rather 
than the level of dependency, which is distinctive 
by comparison with other countries. 
Household Formation 
The demographic forecasts described above have 
important implications for the demand for housing 
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over Lhe next 15 years. The rapid rise in the 
number of young adults with good labour market 
expectations will put continuing pressure on the 
housing market. The extent to which this pressure 
results in increased output or increased prices will 
of course depend on wider economic 
circumstances. 
Figure 2.30: Household Formation and 
House Completions 
35 Thousands, Annual 
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In considering tl1e impact of changing 
circumstances on tl1e housing market it is useful to 
review past experience. Figure 2.30 shows the 
breakdown of house completions into 3 categories: 
Lhe change due to pure demographic factors -
(rising numbers of adults); tl1e change due to rising 
headship (tl1e proportion of each age group who are 
heads of households); and other factors, including 
replacement dwellings and second dwellings.22 In 
22 
'The change in 1he numbers of households in 1he past is obtained 
from the Census. 'The breakdown into change in headship and 
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the 1970s the falling age at marriage and tile rise 
in the numbers in the young-adult age groups (due 
to tile reversal of emigration) meant tllat tllere was 
a big increase in housing demand compared to the 
1960s. Part of tllis demand was due to pure 
demographic effects - tile increase in tile numbers 
of adults. However, there was also an increase in 
the proportion of young adults setting up tlleir own 
homes - partly reflected in the declining age at 
marriage in tile 1960s and 1970s. The improved 
economic circumstances contributed indirectly to 
tile rise in demand tllrough tile reversal of 
emigration, but also directly by increasing the 
number of young adults who could afford to set up 
tlleir own households. 
Emigration in the second half of tl1e 1980s had a 
dampening effect on housing demand witl1 some 
fall in demographic pressure. The unfavourable 
economic climate also meant that fewer young 
adults were willing or able to set up separate 
households at a young age. The rise in headship 
rates slowed as a result. Demand for new housing 
for oilier reasons (apart from the increase in 
household numbers) continued to be high. 
The 1990s has ushered in a new era where tile 
underlying demographic trends mean tliat tllere is a 
rapid increase in tile number of young adults, 
leading to an increase in the overall adult 
population (Table 2.3). In forecasting the future it 
is not sufficient tllough to consider demographic 
factors alone. Changing tastes and rising living 
standards will also have an impact. Figure 2.33 
shows tl1e average number of adults per household 
demographic factors is done on the basis of the information given 
in the Census on the age and sex of 1he individuals reporting 
themselves as head of household. 
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in a number of EU countries including Ireland. As 
can be seen from this Figure, Ireland still has a 
relatively large number of adults per household. In 
looking to the next decade we are assuming that 
headship rates (the proportion of adults in each age 
Table 2.4: Forecast Stock of Households 
Year 
[971 
[981 
[986 
1991 
1996 
2001 
2006 
201 l 
Population 
aged 20 or 
over (OOOs) 
1779 
2073 
2185 
2250 
2412 
2579 
2727 
2869 
Number of Adults per 
Households Household 
(OOOs) 
726 2.45 
911 2.28 
976 2.24 
1029 2.19 
1113 2.17 
1242 2.08 
1350 2.02 
1451 1.98 
Figure 2.32: Average Number of Children 
per Household 
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cohort who m·e heads of household) will rise so as 
to reduce the average number of adults per 
household to just over 2. This would bring 
household size in Ireland almost into line with the 
current EU average, though well below the current 
situation in the country with the largest 
households, Spain. 
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When all these demographic factors are taken into 
account and assuming tlrnt the demand for housing 
for replacement and other reasons continues to run 
at roughly the level experienced in t11e early 1990s, 
t11ere is likely to be a need for around 32,000 new 
dwellings a year over the rest of t11e decade (Figure 
2.30 and Table 2.5) falling to around 28,000 a yem· 
in the first half of t11e next decade. 
The growt11 in population on its own will 
necessitate 16,000 new dwellings a year to 2001 
and 17,000 a year in t11e following decade. Based 
on current developments in the housing market, 
our assumptions about rising headship add 10,000 
new households a year to 2001. Thereafter, as the 
economy begins to slow down, we assume that t11e 
rate of increase in headship falls off. Obviously, 
these assumptions about headship rates are 
uncertain and they appear to have been affected by 
economic conditions in t11e past. It is quite possible 
tlrnt they could prove rat11er different tlrnn we have 
anticipated - eit11er higher or lower in the face of 
changing economic conditions. If our assumptions 
on emigration were to prove wrong and there was 
to be net immigration, for example, it would add 
significantly to demand for dwellings over the rest 
of the decade. 
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The estimate of the number of dwellings for 
replacement or other reasons is particularly 
uncertain. The housing stock is unusually new by 
European standards which should make the need 
for replacement relatively low. To this must be 
added the demand for second homes and the need 
for additional dwellings to cater for movement of 
population within the country. 
Table 2.5: Contribution to Demand for 
Dwellings 
Average Annual Number of Dwellings due to: 
Demog. Change in Replace, Total 
Change Headship etc. 
1971-8] 10900 7600 5900 24400 
[981-86 9400 3800 13000 26200 
1986-9 l 7900 2700 8300 18900 
1991-96 13000 6800 4400 24200 
1996-0] 16000 10000 5000 31000 
2001-06 17000 5000 5000 27000 
2006-10 18000 2000 5000 25000 
Because of the rapid rate of population growth by 
EU standmds and the peculiar structure of the 
population (a high proportion of teenagers and 
young adults), Ireland faces a continuing need to 
devote a substantial volume of resources to 
investment in new dwellings. For many other 
Northern European countries with more stable 
population structures the number of dwellings 
becoming available from deaths go close to 
meeting the housing needs of the younger 
generation. This allocation of national resources 
has a corollary in terms of a reduced level of 
national consumption necessmy to make available 
tl1e necessary resources. 
The demographic changes under way mean that the 
demand for different types of dwellings may 
change over the next decade. In particular, the 
falling number of children per household (Figure 
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2.32) and the rising number of single person and 
single parent households will result in a growing 
demand for smaller dwellings. Whereas, in the 
past, 3 bed-roomed suburban dwellings represented 
the first dwelling of new households in urban 
areas, it is possible that smaller dwellings may be 
sought in future. However, the floor space per 
person may continue to increase with rising 
incomes, as it has in the past, though rising real 
prices could modify this trend. With a rise in the 
number of childless households there may also be a 
movement towards locating closer to urban centres. 
This possible change in the pattern of demand is, 
of course, reinforced by the fiscal incentives 
resulting in a substantial increase in the number of 
"town-houses" and apartments currently being 
built. 
2.5 Conclusion 
In tl1e first 60 years of tl1e century, because of tl1e 
combined effects of mortality and emigration, large 
shares of each birth cohort were lost to tl1e 
population in childhood or early adultl10od. As a 
result, population reproduction was usually well 
below replacement levels. Below-replacement 
fertility rates may well be a new feature of 
population patterns in Ireland and in western 
countries as a whole, but a more general failure to 
replace population was a persistent characteristic of 
Irish population performance between 1850 and 
1960. 
The advent of population growth in Ireland since 
the 1960s occurs against this background of longer-
term decline. That recovery has by no means 
eliminated the consequences of tl1e earlier 
experience, but it has introduced a new dynamic 
into Irish population structures. While this new 
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dynamic in some ways brings Ireland closer into 
line with the experience of other countries, in other 
ways its peculiar timing and nature serves to keep 
Ireland on a distinctive trajectory. Ireland's "baby 
boom" in the 1970s occurred considerably later 
tlrnn tl1e baby boom of the late 1940s or 1950s in 
most other western countries.23 The baby boom 
generation in Ireland, therefore, is now in late 
adolescence and early adulthood rather than middle 
age - it is about 30 years younger than the baby 
boom generation of North America or Western 
Europe. Fertility has fallen sharply since the early 
1980s, so that the generation now in childhood, 
which will be reaching t11e brink of adulthood in 
about 15 years time, is likely to be small in 
numbers. Even then, however, t11e preceding 
generation the baby boom generation of the 
1970s and early 1980s - will still be in t11eir prime 
yecu-s (30s and 40s) so tlrnt t11e overall population 
profile in the early decades of t11e next century will 
still be quite vigorous. Furthermore, the 
disappearance of emigration means that fewer 
children will not necessarily translate into fewer 
adults: larger numbers of today's children are 
likely to find a place as adults in Ireland than was 
the case for most of t11e earlier cohorts of children 
in t11e present century. 
Together, these factors mean that, in certain basic 
ways, Irish population structure is now in an 
usually favourable condition, particularly by 
comparison with its own past. Furthermore, the 
favourable features in Irish demographic patterns 
will come to full fruition only over the next three 
decades so tlrnt the direction of present trends is 
more favourable than in other western countries. 
23 
·me birth-rate also rose in Irehmd in the i1mnediate post-war 
years. 
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Because of the recent fall in the fertility rate, the 
situation may become less favourable as the bulk of 
the baby-boom generation enters old age from the 
mid-2020s onwards. However, this eventuality is 
three or four decades down the road, and even then 
it may be less burdensome in its impact than the 
demographic problems of the recent past. 
An important feature of the recent population 
experience is the rising educational attainment of 
the adult population. This change is of necessity 
occurring many years after the policy changes were 
made which have brought it about. The changing 
education of the adult population is affecting 
demographic behaviour in a number of different 
ways: it contributes to the falling marriage rate and 
the decline in fertility as well as intluencing the 
pattern of migration. It will continue to alter 
demographic behaviour over at least t11e next 
decade and a half. 
Rising participation in education is having its 
sharpest impact on economic behaviour the 
participation rate, exposure to unemployment and 
ultimately the dependency ratio. The rise in labour 
force participation by women is directly affected by 
rising educational attainment. The wider cultural 
factors, which are of prime importance in 
determining the future course of participation rates, 
are themselves indirectly affected by the changing 
educational background of the population. In ilie 
next chapter we discuss the direct impact on output 
and productivity of educational change. 
Finally, it should be noted that the long-term 
demographic projections set out in this chapter are 
liable to wide error and should be treated 
circumspectly on that account. It is more fruitful to 
concentrate on the general shape and impact of 
THE EDUCATIONAL REVOLUTION AND DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGE 
eventi, in the short to medium term and not to 
become excessively concerned about· developments 
which may or may not lie beyond distant horizons. 
The fact that many factors appear to be combining 
to promise a fairly benign demographic prospect 
for the future is reassuring, but there can be no 
certainty that the demographic bonus will be paid 
on time and in full measure over the coming 
decades. 
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CHAPTER 3 
Interpreting the Recent Irish Growth Experience 
John Bradley, John Fitz Gerald, Patrick Honohan and Ide Kearney 
3.1 Introduction 
In recent years the Irish economy has recorded a 
growtJ1 rate far above the average performance of 
our main trnding partners. This performance marks 
a significant turnaround from the prolonged 
recession in the early and mid-1980s. Ireland's 
current economic success has attracted much 
discussion mnong both domestic and foreign 
commentators. Understanding tllis success is an 
essential first step to forecasting the future. 
The interpretation of the underlying causes of tl1e 
most recent period of strong growth is complex. 
There is no single theory tl1at stands out clearly 
from a range of possible contributory factors which 
have been put forward by various commentators. 
These factors include tl1e tightening of fiscal policy 
111 the 1980s; tl1e successive national pay 
agreements from 1987 on; the devaluations of 1986 
and 1993; the adherence to a strong currency 
policy from 1987; improvements in 
competitiveness; tl1e increasing level of average 
educational qualifications; and the int1ow of 
structural funds. We argue tlrnt no one of tl1ese 
factors can in isolation explain the economic 
turnaround. But much of what has happened can be 
captured by a relatively simple schematic story 
which titkes account of tl1ese main elements. This 
focuses on tl1e mutually reinforcing effect of 
different domestic forces tlrnt were operating over 
quite different timescales. These have interacted 
favourably witl1 several external forces which can 
likewise be categorised by tl1e timescale over which 
they are operating. 
At tl1e lowest frequency, there is tl1e gradual 
accumulation of human capital and the effects of 
demographic change on the supply of labour, the 
progressive opening up of tl1e economy over tl1e 
past 30 years, culminating in our participation in 
tJ1e single market project in 1992, and the success 
of industrial policy in attracting multinational 
investment. These developments have been 
consistently underpinned by the policies of 
successive governments over tl1e last 40 years. 
Externally tl1ere was a progressive shift (resulting 
from globalization and from technological 
changes) in the premium which tl1e market pays for 
such characteristics as adaptability, problem-
solving and communication skills (in which 
Ireland may be held to be strong) over installed 
plant and size of home market (in which Ireland 
has less to offer). 
At tJ1e middle frequency we identify tl1e 
institutional shake-out caused by tl1e recession of 
the early 1980s, the contribution of tl1c structural 
funds to growth and to the investment planning 
process in tl1e early 1990s, and tl1e confidence-
restoring correction in the public finances in tl1e 
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late 1980s. The positive trends in Irish wage 
competitiveness have been sustained by successive 
pay agreements and social partnership 
arrangements. At the political level an emerging 
consensus in relation to medium-term economic 
policy in the 1980s has helped to consolidate the 
stability of the macroeconomic environment. 
At the highest frequency, factors include the short-
run impact of the achievement of fiscal control and 
maintenance of wage competitiveness, and the 
favourable conjunction of demand growth in our 
major trading partners when this was needed to 
kick-start the recovery. 
In this chapter we identify five distinct medium 
and longer term factors which are central to 
understanding the current success of the Irish 
economy. These broadly correspond to the low and 
middle frequency forces in the previous 
paragraphs. The first factor, demographic change 
and increases in labour market participation, is 
discussed in detail in Chapter 2. The second, 
related, factor, human capital accumulation, is 
discussed in Section 3.4. Both of these factors have 
had profound implications for the labour market 
and the long-run growth potential of the economy. 
The third factor relates to the impact which the 
increased openness of the economy has had on both 
the goods market, through a substantial increase in 
foreign investment, and on the labour market, 
through the migration mechanism. We draw on 
research on the impact of the single market to help 
quantify the more recent gains from increased 
openness. The fourth factor, which is directly 
related to the single market prqject, looks at tl1e 
likely impact of structural funds investment (in 
physical infrastructure and human capital) on the 
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growth potential of the economy. These two factors 
are discussed in Section 3.5. 
Finally in Section 3.6 we discuss the domestic 
policy environment. We identify three factors as 
central to fostering a stable macroeconomic 
environment; the long-term consistency of 
industrial policy, the more fiscal stabilisation and 
the ongoing process of institutional reform. 
Prior to our discussion of these five factors, in 
Section 3.2 we set out some stylised facts on the 
performance of tlle Irish economy over the past 
forty years. Section 3.3 presents a summary of the 
underlying framework used in this chapter to 
interpret the recent success. Sections 3.4 to 3.6 
discuss each of tl1e five factors and Section 3.7 
concludes. 
3.2 Stylised Facts on the Irish 
Economy 
In this section we look at some stylised facts on the 
performance of the Irish economy over the past 40 
years which can be summari5led as follows. 
• The recent strong growth in output has been at 
a higher rate tlian the underlying trend of tl1e 
past three decades. 
• This has occurred in a much more stable 
macroeconomic environment than tl1e previous 
unsustainable high-growth period in 1976-
1981. 
• The current performance is well above tlle 
average growth performance of the OECD 
group of countries. Notably the growth in \Irish 
employment has, since 1986, outperformed \the 
EU and US experience. 
INTERPRETING THE RECENT !RISH GROWTH EXPERIENCE 
• Despite a poor unemployment record between 
197 5 and 1991, on a sector by sector basis our 
employment growth performance exceeded the 
EU average, alt110ugh this was clearly 
insufficient to meet t11e employment needs of 
the economy. 
" In the 1990s employment growt11 has picked up 
strongly and tl1e debate has switched from 
discussions of "jobless growth" to 
"investmentless growtl1", given the low 
recorded rates of investment growth in recent 
years. 
• While t11e growtl1 in output appears to have 
shifted to a higher trend path, the growth in 
disposable income has remained stable. The 
gap between output and income is largely 
accounted for by large profit repatriations in the 
foreign owned multinational sector and 
consistently unfavourable tenns of trade 
movement~ since the mid- l 980s. 
Finally, this section looks at output per capita in 
the economy since 1960. The growth in this 
variable is accounted for by growtl1 in productivity; 
employment; labour force participation; and 
dependency. In contrast to earlier decades each of 
these factors has made a net positive contribution 
to the overall growtl1 in output per capita in the 
1990s. This reflects the central theme of t11is 
chapter, namely tlrnt t11e growtl1 experience in the 
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1990s has been driven by the coincidence of several 
favourable underlying factors ratl1er than any 
single factor in isolation. 
The Record 
The Irish economy has grown strongly in the 
1990s. Table 3 .1 gives annual average growth rates 
over 5-year intervals since 1961 in a selection of 
key performance indicators. Average growili rates 
in GNP and employment in the 1990s have been 
higher than in any of tl1e earlier periods. At the 
same time the growth in the personal consumption 
deflator and in average industrial earnings has 
been ilie lowest of recent decades. Investment, bot11 
in tenns of growth and as a share of GNP, was very 
low in ilie early 1990s by historical standards. 
However there are indications that investment 
picked up strongly in 1996 and tl1is strong growt11 
is likely to continue in 1997. The high public 
finance deficits experienced since tl1e late 1970s 
have also been corrected, the average Exchequer 
Borrowing Requirement as a percentage of GNP in 
the period 1991-1995 was 2 per cent compared 
witl1 an average of 13 per cent in 1981-85, while 
the external accounts (both t11e Balance of Trade 
and the Current Account) moved into strong 
surplus. The unemployment rate has also started to 
edge downwards, altl10ugh it is still substantially 
higher than average rates in the 1960s and 1970s, a 
legacy of t11e prolonged recession in the 1980s and 
the depressed UK labour market in this period. 
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Table 3. 1: Some Indicators of Irish Economic Performance 1961-97* 
Annual Average per cent Growth 1961-65 1965-70 1970-75 1975-80 1980-85 1985-90 1990-95 1995-97 
GNP 3.7 4.1 3.8 4.1 0.4 3.6 4.7 6.0 
Investment 12.4 6.0 3.2 8.2 -3.2 3.8 1.1 8.7 
Employment 0.4 -0.2 0.6 1.5 -1.4 1.0 1.8 3.5 
Average Industrial Earnings 7.1 10.8 18.0 18.8 13.5 4.8 4.1 1.7 
Consumption Deflator 4.5 5.5 13.7 14.6 11.2 3.3 2.4 2.1 
Period Averages 61-65 66-70 71-75 76-80 81-85 86-90 91-95 96-97 
EBR (as per cent of GNP)** 6.4 7.7 9.7 11.4 13.2 5.7 2.0 1.4 
Current A/C (as per cent of GNP) -2.9 -1.9 -3.9 -7.9 -7.9 -0.6 5.7 4.4 
Balance of Trade (as per cent of -7.1 -6.0 -7.5 -11.0 -4.5 6.4 13.0 16.9 
GNP) 
Unemployment Rate*** 4.8 5.1 6.0 8.1 13.6 16.0 15.2 12.2 
Net Migration (OOOs) 14.8 14.2 -11.5 -8.5 8.4 32.0 0.9 -2.8 
*GNP and Balance of Payments data in the table are based on ESA79 definitions for historical comparability. 
** EBR measures switched to calendar year b,L~is in 1974. 
*** Measured on Labour Force basis, not ILO basis. 
Sustainability of Recent Success 
The latter half of t11e 1970s was the last 
comparable period of high growth in Ireland. 
However the growt11 in iliat earlier period was 
unsustainable, driven as it was by massive 
increases in public expenditure and cuts in tax 
rates. The imbalances tlrnt accompanied the growili 
of t11e period 1976-1981 are quite striking when 
compared wit11 the balanced nature of t11e growth 
performance since the mid-1980s (Figure 3.1). 
These two "diamond diagrams" juxtapose four key 
macroeconomic indicators in these two periods of 
high growth. Along t11e vertical axis t11e diagrams 
show annual averages of GNP growth and the 
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Balance of Payments Current Account (BoP) as a 
percentage of nominal GNP. Inflation (growth in 
ilie personal consumption deflator) and the 
Exchequer Borrowing Requirement (EBR) as a 
percentage of nominal GNP arc measured along 
the horizontal axis. The diagrams for both periods 
1976-81 and 1987-96 are set to the same scale for 
comparison purposes. In a stable macroeconomic 
environment t11e BoP, inflation and EBR will tend 
towards the central point at zero in the diagram 
where the two axes intersect: the more stable the 
macroeconomic environment the closer is the 
economy to internal and external balance, with the 
EBR and the BoP indicators close to zero, and t11e 
lower is the inflation rate. 
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Figure 3.1: Growth, Inflation, EBR and BoP as Share of GNP for (a) 1976-81 and (b) 1987-96 -
ESA79 Basis 
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These diagrams highlight tl1e contrast between ilie 
Lwo periods in terms of ilie sustainability of growili. 
Around a fixed central point of strong average 
annual growtl1 in botl1 periods (3.7 per cent 
average annual growili in 1976-81 compared wiili 
4.8 per cent in 1987-96), tl1e iliree oilier 
macroeconomic indicators, inflation, EBR and BoP 
respectively, were clearly unsustainable in ilie 
earlier period, wiili a combination of high internal 
and external deficits and high inflation. This 
insLability gives a bloated diamond shape to tl1e 
1976-81 diagram. By contrast in ilie most recent 
period this bloated diamond has collapsed, GNP 
growtl1 has occurred in conjunction wiili low 
inflation and sustainable internal and external 
balances. 
Ireland's Relative Performance 
The success of Irish economic performance over 
tl1e past 10 years in terms of both output and 
employment stands in marked contrast to tlrnt of 
our major trading partners. While cumulative 
growtl1 in Irish GNP between 1986 and 1995 was 
just over 60 per cent, cumulative growth in the 
OECD group of countries was under 30 per cent. In 
J 1987-19961 
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39 
each of tl1e years since 1986 Irish growili in real 
GDP has exceeded both tl1e EU average and ilie 
OECD average. 1 
Figure 3.2 plots Irish non-agricultural employment 
against the EU-12 average and ilie US. It 
highlights two distinct sub-periods in Irish 
employment growth. Between 1981 and 1986 
employment in Ireland fell by 4 per cent while it 
rose strongly in the US (by 9.5 per cent) and more 
modestly in the EU-12 (1.6 per cent). The Irish 
employment performance was clearly far worse 
than ilie average in this period. From 1986 
onwards, however, Irish employment grew more 
rapidly ilian in the EU-12 or even tl1e US. Between 
1986 and 1996 cumulative Irish employment 
growth was 26 per cent compared with 15 per cent 
for ilie US and just 7 per cent for tl1e EU (1995). 
Even including tlle period of negative employment 
growtll in tlle early 1980s Irish employment growili 
by 1996 has almost equalled tl1e strong US 
perfom1ance. Relative to 1981 Irish employment 
10ECD Economic Outlook, December 1996. 
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had grown by 21 per cent in 1996 compared with 
26.4 per cent in the US. This marks a far stronger 
employment performance than that in the EU-12 
group of countries. 
Figure 3.2: Non-Agricultural Employment in 
Ireland, EU-12 and USA 1981-96 
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Ireland's Relative Manufacturing Employment 
Performance 1975-1991 
Between l 975 and 1991 Irish unemployment rose 
from 7.3 per cent to almost 15 per cent of the 
labour force. Over the same period total 
employment rose by approximately 61,000, far 
below the rate needed to absorb the growth of 
] 77 ,OOO in the labour force. 
Table 3.2, following Marimon and Zilibotti 
(1996),2 shows the employment growth rate by 
sector for Europe (10 EU countries) and Ireland 
(1975-1991). In almost all sectors Irish 
employment growth was faster (or declined more 
slowly) than in Europe. The table also shows the 
number of additional jobs created in each Irish 
sector over and above what would have happened 
at EU sectoral growth rates. 
The net positive employment differential was 
93,000. This superior performance was not uniform 
across sectors. Employment in the metal and 
2 
'' 'Actual' versus 'Vi1tual' Employment in Europe: ls Spain 
Different?", CEPR Discussion Paper No. 1427, July 1996 
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engineering products sector3 alone accounted for 
37 ,OOO of the total differential while professional, 
personal and other services accounted for another 
36,000. By contrast the sector which 
underperformed the most in terms of absolute 
numbers was the Food Processing sector where 
actual employment was 9,000 lower than the 
implicit level. 
What is most striking about these data is the 
divergence in the manufacturing sector's 
employment performance. This serves to highlight 
the uniqueness of the Irish manufacturing sector 
within the EU. Employment in manufacturing in 
Europe declined on average in all the sectors 
identified here. This contrasts sharply with the 
Irish experience. The metal and engineering 
products sector in Ireland recorded average annual 
employment growth of 4 per cent while the average 
European growth was -0.9 per cent per annum. 
Indeed there is only one sector where Irish 
employment declined (by 0.3 per cent per annum) 
while European employment rose (by 0.4 per cent 
per annum), that is in the Transport and 
Communications sector giving an estimated loss of 
8,000 jobs in this sector relative to the average 
European perfonnance. These differences in Irish 
sectoral growth performance partly ret1ects 
structural differences within sectors due to the 
relatively late industrialisation in Ireland. 
3Metals, metal products: mechanical, electrical and instrument 
engineering. This figure is paitially overstated because prior to 
1981 instrument engineering was included under Other 
manufacturing industries in the Labour Force Survey. Since 
employment in this sector in 1981 was approximately 6,000 this 
would more than account for the negative excess employment in 
Other Manufacturing. However it is not clear whether this 
reclassification also occured in the data used by Marimon and 
Zalibotti. 
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While tllis calculaLion indicates a strong 
employment performance relative to our sectoral 
structure in 1975 it is silent on employment needs 
relative to 197 5. Despite strong relative 
employment growth, the Irish unemployment rate 
rose more rapidly than the European average over 
t11e same period. 
Table 3.2: Actual and Implicit Employment in Ireland 1975-1991 
Agriculture 
IndustTy 
Mining and Utilities 
Building & Constrnction 
Manufacturing Industries: 
Food Processing 
Textiles 
Wood Products 
Paper and Printing 
Chemical products 
Non-metallic products 
Metal products 
Other Manufacturing 
Services (net of Public Admin.) 
Distribution 
Financial Services 
Transport & C01mnunications 
Professional, Personal and Other Services 
Total Employment (net of Public Admin.) 
* EU growth rates taken from Marimon and Zalibotti 
From "Jobless Growth" to 
"lnvestmentless Growth"? 
Until recently Irish growth was often referred to as 
a "jobless growth phenomenon".4 Figure 3.3 plots 
average annual growt11 rates in both t11e physical 
capital stock and employment since 1961. Wit11 the 
exception of the deep recession in 1980-85 the 
'
1Sce for example NESC (1993) A Strategy for Competitiveness, 
Growth and Employment, Report No. 96. 
Average Annual Growth per cent li,xtra Irish Jobs 1991 
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growth pattern prior to 1990 was one of strong 
growth in the capital stock and weak or negative 
growth in employment. This pattern was reversed 
in the 1990s when the growth rate in employment 
passed out iliat in the capital stock. Clearly t11e 
capital-labour ratio in the economy has begun to 
fall. Figure 3 .4 shows the average share of 
investment in GNP. In the 1990s t11is has fallen to 
pre-1965 levels. While investment is estimated to 
have picked up strongly in 1996-97, this slow 
growili in physical investment in the 1990s, at a 
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time when output was growing strongly, has 
focused some attention 011 a so-called 
"invcstmcntlcss growth phenomenon". 
Figure 3.3: Growth in Employment and 
Capital Stock 
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Figure 3.4: Investment Share of GNP 
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There me some plausible reasons why investment 
in Ireland has fallen from the extremely high rates 
of the 1970s and emly l 980s. In tl10se years, while 
the level wcL~ high, many of the public investment 
prognunmes were wasteful. In this regard the 
introduction of long-term planning under the CSF 
process in recent years has helped raise the quality 
of public investment. 
The restructuring of the manufacturing sector 
towmd more high-technology process has reduced 
the physical capital-output ratio in production. 
Much of tl1e investment required m tl1e modern 
manufacturing sector is quite human-capital and 
R&D intensive with relatively low plant and 
equipment requirements. 
The Link Between Output and 
Disposable Incomes 
It is essential not to overstate the vigour of recent 
economic performance. Although growt11 in GDP 
is the most c01mnonly used indicator of standards 
of living across countries it docs not translate 
directly into growth in incomes. GDP growtl1 rates 
me bloated by t11e profits of foreign multinationals, 
which do not contribute to Irish national income. 
The alternative measure, GNP, includes only those 
factor incomes accruing to residents and thus 
excludes t11e distortion by the multinationals. t. 
Table 3.3: Outeut and Income Measures of Economic Growth 
Annual Average per cent Growth 1961-65 1965-70 1970-75 1975-80 
GDP 3.3 4.0 4.1 4.5 
GNP 3.7 4.1 3.8 4.1 
GNP adjusted for terms of trade 3.9 4.3 3.5 3.6 
Gross Na lion al Disposable Income 3.9 4.4 3.8 3.8 
National Resources 3.9 4.4 3.8 3.9 
GND1::: GNP adjusted for terms of trade plus cunent transfers from abroad; 
National Resources::: GNDI plus capital transfers from abroad. 
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1980-85 1985-90 1990-95 1995-97 
1.5 4.1 5.2 6.2 
0.4 3.6 4.7 5.7 
0.7 3.5 3.6 4.5 
0.8 3_8 3.1 4.4 
0.8 3.9 3.2 4.3 
Another distorting factor which leads to an 
exaggerated impression of recent performance is 
the unfavourable trend in the tenns of trade: 
growth rates of output measured at constant prices 
overstate tl1e growth in Irish purchasing power 
because of a fairly systematic upward trend in the 
ratio of import to export prices. As a result, the 
purchasing power of GNP is rising less rapidly 
than the volume of GNP output. Finally GNP does 
not include transfers from abroad, of which 
transfers from the EU form the major 
componenTable 3.3 gives average growth rates in 
each of GDP, GNP, GNP adjusted for changes in 
the terms of trade, GNDI (Gross National 
Disposable Income) which also includes current 
transfers from abroad and National Resources 
which also includes capital transfers from abroad. 
Terms of trade adjustments and current transfers 
have substantially altered the growth in incomes 
relative to the growth in output. Over the period 
1980-1985 GNP grew on average by just 0.4 per 
cent per annum, however favourable terms of trade 
movements meant that incomes grew by 0.7 per 
cent per annum. 
Since that time the terms of trade adjustment has 
generally heen negative, most especially in the 
1990s. This disimprovement in the terms of trade 
is attribntable to two factors: the downward 
pressure on agricultural prices resulting from 
excess output of CAP products and the importance 
of high technology exports (many of which have 
falling output prices due to rapidly changing 
technologies and short product life-cycles). Despite 
this, in the period 1985-1990, incomes grew by 
slightly more than GNP due to tl1e increased 
contribution from EU transfers. Since 1990 slower 
growth in EU transfers5 together with a marked 
deterioration in the terms of trade meant that 
incomes grew more slowly than output. While GNP 
growth averaged 4.7 per cent between 1990 and 
1995, GNDI growth averaged a much more modest 
3 .1 per cent per annum. 
Figure 3.5: Output (GDP) and Income 
Growth (GNDI) 
Annucil % Grown1 
GND! =GNP Aqusled for Terms of Trade and Including current transfers from abroad 
Figure 3.5 shows the contrast between average 
growth rates in output and incomes. In the 1990s 
the gap between GDP growth and growth in 
incomes has widened to an average of 2 percentage 
points per annum. The graph illustrates the upward 
trend in GDP growth over the past 15 years and the 
historically high rates of average GDP growth in 
the 1990s. However trend GNDI growth does not 
appear to have similarly shifted upwards. The 
headline growth rate for Ireland is typically the 
growth of GNP. However, the growth rate which 
actually matters in directly effecting an increase in 
living standards for the economy as a whole is tl1e 
growth in disposable incomes. Thus the persistent 
worsening in our terms of trade since 1985 has 
meant that output growth had to continuously 
accelerate in order to maintain a constant growth 
rate of disposable incomes. 
'Despite the rapid 1ise in EU Strnctural Funds the overall growlh in 
u·ansfers declined in this period due to a fall in u·ansfers under the 
CAP. 
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The Contribution of EU Transfers to GNP 
EU transfers as a proportion of GNP ( in current 
price terms) have grown in importance since our 
accession in 1973. Total transfers measure net 
receipts from the EU, these include payments under 
the Community Support Framework and the CAP 
net of Irish contributions to the EU budget.6 Total 
transfers from the EU rose from just over 5 per cent 
of GNP in 1986 to a peak of over 7 per cent of 
GNP in 1991 (tl1e previous peak was in 1979 at 6 
per cent). Figure 3.6 plots total transfers as a share 
of GNP along witl1 the structural funds' and 
budgetary contribution's shares of GNP. Total 
transfers include subsidy payments under the CAP 
(whose erratic year-to-year movements distort 
accurate measures of annual GNP and can be 
misleading if considered on a single year basis). 
However tl1e contribution of ilie structural funds to 
incomes is unmnbiguous and substantial. In the 
period 1991-1993 tl1e strnctural funds on average 
accounted for 3.5 per cent of GNP from an average 
level of below 2 per cent tl1rough the 1980s. Figure 
3.7 illustTates that the bulk of tl1is increase was in 
transfers through tl1e Social and Regional Funds. 
Figure 3.6: Transfers from the EU as a 
Percentage of GNP 
6Net receipts from the EU also includes other once-off item~. e.g., 
EMS transfers received 1979-83, food aid paid through EU budget 
1976-87. 
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Figure 3.7: Components of EU Structural 
Funds as a Percentage of GNP 
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Productivity, Employment, 
Participation and Dependency 
Despite tl1e distortions embodied in GNP as a 
measure of standard of living, it is a key measure of 
output produced (as compared to output consumed 
which is detennined by tl1e level of disposable 
income) in tl1C economy. A commonly used 
measure of an economy's productive perfonmmce 
is GNP per capita. Figure 3.8 plots the average 
growili in GNP per capita in 5 yecu· intervals from 
1961. The tTend growth of GNP per capita was 
negative during tl1e recession of the early 1980s. In 
more recent years it has picked up and in tl1e 
period 1995-1997 tl1e estimated growth rate is an 
unprecedented 6 per cent per annum. 
Figure 3.8: Growth in GNP per capita 
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To understand more fully the productive capacity 
of tl1e economy it is useful to decompose GNP per 
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capita into four individual component-,, namely 
productivity, employment, participation and 
dependency, as follows: 
GNP GNP LTCJI' IY Nl564 
N f;J'OT LF Nl564 N 
'-----' '----r-' '----r-' ~ ~ GNP per Procluctivity En1,loyment Pmticipation Dependency 
capita Rate Rate Ratio (inverse) 
where LTOT is total employment, LF is the labour 
force, N 1564 is the population of working age (15-
64) and N is the total population. The first tenn on 
the right hand side of the equation measures 
productivity (output per employee), the second tenn 
measures employment as a proportion of the labour 
force (equal to one minus the unemployment rate), 
the third term measures the participation rate and 
the fourth term is the inverse of the dependency 
rate. 
Figure 3.9: Decomposition of GNP per 
capita Growth 
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Figure 3.9 plots the growth in each of the 
components of GNP per capita in 5 year intervals 
from 1961. It is clear from the chart that 
productivity growth has been strong throughout the 
past 30 years. The fall in GNP per capita in 1980-
85 ww; due to a large increase in unemployment (a 
fall in the employment rate). In recent years 
increases in participation and employment have 
made a positive contribution to overall growth in 
GNP per capita. 
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This decomposition helps distinguish the relative 
importance of different factors underlying overall 
growth performance. By way of example let us 
compare the period 1965-70 with the period 1990-
95. Between 1965 and 1970 productivity growth 
averaged 4 per cent per annum, a rate which has 
not been equalled since. However, because 
participation rates fell and the unemployment rate 
rose during this period the overall growth in GNP 
per capita was slower at 3.3 per cent per annum. 
By contrast in the period 1990-1995 productivity 
growth was lower at 2.5 per cent per annum but 
because participation rates grew and dependency 
rates fell GNP per capita grew at a faster rate of 3.8 
per cent. Productivity growth alone is not sufficient 
to foster growth. 
The chart indicates that since 1990 each of the 
factors productivity, employment, participation and 
dependency have made net positive contributions to 
growth. This marks a central point in the overall 
theme of this chapter. The recent growth 
experience has been driven by the coincidence of 
several favourable underlying factors. Strong 
productivity growth reflects the strength of the 
supply-side of the economy driven inter alia by the 
growth in the stock of human capital and 
improvements in the physical infrastructure of the 
economy. This has in turn increased employment. 
The rise in participation rates, driven by increased 
participation of women in the workforce, is 
strongly linked to the increase in investment in 
education as well as improved employment 
prospects. At the same time underlying 
demographic trends (and especially with declining 
unemployment) have reduced the dependency ratio. 
We will explore each of these issues in detail in the 
following sections. 
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3.3 An Interpretative 
Framework 
In this chapter we present an eclectic view of what 
arc t11C likely medium-to-long term factors 
underlying the current growth performance of the 
Irish economy. This view is info1med by recent 
developments in the international literature in 
growth theory and economic geography which 
provide some key insights in interpreting the recent 
Irish growth experience over a longer-term 
horizon. Two key determinants of growth identified 
in this literature, which are of direct relevance to 
our interpretation of the Irish growth experience, 
arc human capital and the physical infrastructure. 
Modern growth theory stresses the key role of the 
stock of human capital and the rate of human 
capitnl accumulation to the production process. 
Including human capital as a dete1minant of 
growt11 can help to explain observed pennanent 
differences in growtl1 between countries. The stock 
of human capital is clearly endogenous to tl1e 
growtJ1 process itself. For example the individual's 
decision to invest in human capital is itself 
influenced by the likely returns to such investment 
which are determined inter alia by the current and 
expected future growth rate of the economy. The 
rate of human capital accumulation is defined both 
hy demographic trends within the economy and the 
level of investment in education and training. 
These are two of the long term factors which we 
idcnt.ify as significant contributors to the Irish 
growth process. 
The combination of new growth theory and 
economic geography is of particular relevance to 
Ireland, i.e., how economic activity and growtl1 are 
allocated over space. Such research usually 
chcU"acterises tl1e world as consisting of a rich core 
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and a poor periphery. While tl1e periphery has 
cheaper production costs, tl1e core has a larger 
market. If tl1e periphery gains access to tlrnt core 
market and reduces transport cost~ between the 
core and tl1e periphery then tl1is will facilitate firms 
locating production in tl1e periphery.7 [n relation to 
developments in the Irish economy, the gradual 
opening up of the economy to the European 
market, culminating in the 1992 Single Market 
pr()ject, and tl1e recent infrastructural investment 
under the CSF are both pertinent within this 
framework. These form another two of the factors 
contributing to tl1e Irish growth process which we 
focus on in this chapter. 
Lastly we identify a stable macroeconomic 
environment as a further key factor to the 
underlying growtl1 process. RcsecU'ch suggests tJrnt, 
along witJ1 an adequate level of human capital and 
freely functioning market,, a stable macroeconomic 
environment is also a key element of economic 
growth. This has important implications for 
attempts to assess tl1e growtl1 performance of tl1e 
Irish economy over tl1e past three decades since it 
implies tl1at tJ1e severe macroeconomic imbalances 
of tl1e early 1980s may have contributed directly to 
the poor growth performance at tl1at t.ime. Once 
tJ1is factor is taken out, the past performance of the 
Irish economy does not look particularly bad, and 
the relatively strong growtl1 performance since the 
late 1980s may be taken as an indication of t11e 
strong underlying potential for growth. 
70f course there is also the danger that reducing transport costs 
may cause production in the periphery to reloc1tte at the core. 
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3.4 Demographics, Human 
Capital and the Labour Market 
Over t11e last decade the Irish labour market has 
been profoundly affected by a number of different 
factors which have altered t11e supply of labour. 
These factors include changing demographic 
trends, rising female participation rates and the 
medium and long-term effects of changes m 
domestic policies in the education system and in 
the social welfare system. These policy ch:mges 
have had the effect of increasing t11e supply of 
skilled labour and gradually reducing the supply of 
unskilled labour. This has led to an increase in the 
stock of human capital and t11e rate of human 
capital accumulation. 
In Section 3.2 we pointed out that productivity 
growth alone is not sufficient in explaining overall 
growth in GNP per capita. Increasing participation 
rates and falling dependency ratios in the 
I 990shave also been determinants of t11e growth in 
output per head. The effect of a high economic 
dependency ratio (t11e population which is not in 
employment divided by t11e numbers employed) on 
frish standards of living is illustrnted in Figure 
3.10. This shows that measured in terms of GNP 
per person employed there has been a fairly steady 
upward trend since joining tlle EU in 1973. 
However, measured per head of the population 
little progress was made in the first 15 yecu-s of 
membership and it is only really since 1990 that 
very rapid progress has become apparent. 
47 
Figure 3.10: Ireland Compared to the EU at 
PPS 
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Changing demographic trends and participation 
rates are also important underlying factors which 
determine the growth in the supply of labour. The 
effective supply of labour in the nineties will rise 
on average by 2.6 per cent per annum (Table 3.4). 
Around 1 percentage point a yecu- of tl1is rise is due 
to the natural increase in tl1e population of working 
age, 1 percentage point to increased female 
participation in t11e labour force and 0.6 percentage 
points to the rising educational attainment of t11e 
labour force. 
Table 3.4: Increase in Effective Labour 
Supply in the 1990s 
Annual Percentage Increase 
Total Effective Supply of Labour 
of which: 
2.6 
Natural Increase in Population 
Increase in Female Participation Rates 
Hnman Capital Accumulation 
l.O 
1.0 
0.6 
In t11is section we focus on the rapid increase in t11e 
stock of human capital in recent years and its 
impact on the supply of labour. The pattern of 
human capital accumulation in Ireland contrasts 
with the situation in many oilier EU members 
where the labour force is growing quite slowly and 
where the rnqjor benefits of the post-war 
investment in human capital have already heen 
reaped. This factor alone provides an important 
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part of the explanation as to why the Irish economy 
is growing more rapidly than those of most· other 
EU members. 
Demographic Change and Rising 
Participation Rates 
The past high birth rate and the rise in female 
participation in the labour force have meant that 
the potential numbers in the labour force have risen 
rapidly in recent years. In the past such a rise in 
numbers has not necessarily translated into 
increased employment. Those who could not find 
employment in Ireland chose to emigrate if their 
education was sufficiently good to guarantee them 
a job elsewhere. However, in the last 5 years tl1e 
increase in supply of labour, predominantly skilled, 
has found ready employment in Ireland. Over the 
1990s the labour force will rise on average by 
around 2 per cent a year. Chapter 2 contains a full 
discussion of this demographic change and its 
impact on tl1e supply of labour. 
Human Capital and the Labour 
Market 
Changes in the world economy have affected the 
demand for labour in Ireland. In 1960, with a high 
level of protection, the demand for unskilled8 
labour in the economy was high. There was little 
competition from suppliers in the Far East who 
faced much lower labour costs. However, over the 
past 30 years labour costs have risen in Ireland at 
tl1e same time as the Irish and the EU economy has 
opened up to world-wide competition resulting in a 
81lu·oughout this section we classify labour into two broad 
categories: skilled and unskilled labour. These categories are useful 
simplifications to illustrate the argument. Unskilled labour is 
broadly defined to include those who leave school with little or no 
education qualifications. 
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fall in demand for unskilled labour in Ireland. By 
contrast, the demand for skilled labour has risen 
world-wide. In Ireland the interaction of these 
different forces has determined the rates of return 
for different kinds of labour and the numbers 
employed. 
Changes in The Unskilled Labour Market 
In the 1950s, at a time when tl1e UK had developed 
a sophisticated social welfare safety net, tl1ere was 
only limited protection available in Ireland. As a 
result, unskilled labour in Ireland faced a choice 
between emigration to the UK, generally to take up 
employment there, but in some cases to 
unemployment at higher benefit rates than in 
Ireland, or employment at any price in Ireland. 
However, over the period from 1960 to the early 
1980s there were substantial improvements in the 
rates of social welfare payments (Figure 3 .11). 9 
This effectively set a minimum wage for unskilled 
labour which resulted in a reduction in unskilled 
employment. 
Figure 3.11: Estimated Replacement Rates 
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Thus the impact of improvements in tl1e social 
9 The data in this chart are only proxy measures of actual 
replacement rates (for example the unskilled wage rate measures 
gross pre-tax earnings) and are intended to illustrate the real 
improvements in social welfare payments over the period. The 
measurement of true replacement rates is more complex. Callan et 
al (1997), using micro data for 1987 and 1994, found that the 
average ,replacement ratio facing unemployed persons was roughly 
constant (see Callan, T., B. Nolan and C. O'Donoghue, 1996 
"What has Happened to Replacement Rates?", The Economic and 
Social Review, Vol. 27, No. 1. 
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welfare system was to reduce the supply of 
unskilled labour. The ultimate effect on numbers 
unemployed in tl1e 1970s was probably small; the 
social welfare system in tl1e UK was more 
attractive tlrnn tl1at in Ireland and rates of pay for 
unskilled labour in the UK exceeded those in 
Ireland making emigration a feasible option. 
However, over the course of tl1e 1980s, as the Irish 
social welfare system was improved, it became 
more attractive to be unemployed in Ireland tlrnn 
unemployed in tl1e UK. In addition, there was a 
rapid rise in unemployment in the UK, especially 
mnong unskilled, which had a knock on effect in 
Ireland. Finally, tl1e rates of pay for unskilled 
labour in Ireland approached, and in some cases 
exceeded, tl10se in the UK. An example of tl1is is 
the relative rates of pay for the textile sector in 
Ireland compared to tl1e UK shown in Figure 3.12. 
As tl1e textile sector has one of tl1e highest 
percentages of unskilled labour of any 
manufacturing sector, tl1e data in Figure 3.12 
provide a reasonable proxy for relative movements 
in unskilled pay rates in tl1e two economies. 
Figure 3.12: Relative Labour Costs -
Textiles 
1.4 Ratio of Irish Rates to UK Rates 
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Simultaneously with these changes in the supply of 
unskilled labour there was a fall in demand. The 
opening up of the economy to competition meant 
tlrnt those companies operating in the tractable 
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sector which depended on unskilled labour faced 
increasing competition. Corcoran, Hughes, and 
Sexton (1993)10 document the effect of this on 
employment of unskilled labour. Since the early 
1970s tl1e absolute number of unskilled labourers 
has been cut by almost 50 per cent, with smaller 
declines in other categories of unskilled labour. 
Investment in Education and Changes in the 
Skilled Labour Market 
The impact of the investment in education was to 
reduce the supply of unskilled labour and increase 
the supply of skilled labour. The increase in the 
supply of skilled labour in Ireland over tl1e last 30 
years has been documented in Chapter 2. The fact 
that the vast bulk of new labour force entrants now 
have at least a Leaving Certificate, compared to the 
1960s when only a minority did so, indicates that 
there have been major changes in the supply of 
botl1 skilled and unskilled labour. However, tl1e 
ultimate impact of tl1is major investment in human 
capital also depends on tl1e demand for both kinds 
of labour. 
If the demand for the two kinds of labour had 
remained unchanged over time, the wages of 
skilled employed relative to unskilled would have 
fallen. This fall would have been particularly acute 
if many of the skilled were unable to find suitable 
employment and were forced to work in unskilled 
jobs. In order to assess whether this has been tl1e 
case we need data on tl1e labour market returns to 
education. Unfortunately, we do not have 
inf01mation on the returns to education from the 
1970s but Figure 3.13 shows the average earnings 
1
°Corcoran, T., G. Hughes and J. Sexton (1993) Occupational 
Employment Forecarts 1996, Dublin: FAS/ESRI Manpower 
Forecasting Selies: Report No. 3 
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of tl10se employed in 1987 and 1994 classified by 
tl1eir level of education. 11 These data suggest that, 
if anything, tlle returns to education over the latter 
period actually rose. Though it is possible that 
changes in otl1er vm'iables, such as tl1e average 
experience of t11e labour force, could have distorted 
tl1e results, a full m1alysis of these data indicates 
that this is not tl1e case and tllat the returns to 
education have actually risen over tlle 7 years. 12 
The increase in returns to university education has 
been especially noteworthy. Given· the very 
substantial increase in the supply of skilled labour 
over the smne period tllis would indicate that tlle 
demand for skilled labour must also have 
increased, offsetting cmy tendency for tl1e increase 
in supply to reduce the return to the investment. 
Figure 3.13a: Average Earnings by Level of 
Education - Male 
200 % of Earnings of Avg. Leaving Cert. Holder 
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0 
Primary Junior Leaving University 
Education Level Attained 
''Callan, T. and A. Wrenn, 1994, Male-Female Wage 
Differentials: Analysis and Policy lrsues, Dublin: 'The Economic 
and Social Research Institute, General Research Series No. 163 
and OECD (1996) Education at a Glance. Paris. 
12Barrett, A., T. Callan and B. Nolan, "111e Earnings Distribution 
and Returns to Education in Ireland, 1987-1994". Dublin: The 
Economic and Social Research Institute, mimeo. 
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Figure 3.13b: Average Earnings by Level of 
Education - Female 
Primary Junior Leaving University 
Education Level Attained 
An Index of Human Capital 
A composite index of tlle supply of human capital 
in the Irish economy can, under certain 
assumptions13 be constructed using tl1e results from 
Callan (1993) and Callan and Wren (1994). These 
studies estimated a series of equations where 
average earnings were regressed on educational 
attainment and other explanatory variables. The 
coefficients on the different levels of educational 
attainment in the equations can tl1en be used as 
weights to aggregate tl1e different types of labour to 
form a composite human capital index. To the 
extent that the returns to education fell (rose) over 
time tllis index will tend to overestimate 
(underestimate) t11e impact of human capital on t11e 
economy. 
Figure 3.14 shows tllis index of human capital for 
the adult population. For the purpose of 
comparison indices of human capital for Austria 
and Gennany are also shown. These latter indices 
13 Among other things, it is assumed the weak homothetic 
separability of labour from other factors of production holds. (See 
Pindyck, R. (1979) "Inte1fuel Substitution and the Industrial 
Demand for Energy", Review of Economics and Statistics, 169-
179, May. ) It also assumes perfect competition in the labour 
market so that the wage rates of the different types of labour are 
equal to their marginal product~. 
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are constrncted on a slightly different basis 14 in 
Koman and Marin, 1997, 15 but tl1e results are 
likely to be broadly comparable to our own index. 
Figure 3.14: Index of Human Capital 
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They tend to confirm tl1c assertion made earlier 
that the benefits from investment in human capital 
arc occurring later in Ireland than in otl1er 
Nort11crn European EU members. Figure 3.15 
shows t11e rate of growtl1 in the index for Ireland. 
The movement in the index of human capital 
reflects the fact tlrnt as each person retires, 
generally witl1 only a primary education, they arc 
replaced by a person with a good Leaving 
Certificate or a third level education. As a result of 
'" Instead of weighting by the average earnings of each category of 
labour the weigh Ls are the total wages of the different categories. 
''Koman, R. and D. Marin (1997) Human Capital and 
Macroeconomic (,rowth: Austria and Gem1any, 1960-92, CEPR 
Discussion Paper No. 1551. 
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this switch, output will rise, as reflected in t11e 
increase in average earnings. The growtl1 in t11e 
index reaches a peak in the first half of t11e 1990s 
suggesting that investment in human capital was 
contributing over 0.6 percentage points a year to 
the growth in that period. While the rate of growth 
in the index is falling over time, as ilie average 
educational attainment of the labour force rises, the 
index will still be rising at over a t11ird of a 
percentage point a year at tl1e end of the next 
decade. It would suggest that currently around 0.6 
percentage points of the growtl1 rate may be 
attributable to tl1e rising educational attainment of 
t11e labour force. 
Figure 3.16a: Relative Hourly Labour Costs 
in Textiles 1988 
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Source: Eurostat, Survey of Labour Costs 
Figure 3.16b: Relative Hourly Labour Costs 
in Computers 1988 
30 
25 
20 
15 
10 
5 
Source: Eurostat Surve of Labour Costs 
The Demand for Skilled and Unskilled Labour 
As discussed earlier, in ilie past t11ere was 
significant emigration of skilled labour, especially 
MEDIUM-TERM REVIEW: 1997-2003 
in the late 1980s. Why is the rise in skilled labour 
supply now translating into increased employment 
rather than emigration? The answer must lie on 
hoth the supply side and the demand side. The 
relative rates of return to employment for skilled 
labour in the Irish and foreign labour markets must 
make it attractive for firms to employ people in 
Ireland. Figure 3.16 shows labour costs per hour 
for the clothing sector and for computers for a 
range of EU countries in 1988. 16 These data 
suggest that labour costs in Ireland in the computer 
sector are lower than in most other EU countries, 
including l11e UK. By contrast, labour costs in the 
clol11ing sector are well above those in Portugal and 
also above l11e UK. These data would suggest that 
skilled lahour is relatively cheap in Ireland and that 
this is a factor in attracting major investment in the 
high technology sector to Ireland. 
Over l11e last 5 years the supply of new entrants to 
the unskilled labour market has been greatly 
reduced hy the increased participation in education. 
While firms employing unskilled labour in the 
tradable sector have continued to experience 
pressures from mmrnfacturers outside the EU, the 
demand for unskilled labour in certain parts of the 
services sector (retailing and catering) has risen 
rapidly in 1l1e face of l11e rapid growth in domestic 
demand. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the 
going rate for unskilled labour in the services 
sector has risen from £2.50 an hour to £3.50 an 
hour over l11e last 2 lo 3 years. Employers are 
currently reporting difficulties in some sectors in 
filling vacancies at these wage rates, altl10ugh 
again this evidence is anecdotal. It does seem likely 
16 These data include all the costs to employers, including social 
insurance contributions. 
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that if these unskilled wage rates continue to rise 
they may impact on tl1e numbers of unemployed in 
the future. Alternatively, the rates may prove 
attractive to unskilled labour from outside the 
country resulting in immigration of people to fill 
vacm1cies. 
3.5 Openness, EU Membership 
and Infrastructural Investment 
Ireland of the 1950s was not only a very closed 
economy but it was also a very inward looking, 
even claustrophobic, society. This atmosphere 
proved stultifying for writers, artists and business 
alike. The advent of free trade from the beginning 
of the 1960s was only one, and probably not the 
most important, aspect of the opening up of l11e 
country to out.;;ide influences and ideas. This 
opening up also helped raise expectations in terms 
of living standards and tl1e level of provision of 
public services. 
The opening up of tl1e economy over tl1e longer 
term had significant effects on botl1 the goods 
market and tl1e labour market. The goods market 
was gradually freed from trade restrictions and a 
policy of encouraging foreign investment in Ireland 
to supply a wider EU market was very actively 
pursued. The labour market, which had always 
been open to tl1e UK, saw further changes witl1 EU 
membership and tl1e development of a substantial 
inflow of returning emigrants. These changes in 
the labour market were related to substantial 
changes in Ireland's competitive position within 
the EU. 
Over a more medium term perspective membership 
of tl1e EU has involved participation in tl1e Single 
European Market (SEM) project and the advent of 
substantial transfers under the C01mnon 
INTERPRETING THE RECENT !RISH GROWTH EXPERIENCE 
Agricultural Policy (CAP), and the Community 
Support Frmnework (CSF). 
In this section we look first at the long-term impact 
of openness on the goods market and the labour 
market. Second, we exmnine recent evidence on the 
estimated impact of the SEM and CSF on growth 
in recent years. 
Openness in The Goods Market and 
Foreign Investment 
The Irish economy over the last 70 years has 
provided a very interesting test-bed of the effects of 
economic integration. Having been an integral part 
of the United Kingdom until independence in 
1922, there were a series of changes over the 
following 15 yem·s which introduced major 
restrictions on trade. 17 ln the early 1930s very high 
tariffs encouraged the development of local 
industry to supply the domestic market resulting in 
a substantial growth in industrial employment. 
However, tl1e new firms were very small with low 
productivity. 
With the progressive dismantling of tariffs from 
tl1e early 1960s the Irish economy, including the 
protected industrial sector, was opened to major 
new forces through the subsequent growth in trade. 
Two landmarks in this process were the Anglo-
Irish Free Trade Agreement of 1965 and EC entry 
in 1973 which abolished all remaining barriers to 
trade with the EU. 
The most obvious economic manifestation of the 
gradual opening up of the economy since 1960 was 
17There was free movement of fonds within the sterling area until 
Irish entry into the EMS in 1979. However, until the late 1950s, 
there were extensive controls on direct foreign investment in 
Ireland, particularly in the manufacturing sector. 
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the growth in the importance of foreign trade and 
the diversification of the markets where that trade 
took place. Since 1970 the proportion of Irish 
output which is exported has more than doubled 
(Figure 3 .17). 
Figure 3.17: Proportion of National Output 
Exported 
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A key feature of the changing structure of the Irish 
economy from the end of tl1e 1950s has been the 
growing importance of direct foreign investment, 
in particular in the manufacturing sector. In 1960 
the Irish economy was still heavily dependent on 
agriculture. The concentration on this sector was 
much greater than for other neighbouring 
countries. There was a need to shift attention to the 
industrial sector so that industrial growth would 
counter-balance the inevitable decline in tl1e 
importance of agriculture. This was reflected in the 
change in industrial policy in the late 1950s to 
favour foreign investment in manufacturing. It is 
now clear that this process has played a very 
important role in transforming the economy. The 
strategy, which relied originally on tax breaks, now 
relies heavily on the availability of skilled labour to 
attract foreign finns. 
It is important to recognise the consistency with 
which industrial policy has been pursued by all 
governments for 40 years. Such a strategic 
approach to economic policy mirrors that of some 
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Asian countries and it highlights the importance of 
creating an environment of certainty for foreign 
investors. While the extent of the concentration on 
developing the multinational sector at the expense 
of attention Lo existing domestic firms has 
frequently been called into question, some of the 
promised fruits of tlrnt policy are currently to be 
seen 111 tl1e rapid growth in tl1e manufacturing 
sector. 
While the low rate of corporation tax has long been 
tl1e key incentive for locating investment in 
Ireland, in tl1e last decade the availability of skilled 
labour al a reasonable cost has grown in 
importance. The location decision of multinational 
firms is a function of tl1e relative cost of production 
m a range of different possible competing 
locations. The cost of production itself is affected 
by the tax regime, labour costs, the cost of capital 
and the cost of other services bought in locally. 
As well as bringing a demand for skilled labour, 
the advent of tl1e multinational firm also brought 
new management skills and access to a range of 
technologies which were not available locally. In 
recent years there has been some sign of a trnnsfcr 
of these skills to local firms. In addition, the 
growt11 in the critical mass of firms operating in 
the high technology sectors has seen a growth in 
the local labour market's supply of necessary skills. 
Openness in The Labour Market and 
Migration 
The free movement of labour has also played a vital 
role in promoting change tlmrngh its effects on tl1e 
supply of la.hour. The emigration of so many of tl1e 
young population in the 1950s was different from 
the emigrations of earlier generations in that ilie 
emigrants maintained contact with Irish society. 
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When the first fruits of the economic changes 
taking place began to be felt in ilie 1970s many of 
t11e emigrants returned bringing new ideas, 
experience and, in some cases, capital to help 
stimulate new activity. These issues are explored in 
more detail in Chapter 2. 
Migration, tlmrngh changing the potential labour 
force, can at least have an indirect effect on wage 
detennination. It is always difficult to make 
comparisons between t11e absolute levels of prices 
of goods or factors of production in different 
countries; comparisons of movements over time are 
easier to undertake. However, over the last 20 years 
the Statistical Office of t11e European Communities 
(SOEC) have undertaken a series of surveys of 
labour costs, both direct and indirect, in EC 
countries which allow a direct comparison of 
labour costs to be made. 
In Figure 3.18 we have used t11ese SOEC data to 
provide a benchmark comparison between labour 
costs per hour in Ireland and the rest of the EC for 
1991. Labour costs are defined to include wages 
(direct remuneration), bonuses, pension 
contributions, training costs and labour taxes. They 
provide a picture of t11e full cost of labour to the 
employer. The remuneration of employees 
obviously differs from tl1e cost to the employer due 
to the various indirect costs associated witl1 
employment. 
As shown in Figure 3 .18, Irish labour costs in 
manufacturing in 1991 were broadly similar to UK 
costs but still well below the labour costs of the 
original EC 6 and Denmark. Portugal had labour 
costs which were under a third of those in Ireland. 
The 1991 data provide a useful benchmark 
comparison of relative labour costs faced by firms 
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Figure 3.18: Hourly Labour Costs in 
Manufacturing 1991 
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in Ireland and the UK. Using this benchmark we 
have used time series data for Ireland and the UK 
to graph the movement in relative labour costs over 
the period 1953 to 1995 (Figure 3.19). 
In U1e early 1960s [rish labour costs were between 
60 per cent and 70 per cent of UK levels. The 
openness of tl1e labour market through the 
migration mechanism did not bring about U1e 
conditions necessary for an equalisation of factor 
prices. This failure is all the more significant in the 
light of the very considerable net emigration from 
Ireland over U1e period. 
From 1960 to 1980 the process of integration into 
the BC economy coincided with a relatively rapid 
rise in Irish labour costs compared to the UK. By 
the late 1970s Irish labour costs were close to 
equality with UK costs. Since the late 1970s the 
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relationship, while showing considerable variation, 
primarily due to exchange rate changes, has shown 
no obvious trend. Irish labour costs in 1978, at 95 
per cent of UK costs, were approximately the same 
level that they were in 1988. 
As discussed earlier in Section 3.4, the relatively 
rapid adjustment upwards in labour cost<; to UK 
levels in the period 1960 to 1980 coincided with 
the development of the Irish social welfare system. 
The combined effect of these changes was to 
eliminate Ireland's comparative advantage in 
unskilled labour and this contributed to the rapid 
decline in unskilled employment since 1970. When 
there was a major recession in the early 1980s 
many firms, which had already lost 
competitiveness, had to close. 
However, when allowance is made for fluctuations 
in the exchange rate since the mid- l 980s, Irish 
labour costs in more recent years have not greatly 
diverged from iliose in the UK. This means that 
labour cost competitiveness at the aggregate level 
has not deteriorated in the last 10 years, in contrast 
to the continuous deterioration in the 1960-80 
period. As discussed above, these aggregate figures 
mask differences in the relative cost of skilled and 
unskilled labour, witl1 skilled labour in Ireland 
probably still maintaining its competitive 
advantage up to the present (see Section 3.4). 
Openness and EU Membership: the 
SEM and CSF Investment 
More important tl1an any other economic feature of 
EU membership in the long run has been tl1e access 
to the single market. The single market reforms, 
which began in tl1e late 1980s, were expected to 
bring significantly greater benefits to Ireland tllan 
was tl1e related increase in structural funds 
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(Bradley et al., 199218). The extent of the 
integration of the Irish economy into the wider EU 
economy means that Ireland's economic interests 
me now inextricably tied up with those of our EU 
neighbours. 
In recent years the CSP process has caught the 
public imagination (outside Ireland as much as 
within) as a manifestation of the effects of EU 
membership. While Ireland has benefited from 
receipts through the Social and Regional Funds 
since the mid-1970s, the reforms introduced as part 
of tl1e single market process resulted in a 
significant increase in receipts. The political 
rationale behind tl1e reform and expansion of 
Structural Fund assistance in the late 1980s came 
from the fear that not all EU member states were 
likely to benefit equally from the single market and 
EMU, whose purpose was to dismantle all 
remaining non-tariff barriers within tlle Union. In 
pmticular, tl1e weaker, less advanced regions of tl1e 
Southern, Western and Eastern periphery (Greece, 
Portugal, tl1e soutllern regions of Spain and Italy, 
Ireland, Nortllern Ireland within tl1e UK, and the 
Eastern Lander of Gennany), were felt to be 
potentially vulnerable unless tlley received 
development aid. Structural Fund receipts as a 
shme of GNP rose rapidly at tl1e beginning of tl1e 
1990s peaking in 1993. Although tlley will 
continue to make a significant contribution to GNP 
out to 1999 they will not again attain tlleir high 
level of 1991-93 (Figure 3.6 in Section 3.2). 
'" Bradley, J., J. Fitz Gerald, I. Kearney, G. Boyle, R. Breen, S. 
Shortall, J. Durkan, A. Reynolds-Feighan, E. O'Malley, 1992 The 
Role of the Structural Funds: Analysis of Consequences for 
Ireland in the Context of 1992, Dublin: The Economic and Social 
Research Institute, Policy Research Series No. 13 
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Membership of tlle EU was particularly important 
in the access it gave to tlle wider EU mmket for 
agricultural produce under tlle CAP. Even before 
membership in 1973 the expectation of tlle 
impending CAP began changing Irish agriculture. 
While the CAP and tlle agricultural sector were 
crucial to the economy at the time of membership 
tlleir significance has steadily fallen. None tl1e less, 
EU receipts as part of tl1e CAP remain larger tllan 
total receipts under the structural funds. 
In tllis section we first examine tlle impact on 
Ireland of tl1e single market reforms of tlle late 
1980s and then consider the impact of the 
structural fund receipts of tlle 1990s. 
Single-Market Reforms 
The likely effects of tlle single market on Ireland 
were studied in Bradley et al, 1992, op cit. This ex 
ante evaluation of tlle SEM found that as a direct 
result of tlle policy changes associated with tl1e 
1992 programme, Ireland's markets in the EC were 
likely to grow by between 3.2 and 5.7 per cent over 
a 6-year period. In addition to changing tl1e 
external environment, tl1e single market would 
bring about some specific intra-economy 
consequences, such as rationalisation of tl1e Irish 
distribution network and financial services (with ex 
ante job losses), greater opportunity for Irish firms 
to benefit from liberalisation of EC public 
procurement practices, and ex ante productivity 
gains in some sectors of manufacturing industry. 
Putting all these effect5 togetl1er, and analysing the 
combined impacts, tl1is emly study estimated that 
Irish GNP in 2000 would be just over 5 per cent 
higher than it would have been without tlle SEM. 
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More recently, a study carried out as part of the 
Commission's ex post evaluation of tl1e effects of 
the SBM, looked again at tl1e combined impacts of 
the SEM and the CSF on tl1e four so-called 
cohesion countries - Greec~, Ireland, Portugal and 
Spain. 19 This study measured tl1e combined effects 
or seven different channels: the reduction in world 
prices and costs; the modest reduction in public 
sector employment as a result of abolition of 
cnstoms harriers; the reduction in ilie suhsector of 
market services associated witl1 rationalisation of 
distribution and financial services; tl1e gains in 
manufacturing productivity associated with 
increased competitiveness; the static gains to 
manufacturing output tlrnt follow directly from 
trade liberalisation; tl1e structural changes as 
economies become more open and exposed to direct 
world influences - a static effect; ilie increased 
impact of faster world growth on the structurally 
changed models a growth dependent effect. 
It found Urnt the combined effects of the SEM on 
the Irish economy me as presented in Table 3.5. 
Table 3.5: Total SEM Shock to Ireland 
1995 2000 2010 
Percentage Deviationsji·mn a no-SEM baseline 
GDP at factor cost 
Manufacturing GDP 
Markel Services GDP 
5.0 
11. l 
2.4 
7.2 
15.1 
3.6 
/)eviatirms ji'om a no-SEM baseline 
Unemployment Rate -1.4 -1.6 
Net trade surplus (percent 0.9 l.3 
of GDP) 
National Debt (percent of -5.5 -l l.l 
GDP) 
9.2 
17.1 
4.8 
-1.2 
1.6 
-21.6 
l'J Barry, l '. , .I. Bradley, i\. Hannan, J. Mccartan and S. Sosvilla-
Rivcro, l 'J'J7. Single Market Review: Aggregate and Regional 
/111par:1s: '/he Cases of Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain, 
London, England: Kogan, Page Ltd. 
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These effects, iliough of a similar order of 
magnitude to tl1e earlier ex ante evaluation study, 
are somewhat higher in tl1eir estimate of tl1e 
ultimate impact. Given that the original Cecchini 
analysis of tl1e impact of the SEM on the EU core 
economies appears to be smaller tl1an tl1e impact on 
Ireland, what tl1is suggests is tl1at Ireland was a net 
beneficiary of ilie SEM initiative. The very large 
positive impact on manufacturing GDP indicates 
tl1e strong competitiveness gains in tl1e tractable 
sector for Ireland. 
The Community Support l<'ramework and The 
Structural Funds 
The growth in EU transfers from tl1e strnctural 
funds since the late 1980s made a significant direct 
contribution to growth at an important time of 
economic change. There have been a series of 
studies evaluating the impact of tl1e CSF for 
Ireland. 20 An ex post evaluation of tl1e first round 
of CSF funding (ESRI, 199321 ) estimated that on 
tl1e demand side of the economy the first CSF 
(1989-93) raised the level of GNP by a maximum 
of 3.5 per cent in 1992 and 1993 above where it 
would have been if there had been no CSF. 
However, because of the decline in significance of 
CSF transfers in recent years the demand side 
stimulus has actually fallen. This means that tl1e 
growth rate in 1994-95 was actually reduced by the 
fall off in transfers (see Section 3 .2). But tl1e 
longer-term supply side benefits of the new capital 
stock, both human capital and physical capital, 
funded under tl1e CSF, which is continually being 
20 
'I11e Bradley et al., (op cit.) study of the single market also 
examined the likely impact of the first round of the CSP on the 
Irish economy. 
21 ESRI (1993) The Com111u11ity Support Framework 1989-1993: 
Evaluation and Recommendations for the 1994-1997 
Framework, Government Stationery Office. 
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put in place, are building up the economy's 
productive potential. 
The combined effect of the demand side of CSF 2 
(1994-1999) and the supply side of CSF 1 in the 
period 1995 to 1999 is to raise the level of GNP by 
between 3 and 4 percentage points above the level 
it would have been without the CSF. The fall in the 
1994-95 period reflects a decline in receipts 
(expressed as a percentage of GNP) in the initial 
years of the current CSF. The long-run impact of 
the two CSFs is estimated to raise the level of GNP 
hy about 2 percentage points above the level it 
would have been without them. 
The more recent study by Bradley et al., 1997, op 
cit., also examined the impact of the two CSFs. On 
the technical assumption22 that all CSF funding 
ends in 1999 it suggested that the two CSFs would 
add around 1 percentage point to the supply 
potential of the economy in the long run. This 
impact increases to over 3 per cent under the 
assumption that the CSF funding remains 
pennanently at 1999 levels. 
These figures seem small when considered in 
isolation but they must be taken in conjunction 
with the SEM impacts. The economic models used 
in all of these studies are of the "stabilisation" 
kind, i.e., they focus on explaining movements 
around trend growth rather than on the underlying 
trend. In such models the impacts of the CSF on 
the level of GDP is investigated, rather than the 
impact on the growth rate. Thus, the combined 
impacts of the SEM and the CSF could be 
considerably greater than those quantified here. 
22This technical assumption is necessary lo isolate the impact of 
CSF 1 and CSF2 from the possible impact of subsequent CSFs. 
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All of these studies concur in indicating that (i) the 
CSF process can only directly explain a limited 
part of the current buoyancy in the Irish economy, 
and (ii) the impacts of the SEM are likely to have 
been much more significant than the CSF in 
boosting the level of GDP over the longer term. 
At least as important as the actual investments has 
been the way the structural fund process has 
affected the administrative and political system. 
Apart from preventing serious under-investment in 
infrastructure and third level education, the CSF 
process has forced the introduction of long-term 
planning. In the past there was a recurrent problem 
of waste when investment projects started and 
stopped in line with short-tenn fiscal pressures. 
Now investment plans arc formulated, 
implemented and evaluated without major 
interruption. 
The structural funds have played an important role 
in developing the economy at a crucial point in 
Irish economic history. The advent of the first CSF 
in 1989 was particularly apposite given the 
prevailing pessimism about the future and the drive 
to cut all forms of public expenditure. The CSF 
encouraged a return to investment in public 
infrastructure at a crucial time. Without such 
investment the economy to-day would be 
encountering more problems of bottlenecks. 
3.6 Domestic Macroeconomic 
Environment 
We argue in this chapter that the success of the 
Irish economy in recent years is due to the 
interaction of several medium-to-long term factors 
which mutually determine the growth trajectory; 
changes in the demographic structure and female 
labour force participation behaviour; increases in 
INTERPRETING THE RECENT !RISH GROWTH EXPERIENCE 
the stock of human capital; the opening up of the 
economy; and the benefits of EU membership for 
long-term competitiveness; and in developing the 
physical infrastrncture. However, a further crucial 
factor over a short-to-medium term horizon has 
been the stable macroeconomic conditions which 
have prevailed since the mid-1980s. Figure 3.1 in 
Section 3 .2 illustntted tlrnt t11e current strong 
growth performance has taken place in a climate of 
low inflation wit11 low public finance deficits and a 
movement into surplus on the current account of 
the Balance of Payments. 
The importance of macroeconomic stability for 
growth has been outlined in Section 3.3. In t11is 
section we look at three ;u-eas of domestic policy 
which have helped to foster a climate of 
macroeconomic stability; industrial policy, fiscal 
policy and institutional reform. 
Ind us trial policy has since t11e late 19 50s been 
strongly oriented toward attracting foreign 
investment in manufacturing tlmmgh the use of 
both fiscal and financial incentives. This has 
gradually led to the build up of a high-growt11, 
skill-intensive, export-oriented manufacturing 
sector which is largely concentrated in high-
technology production. The dominance of foreign 
multinationals within t11is sector, which was 
traditionally seen as a potential fragility within t11e 
manufacturing base, has in recent years shown 
evidence of spill-over effects in terms of both 
technology and skills into the indigenous 
manufacturing sector. The consistency wit11 which 
indust1·ial policy has been pursued has been a 
significant factor in fostering a stable 
macroeconomic environment for business. 
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Much attention has focused on the recent success in 
stabilising the public finances bot11 in terms of the 
reduction of the high level of the public debt in tl1e 
1980s and t11e year-on-year Exchequer Borrowing 
Requirement. Many commentators have argued 
that the fiscal adjustment of tl1e late 1980s is 
evidence in favour of ilie expansionary fiscal 
contraction hypothesis. We argue, however, that 
external factors (falling world interest rates and 
buoyant world growth) played a la1·ge role in 
cushioning t11e det1ationary effects of the sharp 
fiscal adjustment of tl1e late 1980s and iliat short 
term budgetary policy has been decidedly 
procyclical. The strength of the public fimmces in 
recent yecll'S has nevertheless been another 
important contributory factor to overall 
macroeconomic stability. The commitment to 
adhere to tJ1e Maastricht guidelines is likely to 
ensure continued fiscal discipline in t11e near 
future. 
Finally, we identify the ongoing process of 
institutional reform, especially in t11c areas of 
industrial relations, tJ1e semi-state sector and l11e 
administrative and political system, as another 
factor promoting a macroeconomic environment 
conducive to growth. We locate this process as 
emanating from the institutional pressures which 
followed the recession in tJ1e early 1980s. 
Industrial Policy 
The high proportion of foreign direct investment in 
the Irish manufacturing sector and its export-
oriented development makes t11e Irish economy 
quite unique a1nong tl1e EU peripheral members. 
This development is a result of a deliberate strategy 
pursued by policy makers. Since the late 1950s 
Irish industrial policy has offered significant tax 
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incentives and financial packages to foreign 
companies to locate production here. This became 
particularly attractive to foreign investment since 
Ireland's accession to the EU in 1973. The policy 
was outward-oriented, more generous tax 
advmltages were offered to exporting firms in the 
1970s, and gradually became concentrated on 
selected sectors, notably the electronics (including 
software), health care and pharmaceuticals sectors. 
The result of this outward-oriented strategy was 
that there was a significant restructuring of the 
manufacturing sector, especially in the 1970s and 
1980s. Production in manufacturing shifted from 
dominance by a largely indigenous, low-technology 
group of "traditional" industries which had strong 
links to the domestic and UK market to the current 
dominance by a group of "high-technology" 
indusu·ies, concentrated in electronics and 
pharmaceuticals. This group is largely foreign-
owned and export-oriented. 
During the 1980s this restructuring resulted in a 
sharp decline in employment in manufacturing 
(Figure 3.20) and led many commentators to 
question the wisdom of deliberately courting 
foreign finns. It was argued that the relatively low 
labour-intensity of production in the foreign-owned 
sector, and its low linkages with the domestic 
economy, signalled a danger that the indigenous 
sector ww; being crowded out and that t11e economy 
was becoming increasingly reliant on foot-loose 
foreign multinationals. 
However, t11e restructuring within the traditional 
group of industries was an inevitable consequence 
of tl1e progressive opening of tl1e economy to 
international trade. External pressures from low-
wage competing countries forced many inefficient 
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industries out of production. Similar adjustments 
occurred in the manufacturing sector of most 
developed countries (Wood, 199423). Viewed in 
this context, the pro-active industrial strategy 
pursued by Irish policy makers was central to the 
long-term development of a strong industrial base. 
Indeed, as documented in Section 3.2, Irish 
employment in manufacturing between 1975 and 
1991 grew more strongly than the EU average 
despite its poor performance in absolute terms. The 
long-term downward trend in EU manufacturing 
employment can be seen in Figure 3.20. 
In more recent years employment in manufacturing 
has picked up strongly. Between 1985 and 1996 
employment in manufacturing increased by 36,000, 
an increase of almost 17 per cent (Figure 3.20). 
Significantly there has also been positive 
employment growth within the indigenous sector. 
The shift towards high-technology production has 
also led to a significant increase in tl1e skill 
intensity of employment witl1 the positive 
consequences for growth documented in Section 
3.4. 
Figure 3.20: Manufacturing Employment 
1970-1996 
1990=100 
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l-1reland ...... EU·1& 
Data on EU 15 from OECD Historical Statistics: Employment in 
23Wood, A., 1994 North-South Trade, Employment and 
Inequality:Changing Forlunes in a Skill-Driven World, 
Clarendon Press. 
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The concentration on a small group of sectors 
means tlrnt Ireland is emerging as a major location 
for specific industries. This leads to spill-over 
effect, into the indigenous sector both in terms of 
received expertise and technological know-how and 
direct linkages witl1 the domestic economy and 
local labour market. For example in the software 
sector recent evidence suggests that many small 
indigenously owned finns have established niche 
activities within this sector. 
Clearly these spill-over effects form only part of the 
recent success of the indigenous sector. Since the 
mid-I980s industrial policy itself has focused more 
on promoting indigenous industry. In addition the 
shake-out of inefficient industry in the 1980s and 
tJ1e growth of a substantial pool of skilled labour 
available to industry has helped in the development 
of an export-oriented indigenous manufacturing 
sector. 
In summary the benefit~ of a prolonged and 
consistent policy of targeting foreign investment 
has helped in tJ1e process of establishing a modern, 
internationally competitive industrial base in 
Ireland. 
Fiscal Policy 
The fact that the present period of high growth 
started at abont the smne time as the 
implementation of severe cut-backs in public 
expenditure in 1987 has prompted the view that the 
two event, might have a causal connection. The 
term "expansionary fiscal contraction" or EFC was 
coined to describe a situation where a fiscal 
contraction had hotJ1 impact and delayed effect~ 
that caused tl1e overall economy to expand. Simply 
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put, this refers to the hypothesis that a fiscal 
contraction, by signalling to the private sector the 
implied reduction in the future tax burden, might 
actually lead to an expansion in private sector 
activity large enough to counterbalance to public 
sector contraction. 
Two recent Irish studies have tried to explore the 
idea of an EFC being the direct cause of a rise in 
the level of Irish activity.24 Bradley and Whelan 
(1997) explore the empirical likelihood of the EFC 
concept. The model used assumes that both 
households (in planning their consumption 
decisions) and finns (in planning their employment 
and investment decisions) are forward looking, and 
are thus able to anticipate that cuts in government 
expenditures now will be accompanied by cuts in 
taxation later. 
The model simulations suggest that, while the 
introduction of forward-looking behaviour into tl1e 
model certainly moderates the Keynesian 
contractionary effects of public expenditure cuts, it 
seems very unlikely that it can remove them 
entirely. Thus the impact effect of the cuts is still to 
decrease private consumption and GDP. Indeed tl1e 
analysis in Box 3 .1 suggests that short-term 
budgetary policy is procyclical. For example the 
largest reduction in the EBR as a percentage of 
GNP since 1975 was in tl1e 1983 budget. This 
contraction did not lead to an expansion of private 
sector activity in that period. 
24 B,my, F. and M. Devereux, 1995 "The 'Expansionary Fiscal 
Contraction' Hypothesis: A Neo-Keynesian Analysis", Oxford 
Economic Papers, Vol 47. Bradley, J. and K. Whelan, 1997. "The 
Irish Expansionary Fiscal Contraction: A Tale from One Small 
European Economy", Economic Modelling, forthcoming. 
Box 3.1: The Procyclicality of Short-Term Budgetary Policy: 1975-1997 
An interesting indicator of the short-term budgetary stance can be derived by comparing actual net exchequer 
expenditure in a given calendar year with that which would have pertained in the absence of any budgetary 
changes in that year. The latter measures what the exchequer fiscal outcome would have been if there had 
been no discretionary change in policy relative to the previous year's budget, the indexed outcome.a The 
computed difference between the indexed and actual outcomes then serves as a proximate measure of 
changes in short-term budgetary policy. If the actual outcome falls below (lies above) the indexed outcome 
then budgetary policy in that year is contractionary (expansionary) relative to the previous year's policy 
stance. 
It is a relatively simple exercise to estimate this difference using the ESRI macromodel. The model includes a 
detailed series of relations describing public sector activity and its interaction with the rest of the economy. 
The main tax revenues are determined as the product of a tax "rate" by a "tax base". b The main expenditure 
items (public consumption, subsidies, current and capital transfers, and public investment expenditures) are 
similarly included as the product of some notional "rate" applied to a notional "base". 0 These all relate either 
directly or indirectly to a set of policy instruments which can be and are altered in successive budgets. Using 
this model framework it is possible to compare the outcome of the model under indexed fiscal behaviour with 
the outcome treating all policy instruments as exogenous - actua/fiscal behaviour. 
Figure 1: Measure of Budgetary Stance 
- Difference Between Indexed and Actual 
ns'X,of GNP 
-1 
·2 
-3 ~--------------~ 
1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 
j11111Exd1equer Borrowing Requirementj 
Figure 1 presents the Exchequer Borrowing Requirement as a percentage of GNP measures of the (calendar) 
year-on-year budgetary stance, defined as the difference between the indexed and actual fiscal outcomes. 
This is not a comprehensive measure of overall fiscal stance,d it measures the change in budgetary policy 
relative to the previous year but is silent on the level and therefore on the sustainability of successive 
budgets.° A cursory examination of this graph indicates that the largest reductions in the EBR (as a 
percentage of GNP) were introduced in the 1983 and 1988 budgets while the largest increases were in the 
1978 and 1994 budgets. 
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The overall pattern of these successive changes in the EBR suggests that short-term budgetary policy has 
been decidedly pro-cyclical. Figure 2 further investigates this possibility, the first graph plots the year-on-year 
discretionary change in the EBR (as a percentage of GNP) against volume growth in GNP while the second 
plots it against year-on-year changes in the unemployment rate.1 The procyclical nature of short-term 
budgetary policy is confirmed in these graphs in the positive (negative) relationship between GNP growth 
(changes in the unemployment rate) and changes in the budgetary stance. Short-term budgetary expansions 
have been concentrated in periods of positive growth and falling unemployment while the most severe 
budgetary contraction was in 1983 when the unemployment rate rose by more than two percentage points 
and volume GNP fell by -0.5 per cent. 
" Note that because this indexed outcome assumes no volume change in expenditure it has an inbuilt deflationary bias. 
b For example VAT receipts are treated as the product of an average VAT rate - a policy instrument - by the VAT base, being 
essentially the value of consumption. 
c For example expenditure on unemployment transfers is determined as the product of an average rate of transfer - a policy 
instrument - multiplied by the numbers unemployed - determined elsewhere in the model. 
d In fact this measure is not time-invariant since it is conditioned on the previous year's budget. 
e After the late 1970s an increasing proportion of the EBR has gone in debt repayments. A rapidly increasing debt burden and 
historically high and rising real interest rates meant that the EBR was potentially dynamically uncontrollable in the mid-1980s. For 
example we estimate that in 1987 the increase in the EBR due to high real interest rates alone (relative to a constant real interest 
rate of 2 per cent) was more than 2 per cent of GNP. 
r Both of these variables (GNP growth and changes in the unemployment rate) also measure rates of change. The graphs include 
simple linear regression lines between the two variables. 
Instead the authors suggest an alternative 
explanation of Ireland's strong growth experience 
during the cut-backs, based largely on external 
factors. The fall in international interest rates, 
together with the big tax cuts in the UK and 
unexpectedly strong world growth, combined to 
produce an unexpected positive shock to Ireland's 
external environment. A model simulation that 
combined this external positive shock with the 
forward-looking behaviour of firms and 
households, produced an immediate and strong 
aggregate Irish response. Thus, although it is 
"EFC-like", the EFC interpretation is somewhat 
misleading. Instead it could be argued that Irish 
policy makers were lucky since the timing of the 
essential fiscal adjnstment of the late 1980s was 
carried out at a time when world interest rates were 
falling and world growth became unexpectedly 
huoymlt. 
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Reform of Attitudes and Institutions 
The prolonged recession of the early and mid 
1980s had damaging consequences, including, of 
course, a huge increase in unemployment and 
emigration. Against a generally adverse 
international background, the macroeconomic 
policies of the period, relying mainly on tax 
increases to suppress domestic demand, made 
considerable progress in reducing the current 
account deficit. Inflation also fell. But there was 
only limited success in redressing the fiscal 
imbalance which had been one of the principal 
causes of the recession. 
This perceived failure of economic policy 
undoubtedly added to the mood of pessimism 
which pervaded public debate at tl1e time. However 
this air of desperation, particularly concerning 
employment prospects, itself engendered a 
profound shift in attitudes which laid the 
foundation for tl1e subsequent sustained recovery. 
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At tl1e individual level, the searcity of traditional 
job opportunities created a greater spirit of self-
reliance among tlle younger generation. Even 
where this was manifested in emigration in search 
of opportunities, this was frequently planned as 
temporary, with the emigrants later returning 
equipped witl1 new skills and experience. 
At the political and institutional level, old 
certainties and assumptions were questioned and 
habitual practices came under critical scrutiny. A 
broad political consensus enabled the fiscal crisis to 
be tackled through deep expenditure cuts in a 
manner impossible to implement 5 years 
previously. Jn addition, an effective tax amnesty in 
l Y88, was, whatever its moral validity, successful 
both in raising immediate revenue and in 
broadening the subsequent tax base. 
A growing recognition of the damage to 
competitiveness from overstaffing, restrictive 
practices and cross-subsidisation led to major 
restructuring in the semi-state sector and in large 
parts of the private sector. Even in the non-trading 
public sector there was considerable re-focusing, 
either internally, or through formal changes in 
structure. 
Perhaps the most notable shift in attitudes was 
among the trnde union leadership. In adopting a far 
more long-term perspective tl1an had been common 
previously, they eased tl1e way of adaptation to 
change in large sections of the economy, buttressed 
competitiveness by agreeing to moderate increases 
in nominal pay, with the beneficial side-effect of a 
sharp fall in days lost to industrial action, and, by 
becoming partners in a series of national 
agreements, broadened the consensus in favour of 
continuous fiscal responsibility. At least in tlle 
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competitive sectors of tl1e economy, tl1e union 
leadership has managed to bring tlle majority of 
their membership witll tllem in tllis realistic, long-
tenn approach. 
As a result of these attitude changes and tl1e 
consequent institutional and behavioural 
acljustrnents, many of the outmoded practices 
which had held performance below its potential 
have been eroded. In recent years Ireland has tlms 
been able to reposition itself more favourably to 
compete effectively in the global economy, and to 
raise its potential for furtller development. 
3.7 Conclusions 
The growtll rate in Ireland in recent years has led 
to a convergence in the Irish standard of living, 
measured in tenns of GNP per capita, with tl1e EU 
average. From a position of relative 
underdevelopment just a decade ago, Ireland is 
now emerging as a modern, developed economy 
witl1 a strong underlying growth potential. We 
argue in this chapter tl1at to understand tl1is 
transformation it must be viewed within a medium-
to-long tenn perspective. 
We identify five medium-to-long term factors 
which have each made a considerable contribution 
to tl1e growtl1 of tlle economy. These are tl1e 
changing demographic structure, the increase in 
human capital, the openness of tlle economy, recent 
investment in infrastructure and tl1e domestic 
macroeconomic environment. 
The key factor where Ireland stands apart from 
international trends in most developed economies 
is tlle demographic structure. The natural increase 
in the population of working age and the secular 
trend tow,u-ds increased female participation in the 
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lahour force together account for an annual 
increase of 2 per cent in the supply of labour 
Lhroughout tJ1e 1990s. These trends have also led to 
a sharp drop in the dependency ratio. 
The strategy of widespread public investment in 
education and training occurred later in Ireland 
than in most other OECD economies. This began a 
process of change which has involved a steady 
ex tension of participation in education. The 
benefits of tllis education policy beg,m to come 
onstsemn in tl1e labour market in the 1980s and 
have had a significant impact in increasing average 
skill levels in the workforce. In addition, rising 
education levels have heralded a marked change in 
lahour market participation behaviour, especially 
among women. We estimate that the productivity 
effects of this human capital accumulation have 
added over one-half of a percentage point to the 
annual growth in the effective supply of labour in 
ihe l 990s. 
A third long-term strnctural factor which has aided 
the transformation of tl1e economy has been the 
progressive opening up of the economy to 
inLernational trade, culminating m Ireland's 
participation in tl1e Single European Market (SEM) 
project in 1992. This process has introduced access 
to a large market for exports, enforced external 
competitive disciplines on the domestic economy 
and has spurred tl1e development of tl1e necessary 
physical infrastructure required to support a large 
traded sector. Estimates suggest that the supply 
potential of the economy will have been raised by 
over 9 per cent by 2010 as a result of the SEM. Not 
surprisingly, openness and t11e SEM have been 
particularly important in the development of the 
lraded sector. 
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A fourth, more medium-term, factor has been 
investment aid from the EU, and especially CSP 
funding in the 1990s, in ilie fonn of both physical 
and human capital investment. This investment has 
helped in tackling structural lacunae likely to 
impede the completion of our transition to a free 
trade environment. Estimates suggest that EU 
structural interventions between 1989 and 1999 
will add between one and three percentage poinL~ 
to the supply potential of the economy in the long 
run. A related more long-term benefit, which is 
arguably more important than these relatively 
modest quantitative benefits, has been the 
introduction of long-tenn planning of investment 
projects which the CSP process engendered. 
These four factors reflect long term underlying 
changes in the evolution of tl1e economy. The 
benefits of such changes can only be reaped wit11in 
a stable macroeconomic environment. In particular 
such stability is crucial for the sustainability of the 
current growt11 performance. This stability is tl1e 
fifili factor we identify as contributing to tl1e recent 
strong growth performance. The correction of the 
public finance imbalances, t11e ongoing process of 
institutional reform, tl1e climate of political and 
social consensus in relation to medium-term 
economic strategy and the consistency of industrial 
policy have all helped in fostering a stable 
macroeconomic climate for business. 
The mutual interaction of these factors is complex. 
Economic theory tells us iliat the factors which 
determine the growth trajectory of an economy are 
highly endogenous to tlle growth process itself. In 
this context it is important to stress that the recent 
success of the Irish economy is not attributable to 
any single factor in isolation. Rather we have 
witnessed ilie coincidence of several favourable 
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trends emerging at the same time. Assisting t11is 
process have been several other, more short-tenn, 
factors which we do not examine in iliis chapter. 
The importm1ce of this mutual interaction of 
factors is clearly evident in recent trends in the 
labour market. A significant feature of tlle labour 
market in recent yecu-s has been t11e marked 
increase in tl1e demand for skilled labour. The 
opening of the economy, in combination wit11 a 
pro-active industrial strategy, made Ireland an 
attractive location for foreign investment, 
especially US investment, with easy access to the 
lmge European market. This investment is largely 
concentrated in high-technology production which 
requires a highly skilled labour input. The 
attraction of Ireland as a location for tl1is 
invesunent has been strcngtllened by the available 
supply of relatively cheap skilled labour. 
Foreign investment has played a key role in tlle 
development of a modern manufacturing sector in 
lreland, and tl1e sector remains very dependent on 
this investment. However one of tl1e most 
reassuring features of the growt11 performance in 
recent years, in contrast to tl1e late 1980s, is that 
growth is no longer solely export-driven but is 
more broadly based through all sectors of tlle 
economy. Domestic demand has bounced back 
from the mtificially low levels of the 1980s, 
necessitated by tl1e severe fiscal adjusunent in those 
yc,u-s, and a general air of self-confidence has 
replaced tl1e prevailing pessimism of the previous 
decade. 
Perhaps tl1e single most psychologically potent 
indicator of tl1e recent changes in the economy is 
the evolution of net migration. Net outward 
migration was in excess of 44,000 in 1989, just 7 
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years later in 1996 tllis figure had reversed to an 
estimated net inward migration figure of just under 
6,000. Irish emigrants are returning home because 
of tlle sharp improvement in domestic employment 
prospects and because the Irish economy, which 
only a decade ago was a byword for 
underperformance, is now one of the fastest 
growing economics in Europe. 
CHAPTER 4 
Financial Flows and the Balance of Payments 
4.1 Introduction 
Several elements of current and prospective 
medium-·term economic conditions raise important 
questions about the role of the financial sector in 
the years ahead. 
Rapid economic growth requires continued 
investment on a substantial scale. Will the tlow of 
funds respond to the needs in this respect? To what 
extent will these funds come from national savings 
(whet11er or honseholds or business) and to what 
extent from capital intlows? The boom has been 
accompanied by a turnaround in the balance of 
payments resulting in sharp changes in the net 
external assets of Ireland and in t11e How of 
investment income. Will Ireland become a net 
international creditor? Wit11 the encl of our 
independent currency in sight can we ignore the 
balance of payments and will there be a bonus in 
terms of unneeclecl foreign exchange reserves? 
This Chapter attempts to throw light on some of 
these questions, presenting the relevant data. It has 
to be said tlrnt national financial data sources are 
increasingly difficult to interpret, especially as the 
single nuu-ket blurs the nationality of individual 
financial institutions. An additional complicating 
factor in lreland is the presence of the IFSC which, 
by wholesaling huge sums with very little direct 
relevance to non-financial firms in Ireland, has 
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greatly distorted traditional measures of financial 
activity such as the money supply and total 
domestic crecli t. 
The chapter begins with an aJ1alysis of tl1e ilows 
between broad sectors of the economy. in recent 
years aggregate availability of funds for investment 
has been substantial; in Section 4.2, we present 
evidence that Ireland, having long been a net 
debtor to tl1e rest of tl1e world, is rapidly reducing 
its net indebtedness and may become a net creditor 
before the end of tl1e century. This is not only 
because of the reduction in Government borrowing, 
but also because, in recent years, the Irish business 
sector has been self-finaJ1cing in aggregate, 
suggesting that t11e financial sector has been more 
of a facilitator than a motive force behind t11e surge 
in private sector growth. The borrowing and 
lending of different sectors cu-e not wholly 
independent. In pmticular, household saving 
appears to be correlated with government 
borrowing, a fact which has tended to dampen t11e 
effect of government borrowing on the balance of 
payments. We also explain why the Central Bank's 
reserves have become a policy issue and cast some 
doubt on the usefulness of drawing down these 
reserves, as has been advocated by some. 
We go on in Section 4.3 to cmalyse the composition 
of financial asset and liability accumulation ,md t11e 
MEDIUM-TERM REVIEW:1997-2003 
shifting relative importance of banks and other 
institutional parts of the financial sector.. Taxation 
is an important factor in these shifts, as indeed it is 
in explaining the sectoral pattern of credit demand. 
When it comes to financial flows, demand and 
supply cu-e especially hard to distinguish. Even if 
funds are available in aggregate, they may not be as 
readily secured by some as by others; in this light 
we examine the sectoral distribution of credit. 
The final months of any independent Irish pound 
exchange rate and interest rates are at hand. 
Section 4.4 explains the linkages between 
exchange rates and interest rates in the period to 
end-1998 and the alternative possibilities for the 
entry rate of the Irish pound into EMU. 
4.2 Borrowing and Lending 
The Balance of Payments 
With Lhe cu-rival of the Single Market, some of the 
old sources of balance of payments data have 
vanished and the single currency will further 
reduce the import:mee of the balance of payments -
buL it will not be irrelevm1t. 
The recent revised version of the National 
AccounL<; substantially alters the measured current 
account surplus on the balance of payments. On the 
old ESA79 basis, the surplus in 1996 was estimated 
at 4.9 per cent of GNP; the revised ESA95 standard 
puts this smne surplus at 1.3 per cent of GNP. 1 Box 
4.1 gives further details on these revisions. 
However the trend towards surplus since then, 
together with substantial annual injections of 
'The data in this Chapter is based on the new ESA95 standard, in 
contrast to the remainder of the report which (for consistency with 
data available for the J 980s), still uses the old ESA 79 standard. 
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capital transfers from the EU implies that Irish 
residents have been reducing their aggregate 
foreign indebtedness. 2 
Looking over the longer run we can see from 
Figure 4.1 how Ireland entered the post-war period 
with substantial net foreign assets, ran them down 
fairly rapidly during the early-to-mid 1950s and 
then began to accumulate a net foreign liability 
position, at first slowly and then, from about 1977, 
very rapidly. The net foreign liability peaks as a 
share of GNP in 1986 and then declines rather 
rapidly to a position of the order of 20 per cent of 
GNP in 1995.3 At the current rate of decline, the 
net foreign liability would be eliminated by the end 
of the century.4 
2 If everything were measured perfectly, the current account 
smplus of the balance of payment~ plus net inward capital 
transfers, would by definition equal the newt accumulation of 
financial assets abroad. In practice, there is a substantial 
discrepancy between this and identified capital movements. In 
Ireland's case, identified acquisition of foreign financial assets has 
greatly exceeded what would be implied by the current account 
surplus. The discrepancy has averaged about 2.5 per cent of GNP 
since 1990. Therefore either the cmTent account surplus is much 
larger than measured, or some offsetting capital inflows 
(borrowing) are going unrecorded. In this chapter we proceed on 
the assumption that the current account figures are correct. A 
recent international survey of balance of payments discrepancies 
highlights the face that such discrepancies are a world-wide 
problem (World Economic Outlook, IMF September, 1996). 
Indications are that the principal data deficiencies abroad lie in 
investment and transportation income received but not recorded. 
3The figure is based on several approximations and should not be 
taken as providing very precise estimates. The two solid lines 
provide a range based on a perpetual inventory of the current 
account of the balance of payment5. The change in the real value of 
external debt is not equal to the ctment account deficit to the extent 
that there are changes in the real value of the outstanding stock, 
e.g. due to inflation. The lower solid line assumes that foreign 
assets depreciate in real tenns as rapidly as did Irish cmTency, the 
higher assumes that (after 1967) they depreciated only at the same 
value as the US dollar. The dotted line is based on identified 
foreign asset5 and liabilities of the government, the banking system 
and the insurance and pension funds. Foreign-owned multinational 
c01porations are not treated a~ residents. 
4For compaiison, the net external assets of the UK, France and 
Gennany were all about 7-8 per cent of GDP at end-1995, having 
fluctuated between minus 6 per cent (France 1992) and plus 26 per 
cent (UK 1986); The net external liability of the US has grown 
from nothing in 1987 to about 11 per cent of GDP in 1995. 
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Box 4. 1: The Revised Balance of Payments Under ESA-95 
The new ESA (European System of Accounts) introduced in the 1995 National Accounts substantially affects 
items in the Balance of Payments. Changes in the revised system which impact on the Balance of Payments 
include the treatment of (i) profits earned by foreign-owned Irish companies, and (i) royalty payments by these 
companies to their overseas affiliates. 
(i) Where previously only profits remitted were recorded as a factor income outflow, the new system includes 
all profits earned, whether remitted or retained in Ireland, as a factor income outflow. Reinvested earnings 
are then included as a counterbalancing inflow of foreign direct investment on the capital account. 
(ii) Under the old system, royalty payments were included as a factor income outflow. In the new system they 
are reclassified as a service import, reflecting the fact that they are effectively a part of intermediate 
consumption. 
In addition, the revised system has removed capital transfers, which are mainly tranfers under EU structural 
and cohesion funds, from the net transfers item in the current account of the Balance of Payments. These 
have been reclassified as an item on the capital account, which in turn substantially reduces the measured 
current account. Because of the large capital transfers in the Irish accounts this could be misleading to the 
unwary reader. The Institute will continue to examine in its publications a wider 'effective balance' concept 
equivalent to the old ESA79 basis. 
The figure below shows the net effect of these changes on the current account of the Balance of Payments. 
The revised methodology has greatly reduced the estimated surplus with a differential of almost four 
percentage points in 1995. 
Figure: Balance of Payments Surplus 1990-1995 
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This discussion illustrates that the concept of the 
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current account is not one which loses it,;; 
importance with the introduction of the single 
currency. Admittedly, during the 1960s and early 
1970s, trends in the current account of the UK and 
US balance of payments were closely studied in 
order to assess the ability of those countries to 
maintain their currencies without devaluation. 
However, the current account is only part of the 
story so far as sustainability of a currency parity is 
concerned. On the one hand, a steady flow of long-
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Lenn capital can be used to balance a current 
account deficit for many years, as is happening in 
Lhe rapidly developing South-East Asian "tigers". 
On the otl1er hand, short-term speculative flows 
can easily swamp a current account surplus. It is 
mainly because, as a relatively slow-adjusting 
clement of ilie overall balance of payments, tl1e 
current account can be used as a predictor of 
sustainability, that it has assumed importance in 
currency matters. Conversely, tl1e elimination of 
concerns about the sustainability of ilie Irish 
currency does not eliminate the relevance of ilie 
current account. 
Box 4.2: Investment Income in the Balance of Payments 
The recent revision of the balance of payments includes much new material on investment income inflows 
and outflows. The main elements are set out in the table below. 
Table: International Pa}'.ments - Investment Income 
%,GNP 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
Outflows 
Divicknds 9.1 7.6 8.4 9.3 10.3 12 
Reinvested FDI 1.6 2.4 3 2.3 1.8 4.1 
earnings 
National Debt 4.2 4 3.4 3.5 3.5 3 
interest 
Other interest 5.3 5 4.4 3.6 3.4 4.4 
Inflows 
Reinvested FDI 0.9 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.9 1.5 
carnmgs 
Other 5.7 6.9 6.2 5.5 6 7.2 
The data are broken into four main categories: dividends, reinvested earnings, national debt interest, and 
other interest. The heading "Dividends" shows very substantial gross outflows, rising to 12 per cent of GNP by 
1995, an exceptional level by international standards. By contrast, identified inward dividend payments 
(included in "other" under inflows in the Table) are extremely small, amounting to just £10 per capita, a figure 
which may well understate the reality (understatement of investment income is a common problem world-
wide). 
The outflow item "Reinvested FOi earnings" represents that part of the earnings of the Irish branches and 
subsidiaries of foreign multinational corporations which are not included in the "dividends" item because they 
were not repatriated. Thus, the outflow item of 4.1 per cent of GNP for 1995 represents profits of foreign 
multinationals which were reinvested in Ireland. An identical counterpart item is implicitly included in inward 
FDI in the capital account of the balance of payments. Conversely, the 1.5 per cent of GNP inflow represents 
amounts earned abroad by Irish enterprises and not repatriated. The substantial size and volatility of these 
items is worthy of note. 
National debt interest paid abroad has been stable at about £1 billion in recent years, and this represents a 
declining share of GNP. The "other" flows mostly represent interest payments and receipts. Both inflows and 
outflows are large, but there has been a growing net inflow which had risen to almost 3 per cent of GNP by 
1995. This reflects the steady accumulation of foreign assets by the private sector. 
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lntersectoral flows 
Lying hehind t11e overall balance of payments are 
saving and invesunent, borrowing and lending 
decisions made by firms and individuals, as well as 
the puhlic aut110rities. Indeed tlle typical economic 
agent is simultaneously a borrower and lender, as 
for example the household wit11 (on the one hand) a 
mortgage and a credit card account, and (on tlle 
other hand) a savings account witll a financial 
institution and some savings certificates.5 
Although some borrowing and lending is done 
directly wit110ut tlle intermediation of tlle financial 
system, by far t11e largest volume of funds flows 
through formal financial institutions such as t11e 
hanks and insurance companies and tlleir affiliates, 
and the stock exchange. 6 The financial system has 
assumed t11is role because of its ability to tailor 
financial products to tlle needs of the borrowing 
and lending customer more effectively than can be 
achieved hy a direct loan. Thus t11e lender is given 
liquidity and a degree of certainty of repayment, as 
the financial institution assumes t11e role of 
monitoring the borrower and pooling loanable 
funds. Likewise, the borrower can secure funds on 
longer terms or wit11 greater assurance of rollover, 
and so on. In addition, t11e financial system 
provides an array of products tllat can be used by 
customers to hedge risk and to make payments. 
'I\ description of the types and quantities of financial assets held by 
Irish households is in Honohan P. and B. Nolan, 1993, The 
Finanr:ia/ Assets of Househo/dr in Ireland, The Economic and 
Social Research Institute, General Research Series Paper No. 162. 
'T'ension funds now manage a very large, and growing, block of 
l'inancial assets representing claims of future pensioners. In Ireland 
rnost of these fi.mds are either managed by professional fond 
rnanagcrs (often depmtments of insurance companies or banks), or 
are invested with insurance companies. One way or another, 
Lhercfore, they too ,ll'e administered through the formal financial 
sector. 
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The evolution of aggregate borrowing and lending 
by different sectors in the economy throws light on 
changing patterns of indebtedness. But in order to 
draw inferences about tlle prospects for sustainable 
long-tenn growtll we need also to know whetller 
borrowed funds are being invested in productive 
invesUnent, or used for current consumption. Net 
borrowing by a sector bridges tlle gap between tllat 
sector's saving and invesUnent;7 a large flow of net 
borrowing can reflect eit11er a large excess of 
consumption over income, or heavy invesUnent. 
In Ireland, as in most other countries, it is tlle 
household sector which generates t11e greatest 
volume of net lending. Households in aggregate 
are net savers every year, and tlleir aggregate 
invesUnent in housing absorbs only part of tllis 
saving, leaving a surplus of net lending. Table 4.1 
shows tllat household net lending came to an 
average of almost 5 per cent of GNP during 1990-
95, a sum iliat was available effectively to finance 
business or government borrowing, or to be used in 
acquisition of foreign assets. 8 
In tlle event, ilie business sector too has been a net 
lender in recent years in Ireland. The profitability 
of ilie sector has allowed its savings (retained 
earnings) to exceed 2 per cent of GNP, an amount 
which, when added to tlle provision for 
depreciation, was more tllan enough to finance 
business invesUnent in fixed capital, leaving tl1is 
sector wiili an aggregate accumulation of financial 
or foreign assets of almost 1 per cent of GDP. 
7Strictly speaking, lump sum or "capital" gifts and transfers ,ilso 
need to be brought into the equation. 
8For an explanation of how Table 4.1 is constructed, see Honohan 
P., 1992, Intersectoral Financial Flows in Ireland, The Economic 
and Social Research Institute, General Research Se1ies Paper No. 
158. 
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Table 4.1: lntersectoral Flow of Funds 
'Yr1rfGNP 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
HOUSEHOLD 
Saving 8.6 9.4 9.0 10.6 7.9 9.0 
Depreciation 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.2 2.1 2.1 
Capital Grants 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.5 
All Sources 11.5 12.2 11.8 13.2 10.5 11.5 
Fixed Capital Formation 6.9 6.4 6.5 5.8 6.4 7.0 
Stocks 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.1 0.3 0.4 
Capital Taxes 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 
All Uses 7.5 7.0 7.1 6.1 7.0 7.7 
Net Ac4uisition of Financial Assets 4.0 5.2 4.7 7.1 3.4 3.8 
HUSINESS 
Saving (net of appreciation of stocks) 4.7 3.5 0.4 1.3 l.O 1.6 
Depreciation 7.5 7.7 8.0 7.6 7.5 7.8 
Capital Grants 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.8 l.l 0.9 
Capital Transfers from Abroad -0.1 0.1 0.4 0.3 0.1 0.1 
All Sources 12.7 12.0 9.4 10.0 9.8 10.4 
Fixed Capital Formation 10.9 9.5 8.6 8.2 7.7 8.0 
Stock Changes 2.6 2.2 -0.7 -0.5 -0.9 -0.2 
Capital Transfers to Govt. 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.8 0.7 
All Uses 14.1 12.2 8.5 8.2 7.5 8.5 
Net Ae4uisition of Financial Assets -1.4 -0.3 1.0 1.8 2.3 1.9 
GOVERNMENT 
Saving -1.9 -2.3 -2.3 -2.3 -0.2 -0.7 
Depreciation 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 1.0 
Capital Taxes 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 
Capital Transfers from Domestic Sector 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.8 0.7 
Capital Transfers from Abroad 1.0 1.3 1.3 1.5 0.7 1.4 
All Sources 1.0 0.9 0.7 0.9 2.4 2.6 
Fixed Capital Formation 2.3 2.4 2.3 2.5 2.7 2.9 
Cap Transfers to Domestic Sector 1.2 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.6 1.4 
All Uses 3.6 3.6 3.5 3.7 4.2 4.3 
Net Acquisition of Financial Assets -2.6 -2.6 -2.8 -2.8 -1.8 -1.7 
FOREIGN 
Net Foreign Disinvestment -0.0 -2.3 -2.9 -6.1 -3.9 -4.0 
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Box 4.3: Savings 
A huge econometric literature has failed to come up with a simple equation which captures the main 
movements in household saving. Inflation, interest rates, and the level of unemployment, have all been 
identified in the past as important correlates of saving, but each has shown only a transitory correlation. What 
seems clear is that confidence and expectations about future policy developments is likely to have played an 
important part in influencing precautionary saving. Thus the unprecedented rapid inflation, surge in 
unemployment and deterioration of the government accounts in 1975 are all indicators of a sharply 
deteriorating and uncertain economic environment. Conversely, the improved public finances and falling 
unemployment of the late 1980s heralded a recovery of consumer confidence. The government deficit is itself 
influenced by inflation and unemployment, as well as having a policy component. 
Figure: Net Saving by Sector, 1960-1995 
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A glance at the co-movement of the government deficit (shown as negative savings) in the figure above with 
the personal savings ratio strongly suggests that trends in the government deficit may be a useful summary 
indicator of those aspects of confidence which have so dramatically affected the savings ratio in the 1970s 
and 1980s, and hence may help predict future saving trends. Although the government deficit is insignificant if 
simply entered in a regression equation without modification, a simple transformation of the government 
deficit, subtracting the previous peak deficit from the actual, is strongly correlated with personal saving. The 
resulting regression tracks the major turning points rather well (cf. Honohan P. and J. Kelly, 1996, Long-Term 
Trends in Bank Resources and Bank Lending, The Economic and Social Research Institute Working Paper 
No. 70.). 
In other countries, the business sector tends to be a 
net bo1rnwer, and the fact that its domestic 
activities leaves the Irish business sector with net 
funds for investment abroad or in financial assets 
has been the subject of some comment.9 
The sharp reduction in the Government sector's net 
borrowing in recent years needs no detailed 
discussion here. It averaged only a little over 2 per 
9Recent data revisions have considerably reduced the estimate of 
this surplus. 
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cent of GNP during 1990-95. This is much less 
than the net surplus available from the household 
and business sectors and the result is that tl1ere has 
been an appreciable overall net accumulation of 
foreign assets averaging over 3 per cent of GNP.10 
Sectoral deficits and surpluses are not independent 
of one another. There are strong indications that 
10Tuis is not quite the same as the cmTent account of the balance of 
payments, in that capital transfers from abroad (e.g. from the 
structural funds) are no longer credited to the cmTent account of the 
balance of payments, but they do contribute to the net 
accumulation of foreign assets. 
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household saving in particular is sensitive to 
movements in government borrowing, whether 
because an increase in government borrowing 
alerts the household sector to the likelihood of 
future tax increases to service tl1at debt, or more 
generally because the conditions that lead to 
increases in government borrowing also lead to a 
deterioration in households' confidence and an 
increase in their desire for precautionary saving 
(see Box 4.3). 
The Reserves of the Central Bank 
Ireland's need for liquid foreign exchange holdings 
in order to engage in intervention in tl1e foreign 
exchange markets will change as a result of EMU 
membership. This function will henceforth be 
carried out either by, or under the instructions ot 
!he European Central Bank (ECB) and 
m-rangements are being made to transfer a 
substantial block of Ireland's existing foreign 
exchange holdings to the ECB. 
While Ireland's share of the initial transfers that 
have been envisaged (totalling up to euro 50 
billion) would leave tl1e Central Bank with 
substantial residual holdings of foreign exchange, 
it is not yet clear what the final amount of sums to 
be transferred or maintained will be. There are 
theoretical arguments suggesting that tl1is pooling 
of foreign exchange should allow an overall 
reduction in the volume of liquid foreign exchange 
assets needed in the overall System of European 
Central Banks, but no conclusive decision has been 
made. 11 
"'Ihere is also the important consideration that prospective 
members' holdings of DM and other currencies to be extinguished 
in the EMU process will not be available in the same way for the 
purpose of foreign exchange intervention. 
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For many years, Ireland's liquid foreign exchange 
holdings have been maintained at around 15 per 
cent of GNP (Figure 4.2). 12 At end-1996, the total 
came to just under £5 billion a sum equivalent to 
well over a half of tl1e Government's foreign 
currency borrowing at that date. 
Figure 4.2: International Reserves of the 
Central Bank, 1950-1996 
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Debate about the need for liquid foreign holdings 
has given rise to tl1e question: "Who owns this 
foreign exchange?". At one level, of course, tl1e 
owner is the Central Bank, but it has corresponding 
liabilities, as can be seen from its balance sheet 
(summary statement form). 
Almost all of tl1e Bank's assets are foreign. 13 On 
tl1e liability side are four large items. First are the 
banking liabilities: deposits placed by tl1e 
Government (£1.2 billion) and by banks and other 
credit institutions (£1.0 billion). The otl1er two 
items are more in the nature of accounting 
constructs than callable liabilities: tl1e note issue, 
amounting to £2.3 billion, and capital and reserves, 
amounting to £0.7 billion. Since the holder of a 
12This is inclusive of gold and of the liquid claims on the !MF and 
in SDR and ECU. The major dip was at the encl of 1992, when 
they fell to under 8 per cent or lower if one nets out the very 
short-tenn borrowing under the EMS arrangements. 
"Usually called the "Official External Reserves", a usage which 
we avoid here for clarity in the discussion that follows. 
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Table 4.1: Central Bank Balance Sheet 
£ billion 
Liabilities 
Capital and 
reserves 
Cuncncy 
Government 
deposits 
Bankers' deposits 
etc. 
Other (net) 
Foreign 
Lending to 
banks, etc. 
Irish 
Government 
Securities 
1995 
1.20 
2.09 
1.08 
1.19 
0.05 
5.39 
0.04 
0.18 
Note: Simplified from Summary Statement. 
1996 
0.75 
2.29 
1.18 
1.03 
0.03 
4.88 
0.26 
0.13 
banknote has only a notional claim on the Central 
Bank, we may take it these two items imply that 
some £3 billion of the Central Bank's foreign assets 
ultimately stand to the credit of the Exchequer 
through the Minister for Finance's ownership of the 
Bank. 14 This sum represents the present value of 
the undistributed seigniorage accruing to the State 
on foot of its monopoly rights to produce Irish 
currency. Being substantially invested in interest-
bearing foreign securities, this substantial cache 
yields (after deduction of the operating costs of the 
Central Bank) a steady flow of revenue in support 
of the budget £176 million in 1996 and £100 
million in 1997 - through the distribution of the 
hulk of the Central Bank's profits each year to the 
Exchequer. 
14Transfcr of some of the foreign assets to the ECB will not alter 
this, as they will presumably be exchanged for some fonn of 
certificate of indebtedness of the ECB. 
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Two issues arise: First, if most of the profits have 
been distributed to the Exchequer, how is it that 
such a substantial reserve has been built up and is 
it excessive? Second, how will the situation alter as 
a result of EMU membership? 
History throws light on the first question. Over the 
years, as the Irish pound depreciated against most 
major foreign currencies, periodic re-valuations of 
the foreign exchange reserves showed a persistent 
upward bias. However, until quite recently, 
conservative accounting procedures treated these as 
exceptional items not to be taken into the profit and 
loss account and therefore to be added to 
accounting reserves rather than being distributed. 
The accounting reserves peaked in 1993 at over 
£1.4 billion, or 5 per cent of GNP. 
In this way, the higher seigniorage being earned in 
the years of currency weakness, especially in the 
1970s and 1980s, the so-called infiation tax, was 
not immediately transferred to the benefit of the 
Exchequer, but was effectively invested leading to 
the higher distributed profits that we see today. 
Over the long run, no resources were lost to the 
Exchequer as a result of this accounting policy, but 
it had effects, both favourable and unfavourable. 
On the one hand, it may have helped avoid the 
situation, experienced in some other countries, 
where the Exchequer becomes consciously 
dependent on the inflation tax. On the other hand, 
it helped worsen the measured debt/GNP ratio at a 
time when its rise was a source of national 
demoralisation. 
As to whether the accounting reserves of the 
Central Bank are adequate or excessive today, one 
may first note that, with the stabilisation of the 
currency, the systematic biases of the 1970s and 
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1980s has been eliminated: there is no reason to 
expect a further trend increase in these reserves as 
a share of GNP. Indeed, the sharp appreciation of 
the Irish pound relative to the DM in 1996 has 
shown that the opposite can occur. This 
appreciation wiped £0.4 billion off the Irish pound 
value of foreign assets in 1996 and caused the 
accounting reserves to fall by over one-third. 
There are central banks around the world that 
operate with negative capital, relying on the 
goodwill of government to pay the annual deficit 
and operating costs. This is not satisfactory if the 
Central Bank is to have the independence to take 
decisions that may have political costs for 
Government. To preserve the financial autonomy 
of the Central Bank reserves are needed primarily 
to guard against fluctuations in exchange rates. 
There is less agreement on just what level is 
needed. Unlike banks and other financial 
institutions, the Central Bank does not assume any 
material credit risk in the sorts of foreign assets 
which it acquires; therefore, the 8 per cent capital 
adequacy figure commonly employed for banks is 
not really relevant. 
One reasonable approach is to calculate a "worst 
case" estimate for foreign exchange losses, and 
ensure tlrnt accounting reserves arc sufficient to 
absorb that. The largest foreign exchange losses 
(negative valuation change) in tl1e past quarter 
century have been in 1990 and 1996. They 
amounted to about 5 per cent and 7 per cent of 
foreign assets respectively. On that basis, it is hard 
to argue tlrnt tl1e accounting reserves of the Central 
Bank need to be as high as 24 per cent of total 
assets, the average achieved between 1984 and 
1994 ( especially since tl1e note issue is also a 
notional liability and as such help to support the 
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financial autonomy of the Central Bank). The 
recent decline of the accounting reserves to about 
13 per cent of assets probably puts paid for the time 
being to any suggestion that the Central Bank 
could make an exceptional dividend payment 
earmarked for repayment of part of the 
Government's foreign currency debt. Though such 
a device could be defended on national treasury 
management grounds (and perhaps as restraint on 
operating cost-;) were tl1e accounting reserves to 
recover strongly again, the net saving would 
inevitably be small. The saving of national debt 
interest would be largely offset by loss of interest 
on the foreign reserves leaving no more tlrnn 
perhaps £1 million per annum for a dividend of 
half a billion. Any such treasury management 
expedient would be strongly counterproductive if, 
instead of being used to repay debt, the proceeds 
were to be devoted to altering spending or taxation. 
The precise treatment of these matters in EMU, 
though as yet not fully agreed, is unlikely to alter 
the underlying position. The Central Bank will 
remain an independent entity. Any transfer of 
foreign exchange assets to the ECB will 
presumably be matched by some form of certificate 
of indebtedness from the ECB. The loss of profits 
from the reduced foreign exchange holdings will be 
compensated by dividends from the ECB the 
sums will differ in detail. No early decision is 
likely at European level on such matters as 
minimum capitalisation and accounting reserves. 
4.3 The Role of Financial 
Institutions 
A well-functioning financial sector is an important 
contributor to and supporter of economic growth. 
By a strong financial system is meant one which 
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mobilises substantial resources and directs them to 
those who can make best use of them. Comparison 
of growth rates across the world displays a clear 
tendency for those countries which have had 
stronger growth to have had well-functioning 
financial systems to begin with. This correlation 
holds even if we correct for other initial conditions, 
such as the starting level of development, 
investment rates and education. 
Weak financial systems by contrast tend to 
squander what little they do mobilise. The typical 
financial institution in a weak system is either 
poorly managed and prone to speculative excesses, 
or is so heavily taxed and so subject to direction 
from government as to whom should receive 
loanable funds that their independence of action is 
compromised. Ireland is fortunate to have been 
spared any severe crises affecting the financial 
system. 15 In this sense, Ireland has a strong 
financial system. So far as taxation of the financial 
system, explicit and implicit, is concerned, the 
problem has been more one of unevenness than 
overall burden. Administrative direction of the 
volume and sectoral distribution of bank lending is 
almost a thing of the past, with remaining controls 
chieily designed to ensure soundness of 
institutions. 
The elimination of exchange controls, together 
with the evolving single market in financial 
services and the general easing of regulation means 
that, more and more, Irish finance is becoming 
15A recent review of banking c1ises notes that three in every four 
countries have experienced significant banking sector problems in 
the last 15 yem·s or so. T11e only incident approaching that 
dimen.sion in Ireland was the banking implications of the butting 
into Administration of the Insurance Corporation of Ireland in 
1985 (cf. Honohan P. and J. Kelly, 1997, "The Insurance 
Corporation Collapse: Resolving Ireland's Worst Financial Crash", 
mimeo.). 
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integrated into an increasingly seamless world 
financial market. 16 Yet national and even local 
characteristics remain important. Successful 
finance is based on assessment of credit-worthiness 
and of the general business prospects of those who 
seek to employ one's funds. Such an assessment 
demm1ds local knowledge. The borrowing 
prospects of small firms depends on the ability of 
financial institutions with a local presence to 
secure funds at a reasonable price and to carry out 
the credit assessment in an effective manner. 
Foreign-owned institutions entering the market are 
equally aware that they must use local expertise to 
do business successfully. 
Of course domestic cqmpetition also influences the 
relative importance of different classes of financial 
intermediaries: the banks, other deposit-taking 
institutions (building societies, ACC, ICC, POSB 
and TSB, credit unions) plus Government savings 
schemes and insurance and pension funds. The 
behaviour of deposit-taking institutions is 
converging both in what they are pe1mitted to do 
and what they are doing, though the rate of 
convergence can be exaggerated. Figure 4.3 shows 
trends in the main domestic financial assets on a 
consolidated basis. 17 This confirms the continued 
importm1ce of the deposit-taking institutions, who 
have even increased market share since 1989, and 
the trend growth of non-assurm1ce company 
pension funds. 
"Though, as argued in Honohan P., 1995, The Impact of 
Financial and Fiscal Policies on Saving, The Economic and 
Social Research Institute, Working Paper No. 59, the single market 
process is arguably the least important of these three forces. 
17An attempt is made in both panels of Figure 4.3 to eliminate 
double-counting as follows: as we move from left to right, the 
assets of each new intermediary are added net of its claims on any 
institution already included to the left. Thus the figure for gilts only 
includes Irish holdings of gilt~ other than those held by credit 
institutions, the POSB, Life Assurance or Pension Funds. 
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Figure 4.3: Domestic Financial Assets of 
the Irish Private Sector 
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Households and corporate entities hold bank 
deposits both for transactions purposes, and as a 
store of value. Their holdings of the other liquid 
assets are similarly motivated. On the other hand, 
holdings of claims on assurance and pension funds 
,u-e primcu-ily stores of value. Market share, both at 
home and vis-a-vis foreign financial institutions, is 
influenced also by cost structures - long recognised 
as being too high in Ireland and likely to come 
under further pressure as a result of the single 
currency. But there are other external influences 
such as demography and taxation. Taxation has 
probably been the most important factor 
influencing market share in the past given the 
differential tax treatment of savings media. This 
underlay the rapid expansion of life assurance 
companies in previous decades, as well as the 
growth in the mortgage market. While the present 
regime is far from uniform, changes in the tax 
code, and above all the reduction in inflation, have 
greatly reduced the differentials. 
Jn terms of competition for assets the main 
dividing line has been between non-tradable loans 
(the speciality of banks) and marketable securities. 
There is a blurring of boundaries, as securitisation 
partially converts one to the other, and this process 
may be expected to continue. Because of their local 
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knowledge for credit appraisal, banks may retain a 
competitive advantage in making non-tradable 
loans at home even in the globalised financial 
market. 
Figure 4.4: Sectoral Breakdown of lending 
by licensed Banks 
Figure 4.4 shows the changing sectoral 
composition of the banks' aggregate lending 
portfolio on a quarterly basis since 1986. The most 
important change has been the growing share of 
lending to the non-bank financial sector (shown at 
the base of the column). This has increased in two 
phases, interrupted by some retreat between 1989 
and 1992. Overall, the non-bank financial sector's 
share has gone from less than 9 per cent of the total 
in 1986 to just over 30 per cent in 1996 - well 
above the sector's share in output. Undoubtedly, the 
second wave of growth from 1992 has been 
associated with the IFSC. The only other sector to 
see its share rising, at the expense of the rest is the 
personal sector, and the growth here is wholly 
accounted for by the increase in house purchase 
loans (up from 6 per cent to 16 per cent of the 
total). "Business and Other Services" has held its 
share at around 10-11 per cent, but others have 
declined. The sharpest declines have been in the 
Energy sector, which had taken 5 per cent, but now 
accounts for only 1 per cent, in Manufacturing, 
(down from almost 18 per cent to less than 10 per 
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cent) and Agriculture (down from 12 per cent to 7 
per cent). Manufacturing in particular is greatly 
under-represented in lending relative to its 
contribution to output: it has less than half of the 
lending per pound of output than the other sectors. 
Purthennore, its relative position has sharply 
declined since 1986. 
The substantial changes in sectoral share point to 
tJ1e ability of the banking system to respond to the 
changing structure of the economy and tlle 
changing needs of different sectors. Indeed, tlle 
prudential concern that the system might respond 
too willingly to the financing of an unsustainable 
property boom cannot be neglected. At the macro 
or sectoral level, tJ1en, it seems clear that finance 
need present no obstacle to growth, though the 
access of particular enterprises will inevitably 
depend on their ability to present themselves 
convincingly as creditworthy. 
Sectoral shares in bank deposits have, in contrast, 
been ratl1er stable. Household deposits represent 
about 42 per cent of total bank deposits, and tlle 
percentage has fluctuated only between 39 and 45. 
The next large block of deposits comes from tlle 
non-bank financial sector, which has fluctuated 
trendlessly around 20 per cent. Between them, 
these two sectors account for close to two-thirds of 
tl1e total, and a further 15 per cent or so is 
accounted for by "Business and Other Services". 
The only substantial trend in sectoral shares is the 
decline in the deposits of tl1e Agriculture, Forestry 
and Pisheries sector, from almost 10 per cent in 
1990, to around 5 per cent now. 
The global integration of the Irish financial market 
can best be exemplified by the growtll in the 
international business of the Irish banks. Although 
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there has been a trend decline in tlle net foreign 
liability position of the banks since the mid-1980s, 
their gross international business has grown 
phenomenally. For example, Irish banks' claims on 
non-resident non-banks denominated in foreign 
currency have jumped from 2 per cent of GNP in 
1989 to 36 per cent in 1996. No doubt most of this 
increased activity reflects a spin-off from the 
growth of the IFSC, but it highlights the enhanced 
openness of the Irish banking system, which has 
always been very high by international standards. 
4.4 Convergence to EMU 
It is projected movements in exchange rates, and 
the risk of such movements, that chiefly determine 
the international differences in default-free money-
market interest rates. Therefore we may take it 
that, when EMU begins, Irish wholesale interest 
rates will closely approximate those in the rest of 
the euro area. The obligations of some very large 
borrowers may have slightly lower yields than that 
on Irish Government securities, or on the largest 
Irish corporate borrowers because of their greater 
liquidity, and perhaps a perception of slightly 
superior credit quality. However, bearing in mind 
the small premium over German Government 
securities paid in recent times by the Irish 
Government for its DM borrowing, such a 
differential will be small - perhaps of the order of 
14 per cent per annum. 
In recent months, however, and at the time of 
writing (mid-April 1997), Irish interest rates have 
been much higher tlrnn those in Germany: at the 
short end, about 5% per cent against less than 31A 
per cent; at the long-end, almost 7 per cent against 
6 per cent. The question naturally arises as to when 
this gap will be bridged. The existence of the long-
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term yield differential of about 0.9 percentage 
points has been interpreted by some market 
commentators as implying market doubt that 
Ireland will indeed become an EMU member at the 
start in 1999. If so, the convergence in long-term 
interest rates will be associated with expectations 
converging on early membership. 
An important related issue is the question of the 
exchange rate at the time of entry. It has not yet 
been determined what this rate will .be, except that 
tl1ere will be no jump in market exchange rates at 
tl1e start of the EMU. It is possible that no 
collective decision will be taken on this matter, and 
tlrnt t11e starting rates will simply be whatever the 
closing rates happen to be on the last day of 1998. 
However, tlrnt would be to open the door to 
strntegic manipulation of exchange rates by EMU 
candidates in an attempt to achieve a competitive 
entry rate. Therefore, it has been suggested that 
entry rates should be agreed well in advance. A 
credible announcement of agreed entry rates would 
tend to be self-fulfilling, as the behaviour of 
speculators would tl1en have the effect of making 
exchange rates converge to the pre-announced 
values. 
Two possible formulae have emerged as the main 
c,mdidates for pre-announced starting rates. The 
first, and most likely, is to use the existing bilateral 
central rates in the ERM. For tl1e DM/IR£ rate this 
is 2.41. We assume in the Central Forecast that 
this formula will be chosen. The other formula is 
to use tl1e average of market exchange rates 1997-
98. The market rate of most ERM participants has 
been close to central rate in recent months. Only 
t11e Irish pound deviates: the average Irish 
pound/DM rate in the first quarter of 1997, at 2.62, 
was about 9 per cent above the central rate. Clearly 
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tl1e averaging formula risks resulting in a very high 
entry rate for the Irish pound. 
The likely long-te1m interest rate and exchange 
rate configurations between now and the beginning 
of 1999 are not independent, in so far as interest 
rate differentials tend to correspond roughly to 
expected exchange rate changes. On that basis, 
recent interest rate differentials against Germany 
have been consistent with an expected end-1998 
DM/IR£ rate of as much as 2.55 - well above tl1e 
central rate of 2.41. A credible announcement of an 
entry rate of 2.41 would lead to an immediate fall 
in the exch<U1ge rate, even without <illy change in 
short-term interest rates (and even if the market's 
beliefs about t11e probability of Ireland being a 
member did not change at ilie same time). 
Short-term interest rates are at most loosely linked 
to iliese expectations about entry and about entry 
rates. They will continue to be influenced by ilie 
domestic monetary policy stance tl1roughout 1998. 
The higher ilie short-term rates maintained by ilie 
central bank, ilie steeper will be t11e approach path 
to the announced entry rate. 
CHAPTER 5 
Background Assumptions 
5.1 Introduction 
For a small open economy such as Ireland, 
international economic events and the international 
economic outlook are important in determining the 
expected performance of the domestic economy. 
This chapter first sets out our assumptions 
concerning the external environment in which the 
Irish economy will operate over the next 7 years 
and it draws out the implications of this 
environment. While numbers are presented on an 
annual basis to 2003 we believe attention should 
focus on the average growth rates over the period 
rather than on the idiosyncrasies of the numbers for 
individual years in the next decade. 
This chapter then sets out our assumptions 
concerning the domestic policy environment - both 
fiscal and monetary policy. These two sets of 
assumptions, together with the assumptions 
concerning demographic developments discussed 
in Chapter 2, will play a crucial role in 
determining the growth path of the Irish economy 
out to 2003 and beyond. 
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5.2 The International 
Environment 
EMU 
Without doubt the most important international 
economic event that is expected to occur between 
now and 2003 will be the launch of Economic and 
Monetary Union (EMU). This will have a direct 
bearing on the performance of the European 
economy. For the purposes of this Review we have 
assumed that EMU goes ahead on its January 1, 
1999 start date and that the UK stays out and, 
while retaining the option of joining, that it 
remains out for the forecast period. (See Box 5.1 
for details of the institutional changes which EMU 
will bring). Ireland is assumed to join as part of the 
first grouping with at least Germany, France, 
Netl1erlands and Belgium. After 1999, monetary 
policy will be determined by the European Central 
Bank (ECB). ECB policy is expected to be heavily 
influenced by existing 
policy. The German 
Bundesbank monetary 
Bundesbank remains 
committed to a strong anti-inflation policy and now 
sets a two-year monetary target. Given tlle success 
of the Bundesbank's monetary policy it therefore 
seems likely that the ECB will adopt a money 
supply target and that it will use tl1is instrument to 
Box 5. 1: Life under EMU 
The transition to Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) should take place during the time period covered by 
the Review and so it is instructive to look at what life in the environment of economic and monetary union will 
be like. Uncertainties do still exist about some of the practical aspects of EMU but enough information is 
available at the moment to construct some picture of macroeconomic life after January 1, 1999, regardless of 
which countries join. 
One of the most basic changes will be that the exchange rates for countries that join will be irrevocably fixed 
in relation to other euro zone countries and against the euro itself. Exchange rate revaluations will not be 
permitted as a solution to economic problems. Following the fixing of the exchange rate the monetary policy 
of the euro zone will be determined by the European System of Central Banks (ESCB). The ESCB will consist 
of the European Central Bank and the national banks of participating countries. Monetary policy, inter-bank 
transactions, exchange rate policy and public debt issues will be denominated in the euro which will have 
become a currency in its own right. Monetary policy is expected to have the same objective as the present 
monetary policy of many existing national Central Banks - the achievement of price stability. From January 1, 
1 999 the ECB will hold and manage a portion of the official foreign reserves of the Member States of the euro 
area and will direct foreign exchange operations which may be conducted centrally by the ECB or delegated 
to the national central banks of the euro area. 
The Dublin European Council summit of December 1996 agreed the principles and main elements of a 
Stability and Growth Pact for ensuring budgetary discipline in EMU. Membership of EMU means that member 
states must avoid excessive budget deficits. Each member state will commit itself to a medium-term 
budgetary position of close to balance or possibly in surplus. Member states will be required to present 
stability programmes which specify medium term budgetary objectives as well as assumptions about 
economic developments. The national stability programmes will be multiannual and public. 
The European Commission and Ecofin Council will study national programmes and if necessary make 
recommendations to the member state concerned. If it is decided that an excessive deficit does exist the 
Ecofin Council will make recommendations to the member state concerned with a view to bringing the 
excessive deficit to an end within a given period. If a member state fails to act in compliance with the 
successive recommendations the Council can, under the Treaty, impose sanctions or fines. 
Without doubt macroeconomic life will be different after EMU begins. The national budget will be assessed 
externally and will probably bring with it greater transparency and awareness of government economic 
objectives and policy. To some extent economic independence on fiscal policy will be curtailed, given the 
external monitoring provisions of the Stability and Growth pact. 
National autonomy will be lost on exchange rates and monetary policy which, from 1999 will be determined by 
the ECB. Decisions on these will be determined not by what happens domestically but instead by events 
within the euro zone, the relationship between "ins" and "pre-ins" and between the euro zone and other major 
economic areas such as the USA. 
maintain the EU inflation rate at around 2 per cent 
a year for the foreseeable future. 
The differing economic performance of countries 
within EMU will be of particular importance to 
lreland as the new European Central Bank (the 
ECB) will be the final arbiter on the monetary 
policy of the Union and hence of Ireland. The 
relationship between "ins" and "pre-ins", our 
dependence on the UK economy, and how UK 
economic and monetary policy operates after 1999, 
will all be major factors in detennining the benefits 
to Ireland of the single currency. Once EMU is 
introduced the Stability and Growth Pact will place 
constraints on fiscal policy. The likely economic 
implications for Ireland of EMU have already been 
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considered in detail in an ESRI Policy Paper 
published last summer. 1 These implications have 
been built into the Central Forecast set out in the 
next chapter. 
While the most probable scenario is that EMU will 
begin on time with the membership outlined above, 
there remains the possibility that EMU could be 
postponed temporarily or even permanently. We 
foel that any postponement would result in a major 
increase in uncertainty and that this would be 
reflected by instability on the financial markets. 
The possible implications of a permanent 
postponement are considered here in Box 5.2 and 
in the next chapter we consider how our Central 
Forecast would be affected by such an outcome. 
While the assumed stance of monetary policy once 
EMU has commenced is relatively straightforward 
l11e path to Union may show some temporary 
turbulence. Until it becomes certain who will be 
members and what the entry rates will be for each 
of the c:mdidate currencies there remains the 
possibility that speculative pressures could result in 
fluctuations in exchange rates and interest rates. 
Here we have made the simplifying assumption in 
the Central Forecast that the path to Union will be 
relatively smooili. However, iliere may be some risk 
in the short-term tlrnt ilie external environment 
could prove less favourable. Provided that EMU 
starts on time any such temporary turbulence will 
not affect tl1e medium-tenn growth path of ilie 
economy. 
'Baker, T., J. Fitz Gerald and P. Honohan (eds.) 1996, The 
Economic Implications for Ireland of EMU, Dublin: The 
Economic and Social Research Institute, Policy Research Series 
No. 28. 
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World Growth 
As 1997 begins the mqjor economies appear to be 
moving from a period of low inflation and low 
interest rates to a situation where upward pressures 
appear to be building. Growili is firmly established 
in ilie US and in ilie UK and has been for some 
years, while Germany, France and Japan appear to 
be entering a phase of economic recovery, although 
in the case of iliese countries this recovery is not 
yet fully established. The slowdown in economic 
activity lowered government revenues and has 
raised a number of European countries' deficits 
above 3 per cent. To some extent the sluggish 
growth in continental European countries has been 
prolonged by the EMU qualifying criterion that 
budget deficits be kept to below 3 per cent of GDP. 
The need to reduce deficits ilirough reduced 
expenditure and/or fiscal tightening has possibly 
slowed the speed of recovery. 
Economic performance has been boosted in a 
number of ilie major economies by ilie easing in 
monetary policy iliat occurred through 1995 and 
1996. Short-term interest rates were lowered 
iliroughout 1995 and remained low and stable 
during 1996. From a European perspective, the 
decline in German interest rates from anti-
inflationary highs during 1994 helped lower rates 
in other European countries, iliereby aiding 
growth. 
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Box 5.2: EMU does not go ahead 
As EMU is one of the major events within the time period covered by the Medium-Term Review it is instructive 
to examine the implications for the Irish economy if EMU did not take place. This is done using the National 
lnstitute's Global Econometric Model(a). We assume that a failure to fix exchange rates at the European 
Council meeting, scheduled to take place in the second quarter of 1998, signals that EMU will not go ahead. 
The impact of this is assumed to be a 2 per cent annual appreciation in the value of the DM compared to 
other EMU candidate currencies. Short-term interest rates are assumed to increase by 2 percentage points in 
France, Spain, Italy and Belgium. 
The failure of EMU to start would lead to lower EU GDP growth. While in 1998, the year in which a non-start 
becomes apparent, this would amount to 0.3 percentage points, the gap widens over the next two years and 
by 2000 overall EU GDP is 0.6 percentage points lower than it would otherwise be. This reflects the impact of 
higher pan-European interest rates. On average, annual GDP growth would be 0.2 percentage points lower 
between 1998 and 2005 if EMU were not to start. 
Higher interest rates would mean that inflation would remain lower across Europe, averaging 2.8 per cent on 
an annual basis between 1998 and 2005, compared to 3 per cent if EMU goes ahead. However, the cost of 
the marginally lower inflation is higher real interest rates across Europe. German interest rates are assumed 
to retain a key role in determining rates in other European countries. Short-term rates in Germany are higher 
as a result of EMU not going ahead, by 0.5 percentage point in 1998 and 1999. Ultimately lower inflation in 
Germany would allow the Bundesbank to reduce interest rates. However, this would not occur until at least 
2002, when rates would be lower than anticipated in the Central Forecast. 
As well as the impact on the economies of the potential candidates for EMU, there would also be an impact 
on the UK. Sterling would initially be marginally stronger against the DM but would weaken after 2000. In the 
scenario if EMU were not to go ahead, sterling would average 2.42 against the DM between 1998 and 2005, 
compared with DM 2.46 in the Central Forecast. UK unemployment rates would be higher and would remain 
so until the end of the forecast period, reflecting lower industrial production levels. UK unemployment would 
average 6 per cent compared to a Central Forecast of 5. 7 per cent. 
The likely effects of such a shock on the Irish economy are discussed in the next Chapter. 
Table 1: Effects of EMU not Starting* 
EU GDP Growth 
UK unemployment 
1998 
-0.3 
+0.3 
1999 
-0.5 
+0.2 
2000 
-0.6 
+0.4 
* Percentage point difference compared to Central Forecast. 
2001 
-0.4 
+0.5 
2002 
-0.1 
+0.4 
2003 
+0.1 
+0.3 
1998-2005 
-0.2 
+0.3 
(al The National Institute of Economic and Social Research, London. 
In preparing our forecasts for the world economy 
we have utilised a number of different sources 
(especially the National Institute Economic Review 
for January 1997 and the OECD Economic 
Outlook, December 1996). We used the NIESR 
January 1997 forecast as the basis for our medium-
term forecast for the major world economies. This 
forecast was modified to take account of additional 
information available to us from a range of other 
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sources. In carrying out these modifications and in 
examining the sensitivity of our forecast to 
alternative assumptions we used the NIESR Global 
Econometric Model (NiGEM). 
USA 
The United States has in recent years successfully 
achieved a high level of employment and sustained 
GDP growth, while still enjoying a low rate of 
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int1ation. Following growth of 3.6 per cent in 1994 
the US economy expanded by just 2 per cent in 
1995, a welcome slowdown which reduced the risk 
of the economy overheating as a result of high 
resource utilisation. At times during 1996 
consumer prices. However, unemployment levels 
are low and there are worries that wage pressures 
may be building. It is therefore expected that 
int1ation will increase over the next few years, 
reaching a peak of approximately 3.5 per cent in 
economic indicators suggested that the US 1999. 
economy was recovering strongly and worries 
abounded about the risk of int1ation and the 
consequent implication for interest rates. However, 
GDP growth in 1996 is estimated at 2.5 per cent. 
While this is below historic trend growth rates for 
the economy it represents a positive performance in 
a weak international environment. In recent years 
the US economy has enjoyed steady, but not 
spectacular, growth rates. GDP growth is expected 
to increase to 2.4 per cent in 1997, but for the 
forecast period steady unspectacular growth is set 
to continue, averaging a little over 2 per cent until 
the end of the century and beyond. 
Unemployment rates have fallen steadily in recent 
years, reflecting strong growth in non-farm 
employment levels, which rose from 114.2 million 
in 1994 to 119.6 million in 1996. The 
unemployment rate of 5.6 per cent in 1995 fell 
marginally in 1996 to approximately 5.4 per cent 
and should remain at a rate of 5.4 per cent in 1997. 
Capacity constraints mean tlrnt tl1is rate cannot go 
much lower and indeed will rise towards the end of 
the decade. However, tl1is increase is only expected 
to be slight and the unemployment rate is expected 
to average 6.0 per cent between 1997 and 2000. 
Containment of int1ation remains one of the main 
challenges for the Federal Reserve. Int1ation has 
been subdued in recent years - the last time the 
annual rate exceeded 3 per cent was in 1991. 
Despite some worries during 1996, steady 
economic growtl1 did not lead to an upsurge in 
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Figure 5.1: United States Consumer-Price 
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Monetary policy has operated effectively in tl1e US 
in recent years, successfully engineering the "soft 
landing" of the economy in 1995, following strong 
growth in 1994. Interest rates increased, albeit in 
small steps, during 1994 and early in 1995. Only in 
July 1995 did the Federal Open Market Committee 
(FOMC) feel able to ease monetary policy again, 
bringing the Federal Fund rate down by a marginal 
0.25 percentage points, a move that was repeated in 
December 1995 and January 1996. Since tl1en the 
emergence of strong quarterly growth figures and 
some worries about the tightness of the labour 
market and upward wage pressures removed the 
expectation of any interest rate cut. As anticipated, 
monetary policy was tightened in March 1997 
when official short-term interest rates were raised 
by 0.25 percentage points as a pre-emptive anti-
int1ation strike by the Federal Reserve. Another 
small tightening is expected during 1997 and again 
in 1998 but interest rates will then remain stable 
throughout the remainder of tlle forecast period. 
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The dollar weakened against the Yen during 1994 
and early 1995, reaching a low in April 1995. The 
weakness resulted mainly from the Mexican peso 
crisis which was perceived as having a negative 
impact on the dollar as well as worsening the 
external balance. However, the dollar recovered 
against the Yen throughout 1996 and ended the 
year approximately 13.6 per cent higher than in 
December 1995. It seems likely that the upward 
trend against the Yen will continue for most of 
1997 as economic growth rates put upward 
pressure on US interest rates. The dollar has also 
strnngthened against the DM and ended the year 
nearly 8 per cent up on December 1995 values. 
This dollar strength has caused some fears about 
the competitiveness of exports which may limit 
growth. This concern may be justified to some 
extent as the dollar is expected to remain strong 
during 1997. However, the dollar is expected to 
weaken gradually against both the Yen and the DM 
over subsequent years out to the middle of the next 
decade. 
The US trade balance has deteriorated in recent 
years as a strong dollar, and poor economic 
performance of mqjor trading partners, had an 
impact. The appreciation of the dollar in recent 
months will not help the visible balance which will 
remain in deficit. However, despite some decline in 
the deficit during 1997, reflecting in part overall 
world trade growth, the deficit is expected to 
remain high into the next decade. 
Table 5.1: Forecasts for the US Economy 
1997 1998 1999 
Real GDP growth 2.4 2.1 2.3 
lntlation* 2.5 2.0 2.5 
Unemployment, % of Labour 5.5 5.7 5.9 
Force 
Short-term interest rate 5.8 6.1 6.1 
*Consumer Expenditure Deflator. 
As one of the major world economies the 
performance of the US has an important intluence 
on other economies. The prospects for tl1e medium 
term are for stable expansion of the US economy, 
with a growtl1 rate averaging at least 2.1 per cent 
during the 1990s and early in the next century 
(Table 5 .1). The Irish economy has benefited 
significantly from foreign direct investment, as has 
been discussed in Chapter 3. Much of the FDI in 
Ireland originates in tl1e USA. The steady growth 
forecast for that economy should mean a 
continuation of strong FDI by the USA to tl1e end 
of the decade. 
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2000 2001 2002 2003 1995-2000 2000-2005 
2.3 2.2 2.1 2.0 2.2 2.1 
2.7 2.7 2.7 2.6 2.4 2.6 
5.8 5.7 5.7 5.8 5.6 5.8 
6.1 6.1 6.1 6.1 5.9 6.1 
Japan 
Having grown by less than 1 per cent in both 1993 
and 1994, GDP growth in Japan reached 
approximately 1.4 per cent in 1995. Growth has 
not been steady but 1995 seemed to suggest that tl1e 
Japanese economy was returning to more sustained 
growth. In the first quarter of 1996 GDP growtl1 
reached an annualised rate of 12.7 per cent, driven 
mainly by exceptional factors, such as a 
government fiscal stimulus package from 
September 1995. Growth eased during the year and 
overall GDP growth of 3.6 per cent is estimated for 
1996. It is expected tlrnt tl1e rate of growth will 
decline towards its long-term trend and an annual 
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average of about 2.3 per cent is forecast for the 
period to 2005 (Table 5.2). 
The Yen depreciated steadily against the dollar 
from the last quarter of 1995 and throughout 1996, 
ending 1996 down by 12 per cent on its level at the 
encl of December 1995. Japanese monetary policy 
eased during 1995 with official interest rates 
falling to 0.5 per cent. Short-term interest rates 
remained at this level during 1996. The resulting 
differential with US interest rates contributed to the 
weakness of the Yen. The depreciation of the Yen 
is a double-edged sword for the economy. On the 
one hand the depreciation should boost the export 
sector t11creby helping net trade and growth. 
However, offsetting this, the prolonged Yen 
weakness is having some adverse impact on 
industry importing raw materials and companies 
with manufacturing facilities located outside Japan 
which have to re-export their produce back to 
Japan. 
One issue that will certainly influence economic 
policy in Japan over the coming years is the size of 
the fiscal deficit. Between 1992 and 1995 t11e 
government introduced a series of fiscal measures 
to boost activity and accelerate recovery. While ilie 
measures succeeded in offsetting some of ilie 
impact of the recession t11ey did so by having a 
negative impact on public finances. From a 
position of surplus in 1992 the public finances 
moved into deficit and by 1996 t11is had risen to 
over 4 per cent of GDP. Fiscal consolidation is 
necessary but can only really occur when growth in 
t11e economy reaches a rate sufficient to pennit the 
withdrawal of such stimulus. However, the 
temporary income tax cuts have ended after an 
extension into 1996 and a number of fiscal 
measures, such as an increase in the consumption 
tax rate to 5 per cent in 1997, will take place. 
These measures are all part of a tax reform 
programme, srarted in 1994, and which is intended 
to become self-financing in 1998. 
Table 5.2: Forecasts for the Japanese Economy 
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 1995-2000 2000-2005 
Real GDP growth 2.3- 3.2 2.1 
Inflation* 0.6 0.5 0.4 
Unemployment, % of Labour 3.4 3.2 3.2 
Force 
Yen/$ exchange rate 119 113.1 107.8 
*Consumer Expenditure Deflator. 
Overall the outlook for the Japanese economy is for 
a return to sustained expansion in tl1e latter half of 
the 1990s, with growth averaging 2.3 per cent. 
While the new century will see growtl1 rates 
decline to about 1.5 per cent in the first two years, 
growth will average 2.4 per cent in tl1e period 2000 
to 2005. 
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1.5 1.6 2.1 2.6 2.3 2.4 
0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.4 
3.3 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.3 3.4 
103.4 100.2 97.9 95.6 107.7 97 
Europe 
Over the forecast period the role of government 
spending in intluencing economic growt11 is likely 
to be significantly altered. In the short-term the 
European economies are undertaking fiscal 
consolidation in an effort to qualify for EMU. 
Following the start of EMU, qualifying countries 
will continue to control public spending as part of 
t11e Stability and Growth Pact while other member 
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states will be controlling spending to ensure 
qualification in the future. 
Government fiscal policy has an important role to 
play over the time period of the model in 
determining the growth path of the EU. 
Notwithstanding t11e Maastricht convergence 
criteria most countries need to pursue fiscal 
consolidation. This is necessary, not only to help 
lower real-long term interest rates, encourage 
invesunent, ensure reasonable price stability, but 
also to address the prospective budgetary costs of 
ageing populations. Budget deficits have arisen as 
a result of the fact that government expenditure, 
particularly public pensions, social spending and 
other transfers, has increased more dramatically 
than government revenues. Viewed positively this 
me;ms that governments do not face a revenue 
problem but instead must find ways to control 
expenditure. However, high borrowing 
requirements by governments to fund expenditure 
tend to rule out more productive uses by crowding 
out private invesunent, as a result of higher interest 
rates. 
Moving towards economic and monetary union will 
mean serious challenges in fiscal policy. In order to 
qualify for EMU a country must have a budget 
deficit of less than 3 per cent of GDP and the 
government debt to GDP ratio should not exceed 
60 per cent, unless the excess is either exceptional 
or temporary, or unless the ratio is declining 
toward the target level at a satisfactory pace. This 
effectively means that a limit is placed on the 
extent to which fiscal policy can be used as a policy 
measure. The deficit should not exceed this level, 
except on a temporary or exceptional basis. 
Awareness of t11is constraint has influenced 
governments in t11e frmning of budgetary fiscal 
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policy. If EMU is successful we would appear to be 
entering a period of low public-sector deficits. The 
Stability and Growth Pact means that the size of 
public-sector deficits will be controlled after EMU 
has begun through the possibility of sanctions 
against countries with fiscal deficits above 3 per 
cent of GDP through non-interest bearing deposits 
and eventually fines. 
The move to EMU means that the performance of 
other European economies will have a more direct 
impact on the Irish economy than to-day. Post-
1999 developments in the EMU economy, 
especially indicators of inflationary pressure within 
that Union, will determine the stance of monetary 
policy in the EMU and hence in Ireland. Thus 
Ireland's economic performance will be influenced 
in a new way by the performance of other EMU 
members, particularly those members that will 
account for a significant proportion of EMU. These 
larger members will greatly influence inflationary 
and monetary developments. Here we focus on the 
prospects for two economies of particular relevance 
to Ireland, now and once EMU begins, Germany 
and the United Kingdom. 
Germany 
Having contracted in 1993 the Germany economy 
grew in 1994, albeit at a slow pace. After strong 
growth in the first half of 1994, the rate of growth 
slowed throughout the second half, and during 
1995 the economy was static for most of the year. 
The economy contracted in the first quarter of 
1996. Growth rates remained low throughout the 
year and real GDP growtl1 of just 1.4 per cent was 
achieved. Growth is expected to pick-up in 1997, 
increasing to 2.5 per cent. In 1998 an increase of 
2.9 per cent in GDP is projected, while for tl1e 
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remainder of t11e forecast period an average growth 
of 2.3 per cent is anticipated. 
The level of unemployment, having fallen 
mmginally in 1995, rose in 1996 to an annual 
average of 10.4 per cent and has continued to rise. 
German unemployment reached a post-war high of 
4.65 million in January 1997 wit11 the 
unemployment rate going to 12.2 per cent. 
Unemployment levels me increasingly important as 
the German government tries to ~nsure 
qualification for EMU by meeting the fiscal targets. 
The labour mmket is in need of reform to help 
restore competitiveness for German industry, 
which had declined, partly due to high labour costs. 
The structural rather than cyclical problems of the 
labour market mean that unemployment is 
expected to remain high in 1997, averaging over 
I l per cent. The current poor levels of 
unemployment mem1S that a sustained 
improvement in German unemployment to 
previous levels is not forecast and unemployment 
should average 10.4 per cent until 2005. 
German inflation reached a rate of over 4 per cent 
in 1993. Since then it has declined steadily and by 
l 996 the annual average is estimated to have been 
1 .8 per cent. Inflation pressures me quite subdued 
in the German economy at the moment and so 
inflation is expected to remain low, averaging 1.9 
per cent in 1998. Wholesale prices fell in 1996 
and, alt110ugh expectations are that wholesale 
prices will increase by 3 .0 per cent in 1997, this 
rate of increase will decline to approximately 2.7 
per cent until at least 2003. While consumer price 
inflation is expected to move upwards it is not 
anticipated that it will exceed 3 per cent before the 
turn of t11e century. The outlook for price stability 
is helped by t11c fact that the pace of growth in unit 
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labour costs is moderating, and the Bundesbank 
remains committed to controlling inflation. In the 
period 1995-2000 inflation is expected to average 
2.2 per cent. Post-2000, price inflation could 
increase. 
The path of German interest rates is important for 
Ireland and the rest of Europe. The recent decline 
in inflation, coupled with the need for monetary 
policy to ease in order to facilitate economic 
recovery, meant tlrnt short-term interest rates 
declined during 1995 and 1996. The fragile state of 
the Germany economy, high unemployment and 
tight fiscal policy in the lead-in to EMU means tlrnt 
low interest rates are expected to continue into 
1997. However, German interest rates arc expected 
to rise gradually in the medium term for a number 
of reasons. Once economic growth becomes more 
finnly rooted monetary policy is expected to tighten 
to ensure that inflation remains low. Changes in 
interest rates are difficult to predict in the long 
term. The fact that domestic German economic 
needs may differ from a Bundcsbank desire to 
ensure a stable curo means that t11c timing of 
changes in Gennan interest rates are uncertain. For 
the purposes of the Central Forecast interest rates 
are expected to be increased by the new European 
Central Bank to help enhance the credibility of t11e 
new euro in 1999. Short-term interest rates m·e 
therefore expected to increase in 1998 and in 1999 
and are forecast to average 5.4 per cent between 
2000 and 2005. The return to growth by Germany, 
an important Irish export market, should prove 
beneficial to Ireland by stimulating the European 
economy. 
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Figure 5.2: Germany - Inflation and Interest 
Rates 
o~--------------~ 1995 2000 2005 2010 
The lasL Medium-Term Review (April 1994) 
referred Lo the two biggest constraints for the 
German economy as being the public-sector deficit 
and the loss in competitiveness. Three years later 
these two issues remain as important as before. In 
1995, the government deficit reached 3.5 per cent 
of GDP and it is estimated to have increased 
further to 3.9 per cent in 1996, partly due to poor 
economic growth, lower than expected revenues, 
and higher than anticipated expenditure. The need 
to meet the Maastricht fiscal deficit criteria has 
meant the German government is having to pursue 
a tight fiscal policy to improve tl1e budget position. 
Part of this includes a package of measures, 
announced in April 1996, aimed at reducing 
growth in public expenditure and increases in 
social security contributions. While these efforts 
have not been helped by high unemployment and 
low growtl1, t11e German government remains 
committed to EMU and seems set to undertake t11e 
necessary steps to qualify. A deficit of 3 per cent in 
1997 is forecast which would allow Germ,my to be 
in the first grouping of EMU members. However, 
tl1ere remains some uncertainty as to whether the 
German government's fiscal objectives are realistic 
in the face of continuing weakness in tl1e German 
economy. 
Table 5.3: Forecasts for Germany 
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 1995-2000 2000-2005 
Real GDP growth 2.5 2.9 2.7 
Inflation* 2 1.9 2.6 
Unemployment, % of Labour 11.2 10.6 10.4 
Force 
Short-term interest rate 2.8 3.2 3.9 
*Consumer Expenditure Deflator. 
The struggle for competitiveness by German 
industry looks set to remain a feature of the 
economy for the next few years. The high cost of 
labour remains one of tl1e key issues witl1 regard to 
competitiveness and there have been reports of 
German companies relocating abroad to reduce 
overheads. Bundesbank figures show iliat direct 
investment abroad amounted to nearly DM43 
billion in 1996, DM50 billion in 1995, and DM27 
billion in 1994. Some of the measures designed to 
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2.6 2.5 2.4 2.1 2.5 2.2 
2.9 3 3.1 3.1 2.2 3 
10.4 10.4 10.4 10.3 10.4 10.3 
4.7 5.3 5.5 5.6 3.7 5.4 
help government finances - a reform of social 
security rules - should help to reduce labour costs. 
The competitiveness of German industry was not 
helped by the strength of ilie DM iliroughout 1995 
and early 1996. Against a basket of currencies of 
18 industrial countries the DM rose by 4 per cent 
during 1995 and by 3 per cent against tl1e 
currencies of the EU countries. During ilie first half 
of 1995 the increase in the DM was as high as 5.3 
per cent against EU currencies. Since other EU 
member states account for approximately 58 per 
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cent of overall exports, this put companies under 
pressure to maintain competitiveness. However, 
some of this immediate pressure was alleviated as 
the DM weakened during 1996. This depreciation 
during 1996 offaet much of the gains of the 
previous year and the DM seems set to remain at 
this new lower level against the other major 
currencies. The weakness of the DM during 1996 
and 1997 is expected to help the export sector but 
this will really only impact towards the end of 
1997. The medium-term outlook is for the DM to 
appreciate against both the dollar and sterling once 
the German economy begins to recover, which 
mem1s that German industry must continue to 
address the issue of costs to maintain the 
competitiveness regained by t11e recent depreciation 
or the currency. 
As the largest main European economy, t11e 
outlook for Germany will have an major influence 
in determining the path of the Irish economy. 
Bundesbcmk decisions on monetary policy affect 
Irish interest rates (until 1999), as discussed above, 
and the importcmce of German economic growth is 
probably best reflected by t11e impact of German 
unification on European economic performance. It 
is therefore a benefit to t11e European economy that 
our forecast for economic growth in Germm1y is 
positive. We anticipate t11at growth will average 2.5 
per cent between 1995 and 2000 and while this rate 
of growt11 will slow between 2000 and 2005 it is 
still likely to average 2.2 per cent. 
UK 
The UK economy ended 1996 in a strong position, 
in contrast to many continental European 
countries. Growth in t11e final quarter of 1996 was 
0.8 per cent, the strongest quarterly growt11 in two 
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years. The UK has enjoyed steady GDP growth 
over t11e past number of years. Preliminary 
estimates of GDP for 1996 show an increase of 2.3 
per cent, compared to an increase of 2.4 per cent in 
1995. Growth looks set to increase to 2.7 per cent 
in 1997 fuelled by strong consumer expenditure 
growth while output appears not to be severely 
affected by t11e strength of sterling during the latter 
half of 1996, which continued into 1997. The 
expectation is that growth will expand further in 
1998 to approximately 3 per cent. From 2000 
onwards GDP growth is expected to average 
approximately 1.9 per cent per annum. 
A feature of t11e recovery in the UK economy has 
been the fall in the level of unemployment. Having 
peaked at an annual rate of 10.3 per cent in 1993 
the unemployment rate has fallen steadily since 
then and by 1996 it had declined to an annual 
average of 7.6 per cent, a drop in t11e number of 
claimants of nearly 800,000. However, there is 
scope for unemployment to fall further. An annual 
rate of 6.4 per cent is estimated for 1997 and a 
furilier decline to 5.8 per cent in 1998. 
Unemployment is expected to remain low over t11e 
forecast period, averaging 5.8 per cent of the labour 
force. 
Figure 5.3: UK Unemployment Rate 
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The performance of sterling on international 
currency markets is particularly important for t11e 
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Irish economy. During the final quarter of 1996 
and the first quarter of 1997 sterling appreciated 
substantially against the dollar and DM. Part of the 
explanation for tllis rise may be the strength of the 
UK economy compared to continental Europe and 
Japan. Interest rates movements have also favoured 
the currency. Official UK interest rates were 
increased by 0.25 percentage points at the end of 
October 1996, Ll1e first increase since February 
1995. While German rates have remained stable, 
interest rates have been reduced in a number of 
other EU countries. Uncertainty surrounding the 
EMU project has also boosted sterling. For the 
Central Forecast Sterling is projected to depreciate 
compared to the DM, and after 1999 against the 
euro, by around 1.5 per cent per year to 2005. 
Table 5.4: Forecasts for the UK Economy 
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 1995-2000 2000-2005 
Real GDP growth 
Inflation* 
Unemployment, % of Labour 
Force 
DM/£ exchange rate 
*Consumer Expenditure Deflator. 
2.7 
2.9 
6.4 
2.7 
3.0 
2.6 
5.8 
2.61 
2.6 
3.3 
5.6 
2.53 
UK short-Lenn interest rates, currently over 2.5 
percentage points higher than in Germany, are 
expected to remain above German rates, altl10ugh 
the differential will narrow to approximately 0.5 
percentage points towards Ll1e end of Ll1e forecast 
period. The differential may widen temporarily in 
I lJ97 if UK rates are increased following tl1e 
election, a1Ll10ugh a decline in interest rates is 
likely in llJlJ8. The s11·engtl1 of the economy has led 
to worries about inflation. There is the danger tliat 
the consumer-led recovery and tl1e low level of 
spare capacity in Ll1e labour market will lead to 
upward pressure on inflation and a tightening of 
monetary policy. UK inflation is expected to 
remain about 1 per cent above Geiman rates. While 
UK inflation rates will remain low over tl1e next 
few years Ll1e trend is upwards and inflation is 
expected to average 3.6 per cent in the five years 
after the Lum of the century. 
Over time Ireland's relationship with tl1e UK has 
changed and become multi-faceted. The traditional 
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2.3 
3.7 
5.4 
2.48 
2 
3.8 
5.4 
2.45 
1.9 
3.7 
5.5 
2.43 
1.8 
3.6 
5.6 
2.41 
2.6 
3 
6.5 
2.49 
1.9 
3.6 
5.7 
2.42 
relationship of dependency on an important market 
has been reduced though it still remains of major 
importance to many firms. The economic 
relationship has been altered by the integration of 
Ireland into tl1e European economy. Indeed, the 
relationship seems set to change further over tl1e 
time period of tl1is Medium-Term Review when 
Ireland joins EMU and the UK opts out. 
However, the UK still remains a m;:~jor market for 
goods and labour so developments in tl1e UK can 
have a large impact on tl1e Irish economy. The 
outlook for tl1e UK economy is positive and growtll 
will average 2.2 per cent between 1997 and 2005 
providing a reassuring back-drop to our forecast for 
Ll1e Irish economy over tl1e same period. One area 
of uncertainty in tl1e UK economy, that could have 
an impact on tl1e forecast, is tlle strengtl1 of sterling 
on international markets. Account was taken of tl1e 
appreciation of sterling while preparing the 
forecast. However, if this strengtl1 were to be 
sustained in tl1e longer te11n it would lead to lower 
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GDP growth in the UK, lower inflation an~ higher 
unemployment. While we expect the UK currency 
to remain strong we anticipate that it will 
depreciate from its current position in the longer 
term. 
The Context for Ireland 
Ireland has enjoyed strong growth rates compared 
to otl1er international economies. The outlook for 
the medium term seems set to be determined by a 
number of factors which include: the outlook for 
EMU; the strength of recovery in Europe; the 
direction of fiscal and monetary policy in Europe. 
As has been outlined in this chapter, the outlook 
for the main European economies is healthy over 
the forecast period. This is positive for a small 
open economy such as Ireland which relies heavily 
on external trade. As can be seen from Table 5.5 
growth in EU GDP is expected to average 2.5 per 
cent until 2000 and 2.3 per cent until 2005. While 
some slowdown in growth rates is expected after 
2000 this is not likely to be as severe as the 
slowdown that occurred in many European 
economies during 1996. 
As stated at the beginning of this chapter, our 
Central Forecast is based on the assumption that 
EMU goes ahead on schedule. Under EMU the 
euro is assumed to be a strong stable currency. 
Interest rates in the euro zone (i.e., post-1999) will 
also be stable, although not much lower than 
current rates in Ireland. 
It is likely that fiscal policy will remain tight 
throughout Europe over the next few years. The 
desire to qualify for EMU means tliat government~ 
are working to reduce the size of budget deficits 
and government debt. In the short-term fiscal 
consolidation will be offset by fairly loose monetary 
policy in order to ensure that the recovery in 
economic growth is not stifled. However, once the 
recovery seems more sure-footed some tightening 
of monetary policy is expected from 1999. 
Table 5.5: Euroeean GDP Growth 
1997 1998 1999 
Germany 2.5 2.9 2.7 
United Kingdom 2.7 3.0 2.6 
France 2.4 2.2 2.4 
EU 2.4 2.8 2.8 
The size of public deficits has moved very much to 
the forefront of economic policy across Europe in 
recent years as the proposed date for deciding the 
participants in the first wave of EMU moves closer. 
These deficits have increased as the sluggish 
performance of continental European economies 
led to lower tlrnn anticipated government revenues 
and consequently, expanding deficits. The 
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2000 2001 2002 2003 1995-2000 2000-2005 
2.6 2.5 2.4 2.1 2.5 2.2 
2.3 2.0 1.9 1.8 2.6 1.9 
2.6 2.7 2.7 2.6 2.2 2.6 
2.7 2.5 2.3 2.2 2.5 2.3 
difficulty for governments at present is to ensure 
tlrnt expenditure is controlled sufficiently to allow 
qualification for EMU while not jeopardising 
economic recovery. At present the measures 
proposed by countries to achieve entry include a 
mix of expenditure cuts and some temporary fiscal 
measures. 
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The performance of interest rates and exchange 
rates will be crucially important to the Irish 
economy in the medium term. Assuming EMU 
goes ahead on time, from 1999 it is expected that 
the Irish pound exchange rate will be fixed against 
a number of other EMU participants and that the 
exchange rate of tl1e euro will effectively be tl1e 
relevant exchange rate for Ireland. Based on the 
discussion in Chapter 4, we assume tlrnt the 
currencies of the members of tlle EMU are fixed at 
their current central rates against the ECU. This 
would he equivalent to a DM rate for Ireland of 
2.41, considerably below tl1e current level. After 
1999 monetary policy will be determined by the 
European Central Bank and will be determined by 
cvenL-; across tl1e euro zone. Monetary policy has 
cased in most of continental Europe over the past 
two years. A gradual increase in rates is expected 
as European economies recover from the recent 
downturn. 
Low interest rates have done much to boost 
confidence within the Irish economy. The current 
low level of world interest rates means that further 
sustained reductions are unlikely and tl1e overall 
level of rates in Europe is expected to increase from 
l 997 onwards. As tl1e German economy recovers, 
rates arc expected to be raised. Initially, tl1is 
increase is anticipated as a pre-emptive strike 
against ,my signs of inflationary pressure building 
up in tl1e economy. Underpinning the increase after 
1999 will be tl1e desire by the new European 
Cenlsal Bank to protect tlle value of tl1e euro. 
However, interest rates are still likely to be lower in 
the euro zone in 1999 than in Ireland today so 
EMU should see a fall, albeit temporary, in Irish 
interest rates. World interest rates, excluding 
.Japan, are expected to converge at around 6 per 
cent from 2001 and to remain at around tllis level 
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until after 2005. Jap,mese rates are expected to 
increase, altl10ugh this increase is expected to level 
off after 2000 at around 4.3 per cent and Jap,mese 
rates are expected to remain below European and 
US levels over the forecast period. 
The difference in interest rates is expected to help 
susLain tlrn strength of tl1e dollar in 1997. However, 
as this differential narrows after 1998 tl1e dollar 
will weaken gradually. On this basis a weakening 
of the dollar compared to the value of the German 
currency (the DM to 1998 and tl1c euro thereafter) 
by around 10 per cent is expected by 2005 
compared to to-day. 
Growth in world trade declined to approximately 
5.3 per cent in 1996, from 10 per cent in 1995, 
reflecting weak demand levels. The improving 
prospects for economic growth should help and 
growth of 8.3 per cent is expected in 1997. 
Thereafter, trade growtl1 is expected to remain 
stable at about 8 per cent for the remainder of tl1e 
forecast period. 
The European Union 
The European Union 1s unique in tl1e way its 
constitution has been evolving in a continuous 
fashion since its foundation. Since 1957 it has 
gradually changed to meet new needs and 
encompass an ever expanding membership. 
Ireland's accession to membership was but one step 
in this never ending process of change. Looking to 
the future it is clear . tlrnt the EU will have to 
undergo a further radical transformation to meet 
the needs of a wider Europe. 
Extension of membership to Central Europe is a 
strategic imperative for the Union. However, 
extension of membership will itself necessitate a 
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major change in the constitution if the Union is to 
continue to operate effectively. For example, 
reliance on unanimity for key decisions is 
increasingly impractical as the number of members 
increases. Extension of membership will also 
necessitate a radical change in the Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP) as the current Policy 
would see the EU budget bankrupted by the advent 
of a number of Central European countries to 
membership. (Pressure for change ~n the CAP will 
also come from the WTO as the next round of 
liberalisation is negotiated). The expansion of EU 
membership will also necessitate changes in at 
least tl1e orientation of tl1e Structural Funds to help 
promote cohesion in a wider Union. 
All of these changes will prove difficult to 
negotiate and their final impact on the Irish 
economy will he affected by the nature of the 
changes in the EU constitution which ::u-e agreed in 
coming ye::u-s. 
In tl1e Central Forecast it is assumed that the EU is 
ex p,mded from the middle of the next decade to 
include at least Poland, tl1e Czech Republic, 
Hungary and Slovenia. As discussed below this will 
necessitate changes in both the CAP and the 
Structural Funds with consequential implications 
for Ireland. The expansion to tl1e East will open up 
new markets for Irish firms. As Matthews, 1994,2 
indicated, benefits to Ireland from freeing of trade 
(in that case the effects of the Uruguay Round) can 
he quite substantial given the openness of the 
economy. While there could be some offset to this 
in terms of a diversion of foreign direct investment 
2 Matthews, A., 1994 "Implications of the GATT Uruguay Round 
Agreement for the Irish Economy for the Irish Economy" in 
Cantillon, S., J. Curtis and J. Fitz Gerald, Economic Perspectives 
for the Medium Tenn. 
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this does not seem likely to pose a mc~jor problem 
in tl1e immediate future. In the sectors where 
Ireland is currently attracting mqjor foreign 
investment the countries of Central Europe are 
unlikely to pose a mqjor counter-attraction in the 
next five years. In addition, these potential 
members are already proving attractive to Irish 
foreign direct investment, investment which may 
help strengthen the position of Irish finns 
competing in a global m::u-ket. 
CAP Assumptions 
In agriculture we have assumed that a mqjor 
refonn of the CAP takes place around tl1e end of 
the decade. The need for the reform arises from the 
impending membership of the EU of a number of 
Central European countries. The nature of the 
reform is assumed to involve a transition over the 
next decade to a world market where there ::u-e no 
restrictions in trade in agricultural products with 
tl1e outside world and where, as a result, EU prices 
fall to world market prices. For grain this will not 
involve much change from tl1e current situation but 
tlle price fall can be expected to be p::u-ticularly 
large in the case of meat and livestock products, 
especially dairy products. However, the fall in price 
will not be as extreme as might be suggested by 
current world market prices as the excess 
production of these products in protected m::u-kets, 
especially the EU, has tended to depress world 
prices below the level they would attain in the 
absence of such distortions. This change in regime 
would result in an ending of all quota restrictions 
on production. 
Here we have made the following assumptions: 
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• The measures will be phased in from 2002 
onwards with a steady reduction in price to 
world market levels by 2010. 
• There will be a 30 per cent fall in gross output 
prices below the level they would otherwise 
have been. When spread over the years 2002 to 
2010 this translates into roughly a 3 per cent a 
year fall in prices compared to what would 
otherwise have been ( + 1 per cent a year). The 
net result is a 2 per cent a year fall in the price 
of gross agricultural output over the period 
2002 to 2010. This fall in prices would be 
concentrated in the market for meat and 
livestock products. 
• There would be knock on effects on input prices 
over the same period. We are assuming that 
they fall by something under 10 per cent over 
the same period. Some of the reduction would 
be due to l11e effects of a major fall in the 
demand for inputs from outside the agricultural 
sector across the whole of the EU. 
• The ending of restrictions on l11e production of 
milk could be expected to lead to a significant 
volume increase in production, even at a much 
lower price. (The serious restriction on 
production in Ireland imposed by l11e milk 
quota is reflected in its high value). We assume 
that the result is a 25 per cent increase in l11e 
volume of agricultural production over the 
period 2002 to 2010. This is equivalent to a rise 
in milk production of about 70 per cent over the 
same period. 
• While l11e fall in agricultural prices should 
result in a move to more extensive agricultural 
production l11e increase in milk production 
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would tend to raise the volume of inputs used in 
agriculture. On this basis the volume of 
material inputs is assumed to rise by between 5 
per cent and 10 per cent over the 2002-2010 
period. 
• It is likely that this reform will be accompanied 
by some compensation for farmers within the 
EU. In this regard there is the issue of the size 
of the compensation and who pays for it - the 
EU budget or national governments. At 1994 
prices the above set of assumptions translate 
into a loss in income of over £600 million. Here 
we assume that compensation at an annual rate 
of £450 million at cmrent prices is paid to 
existing farmers. This would involve a gradual 
rise in subsidies over the period to 2010. 
Initially it is assumed that half the increase in 
subsidies is paid by the EU and half by national 
governments. All of the pre-existing subsidies 
ai·e assumed to be still paid by l11e EU. These 
assumptions of a continuing major role for the 
EU in agricultural subsidies could prove 
optimistic in the light of likely developments 
within tl1e EU, discussed above. 
It is assumed that all subsidies ai·e guaranteed to 
existing farmers and that they will die with them. 
However, this latter assumption does not have m1y 
impact wit11in the forecast period. 
Assumptions on Structural Funds 
It is as yet too early to know what will happen after 
the current Community Support Framework (CSF) 
runs out, but it seems likely tlrnt after 1999, 
Ireland's structural fund receipts will be less 
generous than in recent years, reflecting the 
significant economic progress which is under way. 
In the Central Forecast the technical assumption is 
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made that over the life of the next CSF - 2000 to 
2005 - lrish receipts will be halved as a share of 
GNP. It is further assumed that they will be 
roughly halved again between 2006 and 2010 
leaving them at a level which would be similar to 
the receipts in other countries, such as Germany or 
France. Set out below is a table showing the 
assumed profile. 
Table 6: Assumptions on EU Structural 
Funds 
£M, current prices 
% of GNP 
1997 2000 2005 2010 
1071 1052 
2.7 2.1 
812 
1.1 
568 
0.5 
Box 5.3: UK "opts out" of EMU 
In this Box we examine the probable impact on the UK economy if the UK opts out of EMU and the value of 
sterling compared to the euro were to fall by 10 per cent after EMU exchange rates are fixed on January 1, 
1999. Using the National lnstitute's Global Econometric Model we assume that the UK opts out of EMU and 
sterling falls in value by 10 per cent compared to the base forecast and remains at this rate. The results are 
presented as changes compared to the base forecast. 
This depreciation affects the UK economy through a number of different channels. To support the currency 
interest rates would rise in the first quarter of 1999, and would be approximately 0.5 percentage points higher 
than they would otherwise be. Short-term interest rates would remain higher than the Central Forecast for the 
time-frame of the MTR. UK inflation would increase significantly. In 1999 consumer price inflation would be 
0.9 percentage points higher. This difference widens over the forecast period and by 2002 reaches + 1.1 per 
cent. 
The depreciation has implications for trade volumes. The volume of exports increases by an additional 1.7 per 
cent in 1999 and 1.0 per cent in 2000. There is a decline in export volumes in 2001 and 2002 of -0.4 per cent 
and -0.6 per cent respectively. This may reflect an increase in manufacturing export prices from 2000, pushed 
upwards by large increases in manufacturing earnings. Initially import volumes remain unchanged. However, 
there is quite a large decline in 2000 and 2001, volumes fall by -1.8 and -1. 7 percentage points. 
In the short run it appears that the depreciation has a positive impact on employment levels. Following the 
depreciation employment would grow by an extra 25,000 in 2000, 85,000 in 2001 and 45,000 in 2002. 
However, after that, the impact is not as positive, as a result of a decline in manufacturing employment, and 
employment numbers grow by a greater amount in the base forecast. This is reflected in the unemployment 
rate which declines in the two years following the exchange rate fall (i.e., to 2001) after which it begins to 
climb again. 
Table 1: Change in Growth of the UK Economy Due to Sterling Depreciation, Percentage 
Points 
1999 2000 2001 2002 
Manufacturing earnings 0.7 1.8 1.7 1.2 
Industrial production 0.5 0.3 -0.4 -0.5 
Wholesale prices 0.8 1.9 1.6 1.2 
Unemployment (change in rate) -0.l -0.4 -0.6 -0.4 
Short interest rates ( change in rate) 0.9 1.5 1.9 2.2 
Export volumes 1.7 1.0 -0.4 -0.6 
Import volumes 0.0 -1.8 -1.7 -1.l 
Consumer Prices 1.1 1.3 1.3 1.1 
*Difference compared to base forecast. 
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MEDIUM-TERM REVIEW: 1997-2003 
An immediate effect of the depreciation is that GDP growth is boosted by nearly half a percentage point in 
1999. This is a short-run gain for the UK economy. Growth falls by 0.3 percentage point in 2001 to 
approximately 1. 7 per cent, and continues to decline to a rate of 1.4 per cent in 2002 and 2003. The 
slowdown in growth can be attributed to a number of factors. Higher inflation means that short term interest 
rates are increased and remain higher, thereby curtailing growth. In the medium term trade volumes fall, 
growth in consumer expenditure slows and investment by business falls. 
5.3 Domestic Assumptions 
Monetary Policy 
The assumptions concerning convergence to EMU, 
which underly Irish monetary policy, were 
discussed in Chapter 4. These imply that from the 
date that Irish membership of EMU becomes 
certain, Irish interest rates will converge on 
German rates. From 1999 onwards we are 
assuming that there will be a small risk margin 
(0.25 per cent) on government borrowing in euros. 
The benchmark lending rate in Ireland should be 
similm to that in Gennany, France or other EMU 
members for borrowers witl1 similar risk profiles. 
The resulting time path for the benchmark lending 
rate is shown in Figure 5.4. 
Figure 5.4: Irish Benchmark Lending Rate 
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From 1999 onwards, pmities within the EMU are 
fixed and the key exchange rates for Ireland will 
then be the euro-sterling and the euro-dollar rates. 
Their likely time paths have been discussed above. 
In the case of the sterling rate there will remain tlle 
possibility of significant disturbances around the 
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expected trend so long as tlle UK remains outside 
the EMU. This possibility is discussed in Box 5.3 
and in the next Chapter we consider how tl1e 
Central Forecast would be affected by such 
developments. 
The Public Finances 
Since the early 1980s tl1e key requirement for 
medium-term policy on the public finances was to 
reduce the level of the national debt. However, 
given tlle progress made to date and tl1e likely 
progress in the next five years, this is no longer tl1e 
over-riding issue in detennining tl1e appropriate 
time path for government borrowing. The 
"demographic dividend", outlined in Chapter 2, 
means that the social pressures on the public 
finances over the next decade will tend to ease 
(whatever about the political pressures). However, 
it seems likely that tl1is period of low dependency 
rates will not last indefinitely. Some time between 
2020 and 2030 tl1e levels of old age dependency 
will begin to put increasing pressure on domestic 
resources. Just as private pensions are funded 
through savings, it may be prudent for the 
government to save during tl1e years "of plenty" to 
provide against any such increasing demands for 
support in the distant future. 
Under these circumstances it seems appropriate 
tliat the level of government borrowing should be 
further reduced or even eliminated over the next 
decade with the government running a small 
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surplus over that period. In the next few years the 
rapid growth will make such a policy feasible 
without. ,my recourse to t11e type of draconian 
policies needed in the 1980s. However, it will only 
be achieved if the Irish public keep their 
expectations for public services in line with tJ1e 
state's ability to fund tJ1em. In the next chapter we 
discuss tJ1e possible consequences if expectations of 
the public at large, and more especially those of 
state funded employees, run ahead of tJ1e 
economy's ability to pay. 
By running a small surplus, provision can be made 
for any deterioration in circumstances compared to 
the Central Forecast later in tJ1e next century. 
Obviously if economic circumstances proved less 
favourable tJrnn anticipated tJ1ere would probably 
he a return to emigration. This, in turn, would see a 
deterioration in tJ1e demographic situation but tJ1ere 
would be a corresponding reduction in future 
liabilities. This might justify a somewhat looser 
fiscal policy stance. 
In the next few years the Government faces the 
likelihood that l11e EU Structural Funds will begin 
to fall and iliat ,my such reduction will coincide 
with a period when economic growth will require 
increased investment in infrastructure rather than a 
reduction. To make it possible for future 
government's to gradually take over ilie funding of 
a major programme of infrastructural investment it 
will be necessary for the government to maintain a 
fairly tight fiscal policy out to 1999. 
In our discussion so far we have not referred to 
either the Maastricht criteria or to the Stability and 
Growth Pact as constraints on fiscal policy. This is 
because the likely circumstances of the Irish 
economy and Irish society over the next decade will 
argue for government surpluses greater than eitJ1er 
of l11ese external criteria would require. If the 
economy grows along tJ1e lines suggested in the 
Central Forecast, these external restrictions on 
policy will prove itTelevant to tJ1e needs of tJ1e Irish 
economy. 
Table 5.7: Government Income and Expenditure 
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 1990-1995 1995-2000 2000-2005 2005-2010 
Taxes on Income and Wealth 10.17 5.45 6.47 4.63 8.99 4.29 7.09 6.93 7.88 7.12 6.48 4.75 
Company 24.12 6.09 2.46 3.53 8.85 4.96 7.24 6.77 17.99 8.74 6.56 5.91 
Personal 7.62 5.32 7.33 4.86 9.02 4.15 7.06 6.96 6.51 6.82 6.46 4.51 
Taxes on Expenditure 8.42 9.88 8.97 8.48 6.04 6.37 6.49 7.07 6.19 8.35 7.04 6.44 
Transfers From A broad 2.17 1.52 11.94 6.67 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.48 5.39 5.00 5.00 
Total Current Receipts 9.78 6.42 7.69 6.39 7.61 5.24 6.80 6.98 6.90 7.57 6.73 5.55 
Subsidies 13.86 8.70 4.42 4.86 3.97 3.76 8.92 9.09 5.15 7.10 7.90 6.70 
National Debt Interest -2.77 0.00 -4.95 -1.96 0.04 -3.91 -0.48 -0.63 -1.36 -l.95 -2.57 -3.20 
Transfor Payments 11.14 7.53 3.53 4.66 6.06 5.62 5.62 4.99 8.54 6.55 5.15 5.26 
Foreign 29.6] 32.96 7.88 8.05 6.74 6.54 6.79 7.18 32.50 16.48 7.11 6.65 
Residents 10.46 6.44 3.30 4.47 6.02 5.56 5.56 4.86 8.05 6.11 5.04 5.17 
Public Consumption 7.02 7.50 6.20 6.97 7.75 6.42 6.97 6.95 7.66 7.09 7.05 7.33 
Tota[ Current Expenditure 7.54 6.59 3.66 4.93 6.12 5.00 5.79 5.54 6.33 5.76 5.47 5.86 
Total Capital Receipts -15.66 1.68 4.00 4.00 -15.08 -7.23 -8.11 -9.18 14.53 -4.66 -3.49 4.00 
Total Capital Expenditure 4.68 5.23 13.19 10.53 9.50 9.04 9.10 9.27 9.07 8.58 9.25 9.08 
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Current Expenditure 
Full details of the assumed growth in the 
components of expenditure are given in Table 5.7. 
The allocation of expenditure, assumed here, does 
not represent a view as to how it ought to be spent. 
It is our best estimate of what is likely to happen, 
given the experience of the last decade. In the case 
of subsidies we have assumed that consumer and 
producer subsidies, excluding agricultural subsidies 
funded by the Irish govern·ment, will not be 
extended in volume, though rising in line with 
expected inflation. However, as discussed above, 
any move to renationalise the CAP (force the Irish 
government to take over funding of agricultural 
subsidies) could put heavy pressure on expenditure. 
Here we have assumed that half of any increase in 
real subsidies to farmers as a result of a future CAP 
reform will he funded by the Irish tax payer, the 
other half being a charge on the EU budget. This is 
assumed to give rise to an acceleration in the 
growtl1 111 government subsidies from 2002 
onwards. 
National debt interest payments are expected to fall 
throughout the forecast period, primarily because 
of the reduction in the debt burden. The effect of 
changes in interest rates is not expected to play a 
major role in reducing such payments, though it 
will make a minor contribution, especially in the 
initial period when Irish interest rates converge on 
the expected lower euro rates. 
The projected increase in transfers is based on a 
detailed examination of their composition and the 
related change in demographic variables in the 
forecast period. Details of the assumptions made 
are given in Table 5.8. In the case of the 
educational tramfers (funding much of second and 
third level education) it is assumed that there is no 
volume change and that they are indexed to 
average earnings in the public sector. As the 
number of schoolchildren will fall by an annual 
average of around 1.3 per cent a year over the next 
15 years this represents a significant increase in the 
volume of services provided. It is appropriate that 
in the case of primary and secondary education this 
increase in resources should be targeted at the most 
needy pupils rather than being lost in a general 
increase in teacher pupil ratios. 
As discussed in the next chapter, the numbers 
unemployed are expected to fall fairly steadily over 
the next decade resulting in a reduction in 
expenditure on unemployment transfers. 
Table 5.8: Assumptions on Transfers 
(Excluding Unemployment and Education) 
Type of 
Transfer 
Children 
Old Age 
Housing 
Other 
Share of 
Transfers in 
1994 
% 
14 
25 
6 
56 
Assumed Annual 
Volume Increase 
% 
-1.2 
1.2 
5.5 
2 
Rates of payment to those unemployed and to all 
other welfare beneficiaries are assumed to rise in 
line with average earnings in industry. This is 
broadly the experience in the past decade, even if it 
has not been explicit government policy. As the 
human capital of those engaged in industrial 
employment rises this will lead to a rise in the 
average earnings figure at a higher rate than would 
be observed for any individual (as employees in 
industry with lower human capital are replaced by 
younger workers with higher human capital). In 
using the average earnings figure there will be 
some upward bias in rates of payment which might 
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cause problems in terms of the replacement ratio. 
As a result, the detailed implementation of such a 
rale of increase will require care to ensure that new 
poverty traps are not created. This matter is taken 
up in tl1e concluding chapter of this Review. 
The volume decline in child dependency payments, 
assumed in t11e forecast, reflects the underlying 
demographic trends. The small rise in the volume 
of old-age dependency payments reflects the likely 
rise in numbers aged 65 and over in the population 
in the next 15 years. The big volume increase in 
Lransfers related to housing reflects the expected 
pressure in tl1e housing market over the next 15 
years. These pressures, which will arise from the 
rapid number of people in high-paid employment, 
may leave a substantial number of people who are 
not in the labour market more dependent on state 
support than in tl1e past. The cost of provision of 
social housing will itself rise in real terms 
reflecting the pressures from population and 
employment growtl1. The growing importance of 
rent subsidies over the 1990s presages a likely 
furtl1er major increase in the forecast period. 
For other transfers - disability benefit, lone parent 
payments, etc., a real increase of 2 per cent is 
assumed. 
Finally, transfers paid abroad include a significant 
and growing part of Ireland's contribution to the 
EU budget. (The remainder is paid for by EU taxes 
which are deducted from revenue from certain 
indirect taxes and forwarded to the EU). The 
growtl1 in GNP, the base for calculating Ireland's 
contribution to the EU budget, will see a rapid 
increase over tl1e forecast period. 
Numbers employed in healtl1 and education are 
assumed to rise at 2.5 per cent a year - slightly less 
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than the rate observed in the 1990-95 period (2.7 
per cent). Given rapidly falling numbers of 
children, this leaves room for a slightly faster rise 
in employment in the health area, broadly defined. 
Numbers employed in public administration 
(including tl1e Gardai and the Army) are assumed 
to rise at 2 per cent a year. The volume of other 
public expenditure on goods and services 
(excluding direct employment) is expected to grow 
more rapidly than tl1e growth in employment. 
Overall the volume of public consumption is 
assumed to rise at around 3.3 per cent a year in tl1e 
forecast period somewhat more rapidly than in 
the 1990-97 period (2.6 per cent). 
As a result of changes already agreed, average 
earnings in the public sector are assumed to rise up 
to 1 percentage point a year faster than in the 
private sector over the rest of the 1990s. Thereafter 
they are assumed to rise in line witl1 average 
earnings in industry. This longer-term growtl1 rate 
represents a somewhat lower growth rate tlrnn tl1at 
experienced since 1990 when average earnings in 
public administration grew on average by 0.4 
percentage points more than in industry. The 
implications of a failure to control the growth of 
public sector wages is discussed in the next 
chapter. 
Capital Expenditure 
Investment in health and education is assumed to 
grow by cu-ound 4.3 per cent a year in volume over 
the forecast period. This increase may prove to be 
unduly generous given tl1e favourable demographic 
prospect. Investment in public administration is 
assumed to grow by a similar amount reflecting 
increased investment in security and public 
buildings. 
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The volume of public investment in market 
services (roads, water and sewerage) is assumed to 
grow hy over 13 per cent a year in the second half 
of the 1990s and by 8.5 per cent a year in real 
terms out to 2005. This reflect<; the need to greatly 
expand the infrastructure to cope with much higher 
levels of employment and economic activity than 
were anticipated in the early 1990s, when current 
pl;ms were prepared. 
Capital grants to industry are assumed to rise 111 
line with the expected volume increase m 
manufacturing investment. This assumes a 
constant grant rate over tl1e forecast period. 
However, if the economy continues to grow rapidly, 
there may well be a good case for reducing grant 
rates payable in the future. 
Revenue 
ln line with tJ1e assumptions discussed elsewhere, it 
is assumed that tl1e structural funds payments begin 
lo fall after 2000 being roughly halved by 2005. 
With the exception of tl1e CAP transfers, Ireland is 
assumed to be a net contributor to ilie EU budget hy 
2010. The reduction in EU transfers is reflected in 
our forecast in a reduction in tl1e capital resources 
available to the government. In practice some of 
the reduction will probably take place in current 
transfers received from abroad but whichever item 
in the government's accounts reflecrn tl1e changing 
circumstances, it will not affect ilie overall 
economic impact of the change. We are assuming 
that direct tax rates are cut steadily over tl1e 
forecast period. The reductions are gauged so as to 
ensure tl1at the public finances follow the profile 
outlined above. Some of the reduction is assumed 
to Lake the form of a gradual decrease in tl1e 
corporate tax rate (2 percentage points a year) for 
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firms outside manufacturing to 15 per cent in 2010. 
This may he necessary to ensure maximum 
flexibility within tl1e EU in maintaining ilie low 
rate of tax for manufacturing after 2010. This may 
well involve a common rate of between 12 per cent 
and 15 per cent in tl1e very long term. It may be 
fea<;ible to adopt such a rate without inducing a 
major outflow of existing foreign investors after 
2010. 
The average rate of personal taxation is also 
assumed to fall slightly over the period to 2003 
giving scope for further desirable changes in the 
direct. tax system. Indirect tax rates are assumed to 
remain unchanged over tl1e forecast period (wit11 
tl1e exception of tl1e indexation of excise tax rates). 
However, as discussed later in the Review it would 
be desirable to increase indirect taxes in certain 
areas to help protect the environment and to 
promote structural change in the economy, which 
would enhance tl1e quality of the environment in 
the future. Any revenue from environmental taxes 
would be best deployed in reducing personal 
taxation, which falls disproportionately on labour. 
Figure 5.6: Government Revenue and 
Expenditure as a Percentage of GNP 
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The combined effect of the assumptions made 
above would be to substantially reduce public 
expenditure and taxation as a share of GNP in the 
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reduction would be achieved, not through cuts in 
services, but ratl1er through restricting the rise in 
expenditure m1d services to the rates experienced in 
tl1e first half of the 1990s. This would see the 
public sector taking a very low share of the 
national output compared to other EU countries. 
However, t11is would reflect more the unusual 
demographic profile of the country over the next 10 
or 15 years tlrnn a very different approach to the 
demand for publicly provided goods and services. 
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CHAPTER 6 
The Central Forecast 
Denis Conniffe, David Duffy, Delma Duggan, John Fitz Gerald, Ide Kearney, Sue Scott, and Fergal 
Shortall 
6.1 Introduction 
This Chapter sets out our detailed Central Forecast 
for the Irish economy for the period to 2003. It is 
hased on the set of assumptions, described in 
earlier chapters, concerning the external 
environment, domestic economic policy and basic 
demographic trends. It represents our best 
assessment of the likely growth in economic 
activity over the next 6 years. We also give some 
indication, albeit at a much more summary level, of 
how the economy might be expected to develop 
over the period to 2010. 
Because of the many uncertainties concerning both 
the underlying assumptions and the likely 
hehaviour of the Irish economy we also explore a 
number of options. These alternative scenarios 
serve to highlight the sensitivity of our forecast to 
changes in assumptions and it should give the 
reader a flavour of the possible margin of error 
which attaches to our Central Forecast. 
In t11is chapter we concentrate on medium-term 
issues, hasing our Central Forecast on the latest 
available cL~sessment of the performance of the 
Irish economy in 1997 contained in t11e April 1997 
Quarterly Economic Commentary. The forecast has 
been developed with the assistance of the ESRI's 
Medium-Term Model. 1 The model is used 
extensively to analyse t11e sensitivity of the Central 
Forecast to changes in assumptions concerning the 
external environment and the behaviour of the Irish 
economy. As described in Chapter 5 we have also 
used the National Institute of Economic and Social 
Research world model, NiGEM, to undertake some 
of our analysis of different scenarios involving 
changes in the UK, German or the wider EU 
economy. 
The Central Forecast presents a picture of the Irish 
economy continuing to grow very strongly over the 
forecast period with the expected average growth 
rate in the medium term being well above that of 
our EU neighbours. However, we are much less 
certain ahout the precise timing of this growth over 
the period to 2003. It is quite possible tlrnt growtl1 
over tl1e rest of tl1e decade could prove more rapid 
than our annual forecasts with a compensating 
slow-down some time early in the next decade. 
Alternatively, hiccups with EMU could result in a 
premature slow-down next year which would be 
compensated for at a later date by more rapid 
growth tlrnn we have envisaged. For anybody 
planning for the future it is important to take 
account not only of tl1e likely average growth rate 
1 A summary of the characteristics of the model is given in Bradley 
J. and J. Fitz Gerald, 1991 "The ESRI Medium-Term Economic 
Model" in Medium-Term Review: 1991-1996 Dublin: The 
Economic and Social Research Institute. 
MEDIUM-TERM REVIEW: 1997-2003 
but also of the likely variability of growth around 
its trend. 
Section 6.2 of this Chapter presents a brief 
overview of the Central Forecast and discusses 
some of the crucial factors which will drive the 
Irish economy in the medium term. The vital 
determinant of the prospects for the economy in the 
medium term is the development of the supply side 
or the economy which is considered in Section 6.3. 
The likely development of income, expenditure, 
prices and the overall standard of living is 
discussed in Section 6.4. A feature of the forecast 
which is of particular interest is the prospect for the 
labour market, which is m1alysed in Section 6.5. 
The public finm1ces and the balance of payments 
are considered in Section 6.6 together with the 
prospects for savings. In Section 6.7 we exmnine 
the implications of the forecast for energy demand 
and emissions of carbon. (This is in important 
issue in the context of the ongoing debate on 
tackling the problem of global warming.) While the 
main focus of the detailed discussion in this 
Chapter is initially on the Central Forecast, we 
feel tlrnt t11e essential uncertainty of any such 
exercise necessitates special consideration. In 
Section 6.8 we exmnine a range of possible 
scenarios which could result in the economy being 
t11rown off course. Finally, Section 6.9 presents our 
conclusions and considers the forecast within a 
wider context. 
6.2 Overview 
The combined effects of the educational revolution 
and demographic change, discussed in earlier 
chapters, will continue to exert a major positive 
influence on developments in t11e Irish economy 
through t11e next decade, giving rise to a growth in 
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potential output of at least 5 per cent a year. This 
growth in potential is roughly double t11e 2 per cent 
to 2.5 per cent a year growth forecast for EU GDP 
in the medium term. Without special factors one 
might have expected Ireland to inherit a similar 
rate of growth. However, t11e expansion in t11e 
labour force in Ireland and the increase in human 
capital, broadly defined, is likely to be much 
greater t11an in t11e rest of tl1e EU reflecting 
different demographic circumstances. As shown in 
Table 6.1, the natural increase in the population 
will result in a rise in the labour force of 1.5 per 
cent a year in the period to 2001. This rate of 
increase will tend to fall off thereafter as ilie effects 
of the 1970s baby boom come to an end but it will 
still remain well above the forecasts for the EU. Tu 
addition, ilie rise in female labour force 
participation rates is expected to contribute just 
under a half a percent a year to the growth in 
potential labour supply. Finally, as discussed in 
Chapter 3, the increasing educational attainment of 
the labour force will add about 0.5 percentage 
points a year to the growth in the productivity of 
ilie labour force. 
Table 6.1: Growth in Labour Supply 
1996-2001 2001-2006 2006-2011 
Natural Increase 1.5 1.1 0.8 
Increased Female 0.4 0.4 0.4 
Participation 
Increase in 0.6 0.5 0.5 
Education 
Total 2.5 2.1 1.6 
While the growth in labour supply in Ireland may 
be much greater than elsewhere, giving t11e 
potential for higher growth in output, this has not 
g~aranteed growt11 in Ireland in earlier decades. 
Instead many of the new labour force entrants of 
the past found employment out<;ide the country. 
The rest of iliis chapter concentrates on t11e factors 
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which will determine the actual, as opposed to the 
potential, growth in the economy in the medium 
term. The actual outtum will depend on both the 
growth in labour supply and on the overall 
competitiveness of the economy. It is the 
competitive position of the economy, broadly 
defined, which will determine the level of output 
and the de1mmd for labour into the next decade. 
A crucial factor in determining the competitiveness 
of tl1e tradable sector in Ireland is the level of 
labour costs relative to those in other alternative 
potential locations for investment. Since the mid-
l 980s, when competitiveness was at its nadir, Irish 
labour costs have on average been below those in 
the UK. While in some sectors, such as food 
processing, clothing and banking, Irish labour costs 
me higher than in the UK, this is counter-balanced 
by other sectors where Ireland has a cost 
advantage. In the Central Forecast we assume that 
the pattern of moderate increases in labour costs, 
observed over the last decade, will continue for at 
least the period to 2003 preserving Ireland's 
present competitive position. Later in this chapter 
we consider what would he the impact of a change 
in labour market behaviour which gave rise to a 
deterioration in competitiveness. 
A second factor affecting Irish competitiveness is 
the level of interest rates. In the past the high cost 
of borrowing in Ireland has had a serious adverse 
impact on the economy. However, as discussed in 
the last Chapter, the prospects for interest rates in 
the future me that, with the advent of EMU, Irish 
borrowers will no longer be disadvantaged 
compared to borrowers in other EU members. 
While interest rates will he determined by the 
European Central Bank t11ey will be the same for 
borrowers in all members of the EMU. 
107 
A wide range of other factors contribute to the 
competitive position of the tradable sector. Over 
the next six years the prospects are that there will 
be no deterioration in Ireland's present position 
under a number of headings. In fact in some cases, 
such as taxation, it is likely t11at Ireland will see its 
competitive position improve, reflecting the 
relatively favourable fiscal position of the Irish 
government. 
Figure 6.1: National Resources 
(GNDI plus Capital Transfers) 
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Source: ESA79 basis. 
The broadly favourable climate for business in 
Ireland over t11e forecast period mecms that the 
potential of the Irish economy to grow rapidly is 
likely to be realised. Taking each five year period 
between 1960 and 1990 the average growth rate of 
GNP generally stayed close to 4 per cent (Figure 
6.1). It was only in the first half of t11e 1980s t11at 
the Irish economy's performance moved far from 
this trend growth rate due to a combination of 
unfavourable domestic and external factors. As 
discussed above, since 1990 the growth potential of 
the economy appears to have moved up a notch to 
around 5 per cent. The growth of potential output 
will probably reach a peak in the second half of this 
decade when GNP is likely to grow by an average 
of 5.5 per cent a year. As we move into the next 
decade t11e average growth rate is likely to 
slow gradually: to 5 per cent a year between 2000 
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Table 6.2: Central Forecast, Growth in Major Aggregates 
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 1990-95 1995-00 2000-05 2005-10 
% Average Growth, % 
GNP 6.4 5.7 5.9 5.3 4.4 3.7 4.5 5.3 4.7 5.5 5.0 4.2 
GNDI + Capital Transfers 5.2 4.4 5.8 5.5 3.2 3.1 3.7 4.4 3.2 4.8 4.2 3.0 
(National Resources) 
\ 
Consumption Deflator 2.2 2.1 1.9 2.1 2.2 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.4 2.1 2.1 2.2 
Employment, April 3.6 3.1 3.9 2.9 1.5 1.5 1.7 2.2 1.8 3.0 2.0 1.5 
%ofGNP 1995 2000 2005 2010 
Balance of Payments 1.3 0.9 0.4 0.3 0.5 0.1 0.5 0.9 2.5 0.5 1.5 0.8 
Debt GNP Ratio, 87.7 83.4 77.2 71.6 66.9 63.1 59.l 54.9 96.9 66.9 45.7 33.0 
General Government Deficit 1.2 1.6 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.4 0.2 2.3 0.1 -0.7 0.7 
per cent of Labour Force 
Unemployment Rate (ILO 11.9 10.9 9.1 8.3 
basis) 
and 2005, still above the trend of the 1960-90 
period, and then to just above 4 per cent a year for 
!he following 5 years. 
Gross National Disposable Income (GNDI) plus 
capital lnmsfcrs, which we refer to as National 
Resources, is a better measure of the change in 
living standards. As shown in Table 6.2, we 
envisage a somewhat slower growth in this 
aggregate than in GNP. The difference between the 
two measures of welfare over the next decade arises 
pm·tJy from t11e expected deterioration in tl1e terms 
of trade. ln addition, we envisage some fall in EU 
transfers as a result of changes in the CAP and in 
the extent of funding under the CSF. However, the 
precise timing of these changes remains uncertain 
and the effect~ could be spread out over a longer 
period. 
The result of this relatively rapid period of growth 
will be 1J1at Ireland, which in 1990 had a GDP per 
8.6 
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Figure 6.2: Ireland Compared to EU 
GNP Per Head and Per Person Employed at 
PPS 
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head of around 74 per cent of tl1e EU average will, 
by the year 2000, be around 111 per cent of tl1e EU 
average (Figure 6.2). A more appropriate measure 
is GNP per head (which excludes profit 
repatriations); on tl1is measure Ireland can also be 
seen to have narrowed t11e gap in living standards 
compared to the EU as a whole from 67 per cent in 
1990 to an expected 95 per cent in 2000. On tl1e 
basis of tl1e Central Forecast, using the GNP 
measure and the standard method for projecting 
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tJm,e data, 2 Ireland should achieve the average 
standard of living in the EU around 2005, 
exceeding that in the UK between 2000 and 2005. 
The pattern of development shown in Figure 6.2 
suggests a marked change in gear around 1990; 
between 1960 and 1990 there was little change in 
our position within the EU measured in terms of 
GNP per head. However, it now seems possible that 
over tJ1e next 15 years Ireland may achieve a 
standard or living among the highest within the 
EU. 
While this may appear to be an exceptional rate of 
convergence in living standards measured as GNP 
per head, t11e situation looks rather different when 
considered in terms of output per person employed 
- national productivity broadly defined. As shown 
in Figure 6.2, on this measure the Irish economy 
has been converging towards EU stand,u-ds of 
product.ivity fairly steadily since t11e 1970s. While 
we are presently seeing some acceleration in the 
rate of convergence, this is not out of character 
with the past 30 years. Figure 6.2 also shows how 
Ireland's relative position measured as output per 
head will come to exceed its relative standing 
measured as output per person employed, some 
time in tl1e next decade. 
The explanation for the contrast between the two 
measures, GNP per head and GNP per person 
employed, lies in the movement in the economic 
dependency ratio t11e ratio of the population not 
in paid employment to those who are at work 
2 
·n1is method assumes that relative purchasing power pm·ities 
remain unchanged over the periocl. However, this methocl cloes not 
take account of the possible effects of changes in the tem1S of trade 
on the purchasing power parity clata. Given the forecast trend loss 
on the terms of tracle it coulcl be expcctccl that this factor could slow 
the rate of convergence below that shown here. 
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(Figure 6.3). As discussed in Chapter 2, while 
Ireland still has an economic dependency ratio well 
above the EU level it will actually fall below the 
EU average some time in the next decade. This 
contrast, and its related effects on living standards 
represented by the movement in GNP per head, 
reflects the window of opportunity which Ireland 
faces over the next 20 years. The declining 
dependency ratio at a time when the ratio is rising 
elsewhere in the EU will make possible a rapid rise 
in living standards in Ireland. 
Figure 6.3: Economic Dependency 
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Turning to the other aspects of our forecast, Table 
6.2 presents details of the likely evolution of broad 
macroeconomic indicators over the next decade. 
Throughout the slowdown in the early 1990s 
employment growth continued, albeit at an 
attenuated rate. With a return to rapid growth in 
the mid-1990s we have seen a rate of employment 
growt11 unparalleled in t11e history of t11e state. 
While it can not continue at t11e current rate for 
long, it is likely tliat tl1e forecast period will see a 
further sustained increase in employment. For t11e 
second half of t11e 1990s employment growt11 is 
forecast to average 3 per cent a year falling to 2 per 
cent a year in tl1e first half of t11e next decade and 
around 1.6 per cent a year for tl1e following 5 
years. 
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Though the labour force will grow rapidly this 
growth in employment will be sufficient to absorb 
all labour market entrants and to contribute to a 
reduction in the unemployment rate from its 
current level of 11 per cent of the labour force to 
under 9 per cent in 2003. Simultaneously, it seems 
likely that there will be no net emigration over the 
period. 
In spite of the rapid growth in output, the rate of 
inflation is forecast to remain close to 2 per cent a 
year over the period 1997-2003. 
Finally, the combination of substantial growt11 in 
the economy with t11e assumed stance of fiscal 
policy, described in t11e last chapter, would see the 
Exchequer maintaining a small deficit on the 
public accounts into the next decade and moving 
into surplus around the middle of t11e next decade. 
Even assuming a significant reduction in EU 
structural fund payments after 2000, the buoy:mcy 
of the economy will both need and make possible a 
continued major programme of public investment 
funded substantially out of taxation. Given t11e 
impermanent nature of the demographic bonus it 
will also he appropriate for the government to 
invest in the future t1mmgh further reducing t11e 
burden of t11c national debt over the next decade. 
6.3 The Supply Side 
The supply side of t11c economy is t11e medium-to-
longer term determinant of output and employment 
growth rates and ultimately of improvements in 
living standards. It is broadly characterised within 
the ESRI model as follows. The productive capacity 
or the economy is driven firstly by the success of 
the tradahle sector on world markets. Tradable 
sector output is determined both by the evolution of 
world demand for its output and t11e international 
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cost competitiveness of domestic inputs, in 
particular labour costs. Second, the non-tradahle 
sector's output is driven by domestic demand, 
which is clearly linked to the performance of the 
tractable sector, and domestic costs. 
In recent years the supply side of the Irish economy 
has grown strongly, as detailed in Chapter 3. This 
recent strength of real output growth is likely to 
continue over the next few years with strong 
growth both in manufacturing industries (broadly 
t11e tractable sector) and in market services (largely 
non-traded). GDP at factor cost is forecast to grow 
at an historically high rate of 5.8 per cent over the 
five years to the year 2000. For t11c following 5 
years (2000-2005) it will slow slightly to just under 
5 per cent per annum. 
The main factors driving tl1is strong growth 
performance are broadly similar to those identified 
in Chapter 3. Our calculations point to strong 
growth in t11c effective supply of skilled labour, the 
consolidation of a strong competitive position 
within an increasingly global international market 
through, inter alia, t11e continued development of 
the physical infrastructure, and a stable underlying 
domestic macroeconomic environment. Of 
particular interest will be the likely competitive 
effects of a further expansion of the EU into 
Central Europe and the impact of EMU on tl1e 
economy. 
In this section we :malyse tl1e prospects for output 
growth of tl1e main sectors of the economy in tum. 
Table 6.3: Percentage Change in Outeut, GDP at Factor Cost at Constant 1990 Prices 
1996 1997 1998 1999 
Agriculture 4.9 -0.0 1.0 1.0 
lnduslTy 9.0 8.0 6.0 5.6 
Manufacturing 8.9 7.9 5.9 5.9 
Utilities 6.0 5.0 8.5 7.2 
Building 11.0 9.5 5.4 3.0 
Market Serviees 7.8 5.9 7.4 6.7 
Distribution 7.8 5.9 8.4 7.7 
Transport & 7.8 5.9 8.4 7.0 
Communications 
Other Market Services 9.8 5.9 6.7 6.2 
Non-Markel Services 3.0 2.5 2.6 2.6 
Health & Education 3.0 2.5 2.5 2.5 
Public Administration 3.0 2.5 2.7 2.7 
Adjustment for Financial 5.4 5.4 8.6 7.9 
Services (-) 
GDP al Factor Cost 7.6 6.0 5.7 5.3 
Taxes on Expenditure 3.1 4.7 7.1 6.1 
Subsidies -0.0 -0.0 2.9 2.7 
GDP at Market Prices 7.2 6.0 6.0 5.4 
Net Factor Income 13.l 9.5 5.4 7.4 
GNP al Market Prices 6.2 5.4 6.1 5.1 
Industry 
Witi1in U1c ESRI Model tl1e industrial sector is 
analysed using a live-way hreakdown as follows: 
traditional manufacturing; food processing; high-
Lccimology; utilities; and building. The first three 
of these comprise manufacturing industry, broadly 
t11c tradab le sector. The latter two belong to U1e 
non-tradable sector where output is driven by 
domestic demand. 
Manufacturing 
The manufacturing sector grew very strongly in the 
first half of the 1990s at an average annual growth 
2000 
% 
1.0 
5.0 
5.6 
5.6 
1.1 
5.0 
4.7 
5.3 
5.1 
2.6 
2.5 
2.7 
6.5 
4.4 
3.2 
1.7 
4.3 
5.1 
4.2 
2001 2002 2003 1990-95 1995-00 2000-05 2005-10 
Annual Average % Change 
1.0 3.6 3.6 0.0 1.6 3.0 3.5 
4.7 5.1 5.5 8.8 6.7 5.3 4.3 
5.1 5.8 6.0 9.5 6.8 5.8 4.7 
4.3 5.7 6.2 5.0 6.4 5.8 4.4 
1.7 0.4 1.8 6.5 5.9 1.3 0.3 
4.6 5.4 5.9 3.5 6.7 5.6 3.5 
3.6 5.8 7.2 -0.4 6.9 6.3 4.2 
4.8 5.7 6.4 4.8 6.9 5.9 4.1 
4.9 5.1 5.3 4.8 6.7 5.2 3.0 
2.6 2.6 2.6 2.1 2.6 2.6 2.6 
2.5 2.5 2.5 2.7 2.6 2.5 2.5 
2.7 2.7 2.7 1.0 2.7 2.7 2.7 
6.1 6.8 7.2 7.1 6.8 6.9 5.2 
4.1 4.8 5.2 4.9 5.8 4.9 3.7 
4.3 4.2 4.8 2.7 4.8 4.7 4.0 
2.0 3.5 3.8 -7.9 l.4 3.4 3.5 
4.2 4.7 5.2 5.2 5.8 4.9 3.7 
8.4 7.3 6.2 10.8 8.1 6.3 4.3 
3.4 4.2 5.0 4.4 5.4 4.6 3.6 
rate of 9.5 per cent between 1990 and 1995. We 
envisage Urnt U1is vigorous performance will 
continue during the next few years, albeit at the 
slightly slower growth rates of 6.8 per cent between 
1995 and 2000 and 5.8 per cent hetween 2000 and 
2005. In addition the sectoral pattern of growth is 
likely to be more broadly based than in earlier 
periods within both the high technology and 
traditional sectors. Alti10ugh the dominant growth 
impetus still originates in tile high-tech sector, U1e 
performance of U1e traditional sector is also likely 
to be strong over !11e next few years. 
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The 1980s heralded a period of rapid technological 
change within Irish manufacturing with substantial 
shifts in bot11 production processes and in the 
composition of output. Employment in 
manufacturing has grown strongly in the past 3 
yems (an average annual growth rate of 3 per cent 
between 1993 and 1996). We consider that this 
recent strong employment performance signals the 
end of a prolonged structural and sectoral 
adjustment within the manufacturing sector, the so-
called jobless growth phenomenon, and we 
theref01:e envisage that future output growth will be 
accompanied by growt11 in employment. 
High Technology Industries 
The high technology group of industries proved the 
mainstay of growtl1 in manufacturing output and 
employment tl1rough the last twenty years. As 
discussed in Chapter 3, tl1e rapid development of 
this sector was largely attributable to the strong 
influx of foreign direct investment, attracted in 
llmmgh a system of fiscal and financial incentives. 
However, in more recent yems it has become 
increasingly attracted by and reliant on the growth 
in Ireland's supply of skilled labour and it has 
benefited from the demonstration effect mising 
from tl1e companies already here. In the face of 
extensive international competition for foreign 
direct investment from Soutl1 East Asia and 
Central Europe, it is the future growth of this 
human capital resource in Ireland which we 
consider to be tl1e key to tl1e future expansion of 
this sector. 
We envisage that tl1is sector will continue to grow 
strongly over tl1e forecast period, although not as 
rapidly as in tl1e 1980s, fuelled by continued strong 
growt11 in world demand for its output (chemical 
and engineering products). Employment growth 
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has been exceptionally rapid in recent years, 
growing by 9 per cent in 1996. As the sector 
becomes increasingly human capital-intensive the 
employment intensity of growth is increasing, In 
pmticular, the software group of industries within 
this sector have a high demand for specialist 
skilled labour. As shown in Figure 6.4 we expect 
output growth to decline gradually from the very 
high rates of the early 1990s. Employment growth 
should remain strong to t11e year 2000, averaging 
5.7 per cent over tl1e period 1995-2000. After 2000 
we expect employment growtl1 to moderate to an 
average of 1.8 per cent a year over the period 2000-
2005. 
Figure 6.4: Output and Employment in the 
High-Tech Sector 
16 Annual Average% Growth 
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Traditional Manufacturing Industries 
The traditional manufacturing group of industries3 
have performed well in recent years following a 
massive shake-out of inefficient industries in tl1e 
1980s and more export-oriented development. 
Output in this sector is driven by a combination of 
domestic and world demand. This sector has been 
very sensitive to changes in the competitiveness of 
the economy. However research suggests that in 
3 This group includes mining and quarrying; drink and tobacco; 
textiles; clothing; footwear and leather; timber and wocxlen 
furniture; paper and printing; non-metallic mineral product~; and 
other miscellaneous manufacturing industries. 
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recent years, following the shake-out of labour-
intensive uncompetitive firms from the sector and 
tl1e relative improvement in profitability of those 
firms which survived the shake-out, this sensitivity 
to costs has declined somewhat. 
Nevcrtl1eless the traditional sector, which is 
dominated by indigenous firms, is constantly 
competing with t11e high-tech, foreign-owned 
sector for domestic inputs, most notably skilled 
labour, and it is within this group of sectors t11at 
any potential skill shortages will impact (see Box 
6.1). In addition it is within the traditional group of 
industries that the strongest competitive t11reat 
from enlargement of t11e EU lies. We believe that 
this threat is mitigated by the general increase in 
skill levels in t11e Irish work-force as a whole and 
by tlrn movement toward more skill-intensive and 
export-oriented production within t11e traditional 
group of industries. But continuous competitive 
pressures are likely to persist in certain of the more 
"traditional" import-competing industries, notably 
the clothing and footwear sector. 
Box 6.1: Is the Economy Facing Capacity Constraints? 
No more than a decade ago it would have been inconceivable to include a discussion of capacity constraints 
in any review of the Irish economy. But while there is to date little systematic evidence of emerging capacity 
constraints it is an issue which inevitably arises now, given the very strong growth performance of the 
economy in recent years. 
One of the most notable features of the recent success of Irish economic performance, and in particular the 
strong growth in employment, is that it has occurred without any emerging inflationary pressures. This implies 
a highly elastic labour supply curve, reflecting a large pool abroad of mobile emigrants built up through the 
1980s, a large number of women who were outside the labour force but available to enter it, and the natural 
increase in the labour force. Between 1990 and 1995 total employment rose by 105,000 while the total labour 
force increased by 118,600, consequently the unemployment rate did not change. However, Phillip's curve 
effects could kick in if increases in the supply of labour are not sufficient to absorb the continued growth in 
employment. There has been much anecdotal evidence over the past twelve months that labour supply 
shortages have emerged in a number of sectors. Data from the IBEC/ESRI monthly survey of manufacturing 
firms indicates that reported labour shortages are occurring in low-wage sectors. Recent reports suggest that 
some firms have begun recruiting Irish emigrants overseas in an effort to fill vacancies. While most attention 
has focused on skill shortages, there is also evidence that shortages are emerging in low-paid unskilled work 
in the service sector. 
We envisage employment growtl1 of almost 2 per 
cent over tl1c period 1995-2000, slowing to 1.1 per 
cent in t11e five year period after tliat (see Figure 
6.5). If realised, this would translate into an 
increase of 15,000 jobs by t11e year 2003 relative to 
1996. Output is expected to grow on average by 4.6 
per cent in the period 1995-2000 and by a more 
modest 2.6 per cent in the following period 2000-
2005. 
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Figure 6.5: Traditional Manufacturing 
Sector 
6 Annual Average% 
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Food Processing Industries 
The rood processing group of manufacturing 
industries are identified separately because in their 
production they arc uniquely constrained by the 
available supply of inputs from the agricultural 
sector and by the seasonal nature of that supply. 
Indeed until the mid-l 980s this group of industries 
was largely controlled by the supply of inputs. 
However, we have in recent years witnessed a 
radical reorganisation and rationalisation within 
the sector, together with the rise of the Irish agri-
food multinational. Given the binding raw material 
constraints faced by this sector, production can 
expand only through increasing the value-added 
content of output. 
Figure 6.6: Food Processing Sector 
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Witl1 agricultural output forecast to grow only 
slowly in the period 1995-2000 (see section on 
agriculture below) output in tl1e food processing 
sector is forecast to grow on average by 1.7 per cent 
per annum between 1995 and 2000 (Figure 6.6). 
This should pick up in the subsequent five years 
given a resumption of growth in gross agricultural 
output and continued increases in value-added's 
share of gross output. The ongoing rationalisation 
of the sector means that employment is likely to 
stagnate at cunent (1996) levels over the medium 
term, following on an exceptional fall in 1995-96 
due to factors related to the BSE scare. 
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Building 
Output in the building sector has grown at 
exceptionally high rates since 1992. We forecast 
that this strong growth will continue to the end of 
the decade with an annual average growth rate of 
7.5 per cent over tl1e period 1995-2000 slowing 
significantly to an annual average of 3.8 per cent in 
2000-2005.4 Because this sector is of its nature 
very employment intensive, this strong growth will 
result in average annual growtl1 in numbers 
employed of 4.5 per cent in 1995-2000, slowing to 
0.6 per cent between 2000 and 2005 witl1 the 
forecast downturn in output growth in tl1ose years. 
This translates into an increase of 16,000 jobs in 
the sector between 1996 and 2003. One notable 
change in recent years has been the growing 
internationalisation of the sector through tl1e 
internationalisation of tl1e labour market and of tl1e 
major companies operating in the sector. 
What is driving tl1e ~trong upturn in building 
sector output in the 1990s and why does it 
slow after the year 2000? Clearly the demand for 
Figure 6.7: Building Sector 
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building depends crucially on the prospects for 
investment (discussed in the next section) within 
the economy. In addition, changes in demographic 
4111ese are growth rates in gross output. Table 6.3 gives growth 
rates in value added. 
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forces and in the dynamics of growth also impact 
on the pattern of demand for building sector 
output. 
Demographic changes and increases in household 
formation (see Chapter 2), together with low 
illlcrcst rates, have led to a large increase in the 
demand for housing, especially in the micl-l 990s. 
The slowdown m the growth in housing 
investment, forecast in the next decade, is a 
contributory factor in the forecast slowdown in 
building output in t110se years. Second, tl1e demand 
for industrial building and commercial property are 
driven by the growth in the industrial and services 
sectors, which arc hot11 forecast to he strong well 
into the next decade. Finally, the civil engineering 
sect.or, which is affected by the infrastructural 
needs or the economy and by developmenL, in t11e 
state sector and the EU Structural Funds, has 
grown rapidly in the 1990s. We have assumed that 
because or the continuing growth in the economy 
and the derrnmds on infrastructure, public 
investment in this area will continue to grow 
rapidly through the forecast period. 
Utilitie" 
The utilities sector (electricity, gas and water) is 
driven by the demand for energy in the rest of the 
economy (discussed later in this Chapter) so tlrnt 
output tends to follow the growth rate in oth~r 
sectors of the economy. We forecast that utilities' 
output will grow strongly at an annual average rate 
or 6.5 per cent in 1995-2000 (Figure 6.8), slowing 
somewhat to 5.8 per cent in 2000-2005. Strong 
growth in the demand for energy will necessitate 
considerable investment in energy generation and 
transmission in the coming yeai·s, resulting in a 
move Lo a higher level of investment from the late 
1990s onwards. 
1 l5 
Figure 6.8: Utilities 
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Despite strong output growth, employment in the 
sector is likely to fall over the forecast period. This 
reflects the current degree of overstaffing of the 
sector and the necessity for increases in 
productivity to maintain competitiveness, not only 
within the sector but also more generally as a 
supplier of inputs to the tractable sector. 
Agriculture 
As outlined in Chapter 5, we assume that some 
major reforms will be made to tl1e current CAP 
system over the forecast period. Most notably we 
assume a full transition over tl1e next decade, 
beginning in 2002, to a regime where EU prices 
converge to world market prices. This implies a 
sustained reduction in tl1e price of gross 
agricultural output over the next decade, estimated 
at an average reduction of 2 per cent per annum 
from 2002 to the year 2010. The related freeing up 
of quota restrictions, if tl1e CAP reform should 
happen, would lead to an increase in output growth 
in the next decade, contrasting with tl1e relative 
stagnation of the 1990s. Output (GDP arising) is 
forecast to grow at an annual average rate of 1.6 
per cent in 1995-2000, increasing to 3 per cent per 
annum in 2000-2005 (Figure 6.9). 
MEDIUM-TERM REVIEW: 1997-2003 
Figure 6.9: Agriculture 
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Employment in agricnlture has been declining 
steadily for the past three decades. We forecast that 
this downward trend will continue so that between 
1996 and 2003 there will be a fall of 24,000 in 
agricultural employment. A large pa.rt of this 
decline in agricultural employment is attributable 
to demographic changes. Those employed in 
agriculture are an ageing group due to a continuing 
decline in the numbers of young people entering 
agricultural employment. We estimate that on 
demographic trnnds alone agricultural employment 
will fall by over 20,000 between 1996 and 2006. 
Falling output prices in 1996 and 1997, partly due 
to 1l1e BSE scare, have directly impacted on farm 
incomes, which are forecast to fall by almost 2 per 
cent in 1997. Over the medium term, agricultural 
incomes are likely to increase at a much slower rate 
than non-agricultural wage income (see next 
section). However, given the secular decline in tl1e 
numbers employed in agriculture as compared witl1 
the forecast increase in non-agricultural 
employment, agricultural incomes per worker are 
likely to rise faster than wage income per 
employee. If this were to happen, for tl1e first time 
in over twenty years agricultural inrnmes per 
worker could come to exceed non-agricultural wage 
income per worker in the GQro,ing decade. 
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Market Services 
The market services sector is modelled under three 
separate headings; distribution, transport and 
communications and other market services. Output 
in the services sector is driven by domestic 
demand. We envisage vigorous growtl1 in market 
services sector output over the forecast period (see 
Table 6.3) combined with relatively mode.rate 
growth in price int1ation within the sector, albeit at 
a higher rate tl1an in the tradable sector. Although 
the sector is broadly characterised as non-tradable 
it has in recent years been much more exposed to 
international competition, especially the 
distribution and tl1e transport and communications 
sectors. 
Distribution 
The distribution sector's output is driven mainly by 
the growth in the volume of consumption witl1in 
the economy. Changing demographics and rising 
a111uence have altered tl1e consumption pattern of 
tl1e typical household and this has major 
implications for tl1e future pattern of demand. 
Rising living standards, combined with a growing 
proportion of young people and falling dependency, 
means that tl1e demand for goods with a high 
income elasticity of demand is growing rapidly (see 
Box 6.2). This is reflected in a shift in demand 
towards higher quality goods with higher margins 
and this has major implications for the future 
development of tl1e distribution sector. 
In addition to these changes in demand, the supply 
side of the distribution sector has also changed. 
The b:isb wholesale and retail sectors have 
becoming increasingly integrated into Europe, 
notably tl1e UK, especially since the completion of 
the single market. The elimination of border 
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controls and customs barriers means that it is 
relatively easy for UK wholesale and retail firms to 
service the Irish market and, as a result, there has 
been a notable increase in the internationalisation 
of distribution in recent years. 
Figure 6.10: Distribution Sector 
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We envisage strong output growth in the 
distribution sector over the forecast period at an 
average annual rate of 6.9 per cent in 1995-2000, 
slowing slightly to 6.3 per cent between 2000 and 
2005 (Figure 6.10).5 Because of changing demand 
there will be a progressive shift towards non-food 
sectors of retailing, with higher margins and more 
specialised customer service and a consequent 
increase in the employment-intensity of output. 
However, changing technology togetl1er with 
widespread computerisation, should result in 
substantial productivity gains within the sector. 
Overall we estimate that employment growtl1 in the 
sector is likely to be strong, with a modest decline 
in the share of labour in value added over the 
forecast period. We forecast tl1at employment in the 
distribution sector should increase by 49,000 
between 1996 and 2003, although some of tl1is 
increase may be part-time work. 
5 In the past the figures for output in this sector (Figure 6.12) have 
been greatly distmted by movements in EU intervention stocks. 
However, this should prove less significant in the future with the 
eventual phasing out of intervention storage. 
Box 6.2: Shifting Consumer Expenditure Patterns 
Changes in the demographic situation in Ireland have resulted in an increase in the proportion of the 
population in the 25-44 age group. (The share of this age group in the total population rose from 22 per cent 
in 1973 to 27 per cent in 1994). How has this change impacted on consumer expenditure patterns as reflected 
by the Household Budget Survey? The Table below compares the average weekly expenditure in all 
households in the State over the period 1973 to 1994. The data are adjusted for inflation and for changes in 
the average size of households. (The average number of persons per household fell from 4.0 in 1973 to 3.3 in 
1994-1995). 
Table: Average Weekly Exeenditure Per Person in 1996 Prices 
Main Conunodity Groups 1973 1980 1987 1994-1995 
£ % £ % £ % £ % 
Food 21.70 31.9 22.88 27.7 20.25 25.2 22.44 22.7 
Drink & Tobacco 6.15 9.0 5.95 7.2 6.41 8.0 7.56 7.7 
Clothing & Footwear 7.27 10.7 7.35 8.9 5.41 6.7 6.32 6.4 
Fuel &Light 3.25 4.8 5.08 6.1 5.04 6.3 4.91 5.0 
I-lousing 4.85 7.1 5.93 7.2 7.08 8.8 9.69 9.8 
Household non-durables 1.15 1.7 1.55 1.9 1.67 2.1 2.30 2.3 
Household durables 3.25 4.8 4.58 5.5 3.15 3.9 3.58 3.6 
Miscellaneous goods 2.11 3.1 3.12 3.8 2.79 3.5 3.77 3.8 
Transport 8.05 11.8 12.32 14.9 10.91 13.6 14.19 14.3 
Services & other expenditure 10.31 15.1 13.83 16.8 17.59 21.9 24.11 24.4 
Tola] 68.10 100.0 82.58 100.0 80.31 100.0 98.87 100.0 
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In real terms average household expenditure per person rose from £68.1 O in 1973 to £98.87 in 1994/95, an 
increase of over 45 per cent. There have been clear shifts in the composition of consumer expenditure over 
this period. The proportion of household expenditure devoted to food fell by almost 10 percentage points from 
31.9 per cent in 1973 to 22.7 per cent in 1994/95 while the proportion of household expenditure devoted to 
services and other expenditure rose by an equivalent amount (from 15.1 per cent in 1973 to 24.4 per cent in 
1994-95). These shifts towards increased spending on "luxury" goods are typically associated with increased 
affluence. Put more technically, services tend to have relatively high income elasticities of demand. Rising 
affluence is also clearly signalled in the real increase in expenditure per head. The increased proportion of 
young people in the population and the decline in the dependency ratio means that tastes within the typical 
household can be held to have changed and this also explains the increase in resources devoted to 
expenditure on services, which include leisure activities and meals out. 
Transport and Communications 
The transport and conununications sector is likely 
to grow strongly over the next few years, driven by 
the strong growtli in domestic demand. This sector 
also has an underlying potential for expansion, 
given Ilic rapid development of new technologies, 
especially in communications. While tliere is likely 
Lo be a further shake-out of employment in public 
transport witli continued rationalisation, overall 
employment in this sector is forecast to grow 
strongly witli an estimated increase in employment 
or 24,000 between 1996 and 2003 (Figure 6.11). 
Figure 6.11: Transport & Communications 
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Other Market Services 
The oilier market services sector covers a wide 
range of very diverse service activities and includes 
both personal services (hotels, restaurants, pubs, 
hairdressers) and professional services (banking, 
insurance, legal services). This sector has on 
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average higher price inflation tllan either of the 
other service sectors or !lie industrial sector. This is 
due to both a lack of competition within certain 
branches of activity (banking, insurance, legal and 
professional services) pushing up costs, and to a 
difficulty in measuring accurately output prices in 
tliis sector. (Box 6.3 looks in more detail at Ilic 
difficulty of measuring output prices for certain 
more "intangible" service activities.) This sector is 
also especially important in tenns of employment: 
in 1996, 315,000 people were employee\ in other 
market services, as compared witli 351,000 in Ille 
industrial sector as a whole. 
Figure 6.12: Other Market Services 
7 Annual Average% 
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Given a strong predicted growtll in private 
consumption and production, both of which 
directly increase !lie demand for services in tllis 
sector, we forecast tliat both output and 
employment in other market services will grow 
strongly as shown in Figure 6.12. This translates 
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into a growth in employment of 93,000 between 
1996 and 2003. We forecast that by 2003 
employment in this sector will exceed total 
industrial employment. 
Box 6.3: Measuring Productivity in the Services Sector 
It is generally agreed in the international literature that measured services prices are biased upwards thus 
understating output and productivity growth.a This bias is due to two main measurement problems. First, 
services are often intangible and have to be measured indirectly. Second, it is very difficult to adjust 
accurately for quality changes in measured prices, and this problem is particularly pertinent for services. 
Because certain service activities are intangible i.e., they do not produce a physical unit of output, their output 
is calculated indirectly, typically by measuring the value of inputs used. In the Irish national accounts the 
volume of output of many service sectors is derived by using an index of employment (for example, estimates 
of volume output in health and education services), and in certain business services (legal activities; 
accounting; book-keeping; auditing and tax-consultancy; market research and public opinion polling; business 
and management consultancy; architectural; engineering and other technical activities; advertising etc.) 
output is also calculated in this way. This deflation method assumes no change in productivity within the 
sector. To the extent that there are productivity improvements, the implicit price deflator for these services is 
thereby overestimated. 
Certain other services activities can be directly measured since they have an observable unit of output. 
Examples include measuring postal services by the number of items delivered, railway passenger transport 
services by passenger kilometres, cinema entertainment services by cinema admission prices etc. However, 
even in this case it is difficult to adjust fully for quality change. And while correct adjustment for quality 
change is equally important in measuring goods prices, in general it is less problematic because the quality 
change is often directly observable in the good (e.g., power steering in a car). In services quality changes are 
often more difficult to quantify. Such quality changes can relate to time-saving (e.g., advance credit card 
bookings by telephone, laser scanners in supermarkets, automated teller machines), increased convenience 
(e.g., 24 hour stores, extended supermarket hours) or to an improved service output (e.g., while we can 
observe prices paid for a visit to the doctor - the cost of inputs - it is more difficult to quantify the doctor's 
marginal contribution to the patient's health - the value of the output). In general these quality changes - so-
called "intangible inputs" - are not manifested in cost or price reductions and thus do not show up in the 
measured statistics. 
Technological advances, and in particular the rapid improvements in computer power and usage, are clearly 
central to many of these quality improvements. It is easy to observe the influence that information technology 
has had on a variety of services ( e.g., detailed bill listings in hotels and supermarkets; instantaneous credit 
card approval; 24-hour banking, etc.). These improvements are often reflected in the official statistics only as 
a price increase rather than an increase in embodied services. This is particularly relevant in the financial 
services sector where technological advances have, arguably, effected the most radical changes in the range 
and quality of services on offer. 
Both indirect measurement of services prices and the difficulty in adjusting services prices for quality changes 
bias estimated services prices upwards. This in turn leads to an understatement of productivity performance 
in the service sector. For example Brauer (1993t estimates that mismeasurement of services prices can 
explain almost half of the differential between goods and services prices in the US over the period 1989-1993. 
" For a review of the debate over bias in the US CPI see Moulton, R., 1996. "Bias in the Consumer Price Index: What is the 
Evidence?" Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 1 O No. 4, pp. 159-177. 
b Brauer, D., 1993. "Why do Services Prices Rise More Rapidly than Goods Prices?", Federal Reserve Bank of New York 
Research Paper No. 9330, December. 
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Non-Market Services 
Two main branches of non-market services output 
are separately identified in the ESRI model: health 
and education, and public administration and 
defence. Since these are intangible outputs (see 
Box 6.3) it is extremely difficult to measure 
productivity directly in these sectors. None the less 
there are two indirect indicators of productivity 
improvements in recent years. First there has been 
a general movement upwards in the grade structure 
within the civil service in recent years, indicating 
that the average experience and expertise is rising 
(see Box 6.4). And second, the efficiency of the 
sector has been vastly improved by tl1e widespread 
introduction of computer technology. 
Output in tl1is sector is determined by the decisions 
or the Government on its demand for public 
services. In Chapter 5 we set out in detail our main 
assumptions regarding tl1e likely future course of 
public expenditure. We forecast that output in non-
market services will grow at an annual average rate 
ofjust over 2.5 per cent per annum between 1996 
and 2003 with employment growing at the slightly 
slower rate of 2.3 per cent per annum (Figure 
6.13). With the changing demographic structure 
and the improved labour market conditions easing 
pressure on the education system and reducing the 
pool of welfare recipients, these volume increases 
m·e unlikely to be uniform across all sectors. 
Figure 6.13: Non-Market Services 
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Box 6.4: Public Sector Wage Inflation and Unmeasured Productivity? 
The level of and growth in public sector pay has attracted growing attention in recent years. Much of this 
attention stems from an increased awareness of the impact which the public sector pay bill has on the overall 
fiscal balances and on the long-term sustainability of the fiscal position. The public sector pay bill represents 
a large proportion of public expenditure, so that budgetary discipline requires strict controls on its growth. 
The Figure below shows that average earnings in public administration have risen much more rapidly than the 
earnings of industrial workers in recent years. The differential between public sector and industrial wages 
narrowed in the period up to the mid-1980s but has since expanded so that in 1993 and 1994 the average 
public sector wage was around 50 per cent higher than the average industrial wage. In our forecast we 
assume that this differential remains unchanged. 
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This difference results from a number of different factors: changes in relative earnings for similar employees 
of similar skill levels; the upgrading of the average skill levels of employees, as reflected in changes in the 
grade structure; in times when recruitment is low, the fact that most public servants are on incremental pay 
scales. results in a rise in average earnings; problems measuring productivity gains; the inclusion of pensions 
to retired public servants in the wage bill (but not in numbers employed). 
If we examine changes in the grade structure within the public sector there has been a clear shift towards 
more senior and executive grades (see Table). The numbers employed in clerical grades in 1996 (i.e., Clerical 
Officer and below) were 20 per cent lower than in July 1981, while the numbers in the higher grades (i.e., 
Staff Officer and above) rose by 11 per cent over the same time period. The shift from lower paid grades to 
those on higher remuneration levels will in itself have an impact on overall public sector pay levels while also 
marking an increase in output. 
Table : Changing Grade Structure within Public Sector 
Main General Service Grades: % Share of Total 
Jui 81 Jan82 
Senior 6.9 7.0 
Executive 20.1 20.2 
Clerical 73.0 72.8 
Senior: Assistant Principal - Secretary 
Executive: Executive Officer - Administrative Officer 
Clerical: Clerical Assistant - Staff Officer 
6.4 Income, Expenditure and 
Prices 
Income 
Having displayed strong growth in 1994 and 
particularly in 1995, agricultural incomes last year 
remained static, partly reflecting the impact of the 
BSE scare. This factor is expected to carry on into 
1997, with agricultural incomes falling by 2 per 
cent. This slowdown in agricultural income growth 
means tl1at tl1e average increase between 1995 and 
2000 will be just 0.6 per cent a year. This compares 
with a rise of 7 .6 per cent a year over the same 
period in non-agricultural wage income. However, 
as discussed em·lier, in making such comparisons 
allowance must be made for movements in 
employment. 
On tl1e assumptions we have made about the CAP, 
in the subsequent five year period, 2000-2005, we 
project tlmt agricultural income will increase by 2.6 
Jan86 Jan 91 Jan95 Ju/96 
7.5 7.8 8.4 8.3 
20.2 20.3 24.5 24.8 
72.3 71.9 67.1 66.9 
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per cent per annum. The slow growth forecast in 
agricultural incomes is due to subdued real growth 
in agricultural output as well as tl1e changes to the 
CAP we have assumed in Chapter 5. Nevertl1eless, 
tl1e fall off in numbers employed in agriculture 
over the same period means that agricultural 
income per worker will rise faster than income per 
worker in tl1e non-agricultural sector. 
Transfer income is forecast to show annual growth 
of 5.7 per cent a year until 2000, before moderating 
to 5.1 per cent a year between 2000 and 2005. 
Much of this slowdown is due to a decline in 
unemployment and the positive impact of Ireland's 
changing demographics. National debt interest falls 
over tl1e forecast period, reflecting reductions in 
interest rates and a decline in the overall level of 
the national debt. 
As outlined in Chapter 5, it is assumed tl1at 
average rates of personal taxation fall over the 
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forecast period. Personal disposable income is inflation this gives an average real growth rate of 
forecast to rise by 6.9 per cent between 1995 and over 4 per cent for the next eight years. 
2000. A similar rate of increase is anticipated in 
the second half of the forecast period. Allowing for 
Table 6.4: Personal Income, Per Cent Change 
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 1990-95 1995-00 2000-05 2005-10 
% Average Growth Rate,% 
Agricultural Incomes 0.00 -1.98 1.69 1.70 1.73 1.71 2.89 2.89 4.45 0.62 2.64 2.85 
Non-Ag. Wage Income 7.50 6.50 8.33 8.17 7.28 5.41 6.51 7.00 6.94 7.55 6.85 6.66 
Transfer Income 7.40 7.39 3.36 4.52 6.02 5.58 5.57 4.89 7.49 5.73 5.06 5.19 
Other Personal Income 5.11 6.87 10.34 11.56 8.85 9.50 7.97 9.71 5.72 8.52 9.53 7.35 
of which: 
Non-Ag. Profits etc. 12.26 9.67 11.31 10.96 7.39 9.66 9.32 9.77 11.90 10.31 9.52 6.59 
National Debt Interest -2.77 0.00 -4.95 -1.96 0.04 -3.91 -0.48 -0.63 -1.36 -1.95 -2.57 -3.20 
Net Factor Income 12.56 10.30 6.94 9.11 5.48 9.16 8.07 6.88 12.15 8.85 6.99 4.35 
Other Private Income 8.58 9.01 11.16 9.99 7.21 8.30 8.96 10.50 8.56 9.18 9.74 6.87 
U ndislTibuted Profits (-) 15.52 12.90 12.58 7.34 4.32 6.10 10.83 11.94 16.02 10.46 10.11 6.00 
Personal Income 6.49 6.11 7.28 7.68 7.01 5.98 6.42 6.94 6.62 6.91 6.84 6.41 
Taxes on Personal Income 7.62 5.32 7.33 4.86 9.02 4.15 7.06 6.96 6.51 6.82 6.46 4.51 
Personal Disposable Income 6.20 6.31 7.27 8.40 6.51 6.44 6.27 6.94 6.64 6.94 6.94 6.86 
Personal Consumption 8.50 7.00 9.02 8.40 5.34 6.44 6.27 6.94 6.26 7.64 6.94 6.38 
Personal Savings -9.29 0.72 -7.70 8.40 18.35 6.44 6.27 6.94 9.47 1.59 6.94 10.82 
Tax Ratio, % Personal 20.35 20.20 20.21 19.68 20.05 19.70 19.82 19.83 
Income 
Savings Ratio, % 11.04 10.46 9.00 9.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
Disposable Inc. income 
Consumption 
Consumption is driven not only by current personal 
disposable income but also by an individual's 
expectations about the future. Thus, expectations 
about the possible direction of interest rates and job 
security can mean that some income is diverted 
towards precautionary savings, thereby limiting 
consumption. 
In Ireland the personal savings ratio recovered to a 
high of nearly 14 per cent in 1993, possibly 
reflecting the shock to household expectations of 
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the 1992/93 currency crisis. The strong growth 
since then has seen some fall in the savings ratio. 
Counterbalancing the positive economic 
performance has been an increased awareness of 
the variability of interest rates and of the impact 
that this can have on income. Uncertainty about 
interest rates in the lead up to EMU has also 
underpinned the savings ratio. The fixing of 
exchange rates in 1999 and the copper-fastening 
that this gives to EMU together with continued 
stability in the public finances (see Chapter 5) 
should help to boost confidence and consequently 
THE CENTRAL FORECAST 
the ratio is forecast to fall to 9 per cent in 1998 and 
1999. From 2000 onwards we show the savings 
ratio stabilising at around 10 per cent for the 
remainder of the forecast period. 
This stabilisation of the savings ratio, coupled with 
the anticipated increase in real after tax income 
and in employment, indicates a period of strong 
growth in personal consumption. Growth in 
volume of 4.8 per cent is anticipated in 1997, 
increasing to 7 per cent in 1998. Overall we expect 
the increase in the volume of private consumption 
to average 5.4 per cent a year between 1995 and 
2000, and 4.7 per cent between 2000 and 2005, 
compared to an average of 3.8 per cent a year in 
the first halfof the 1990s (Figure 6.14). 
Figure 6.14: Personal and Public 
Consumption, Annual Average Growth 
Rates 
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Table 6.5: Expenditure on GNP, Constant Prices, Per Cent Changes 
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 1990- 1995- 2000- 2005-
1995 2000 2005 2010 
% Average Growth Rate, % 
Personal Consumption 6.2 4.8 7.0 6.1 3.1 4.2 4.1 4.7 3.8 5.4 4.7 4.1 
Public Consumption 3.0 2.5 3.0 2.9 3.3 3.4 3.4 3.4 2.6 3.0 3.4 3.4 
Fixed Investment 10.8 9.7 8.4 6.6 4.9 4.1 3.1 4.8 1.1 8.1 4.6 4.3 
Building 11.0 10.0 7.3 5.3 4.1 3.0 2.4 4.2 3.8 7.5 3.8 4.0 
Machinery 10.3 9.3 10.4 8.7 6.2 5.8 4.3 5.8 -2.7 9.0 5.8 4.7 
Total Exports 8.0 9.9 10.5 8.4 6.7 4.7 7.0 7.7 11.7 8.7 6.8 4.2 
Merchandise 8.0 10.3 10.8 8.6 6.8 4.6 7.1 7.8 12.7 8.9 6.9 4.2 
Services 8.1 6.5 7.5 6.0 5.7 5.4 5.9 6.3 3.8 6.8 5.9 4.1 
Total Demand 7.6 7.6 8.4 7.1 5.2 4.4 5.5 6.2 6.5 7.2 5.8 4.1 
Total Import~ 7.8 9.5 12.8 9.2 5.8 4.0 5.8 7.0 7.8 9.0 6.2 3.3 
Gross Domestic Product 7.5 6.5 5.8 5.7 4.8 4.7 5.3 5.7 5.7 6.1 5.5 4.6 
Net Factor Income 13.1 9.5 5.4 7.4 5.1 8.4 7.3 6.2 10.8 8.1 6.3 4.3 
Gross National Product 6.6 6.0 5.8 5.4 4.7 4.0 4.9 5.6 5.0 5.7 5.3 4.7 
GNP-Average of Output & 6.4 5.7 5.9 5.3 4.4 3.7 4.5 5.3 4.7 5.5 5.0 4.2 
Expenditure 
GNP Adjusted for Terms of 5.3 4.4 6.1 5.8 3.7 3.4 4.1 4.8 3.6 5.0 4.5 3.1 
Trade 
GNDI Ind. Capital Transfers 5.2 4.4 5.8 5.5 3.2 3.1 3.7 4.4 3.2 4.8 4.2 3.0 
The rise in public consumption in the late 1990s occurred between 1985 and 1990 meant that public 
and in the early part of the next century is expected consumption actually declined in this period in real 
to continue at the growth rates of 1990-199 5. The terms, down by an average of 0.6 per cent per 
period 1980-85 saw minimal growth of less than 1 annum. In contrast the period 1990-95 saw a 
per cent a year, while the fiscal tightening that recovery in the growth in public consumption to an 
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average of 2.6 per cent a year. We envisage an 
increase over the current five-year period to a 
growth rate of nearly 3 per cent a year, with a 
further rise in the period 2000-2005 to 3.4 per cent. 
The growth in the volume of public consumption 
ret1ects an easing of pressure on the public 
finances, brought about by a declining national 
debt, low interest rates and improving employment 
levels. 
Investment 
Investment, having reached a peak in the late 
1970s, showed almost no volume change over the 
1980s. While there was a recovery towards the end 
of that decade, with the general pick up in the 
growth of GNP, this proved short-lived. In the 
early 1990s, due to the high real interest rates of 
that period, investment fell back again, so that in 
1993 investment accounted for only 16 per cent of 
GNP. Between 1995 and 2000 the investment ratio 
is expected to average around 19 per cent of GNP, 
a return to the average ratio of the late 1980s and 
to a level closer to the experience of other EU 
countries. The period 2000-2005 should see this 
ratio remain around 19 per cent. The increase in 
investment levels in recent years ret1ects the strong 
growth in the economy, the drive to increase 
capacity, the low level of real interest rates 
compared to the early 1990s, and the stability that 
is expected once EMU goes ahead. 
Investment is agriculture is likely to perform 
poorly, reflecting the poor prospects for output in 
tfas sector within the forecast period. By contrast, 
growth in investment by the industrial sector will 
reach a peak of over 19 per cent in 1998, the main 
contributor being the high technology sector. The 
growth in industrial investment will average nearly 
11 per cent a year to 2000, after which the high 
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growth rate will moderate to 7 per cent a year to 
2005. Investment in market services is forecast to 
show a similar pattern. 
We have assumed that there will be a substantial 
increase in the volume of publicly funded 
infrastructural investment over the next five years, 
designed to meet the needs of a rapidly growing 
economy. This investment will cover a wide range 
of facilities including roads and urban public 
transport. It would see a significant increase in the 
demand for the services of the civil engineering 
part of the building sector. 
As noted earlier, a striking feature of the next five 
years is likely to be the relatively rapid growth in 
GNP and in household real disposable income per 
head. With the combination of the falling debt to 
GNP ratio and the changing demographic 
structure, described in Chapter 2, it is likely that 
over the next few years those at work will have a 
higher proportion of their income to spend on 
themselves. The consequent increase in living 
standards will be reflected in an increase in 
household formation and demand for private 
dwellings. 
When all the demographic factors, discussed in 
Chapter 2, are taken into account, and assuming 
that the demand for housing for replacement and 
other reasons runs a bit above the level experienced 
in the early 1990s, there is likely to be a need for at 
least 30,000 new dwellings a year over the rest of 
the decade. While demographic pressures may 
actually increase slightly, reaching a peak some 
time in the following five year period, we estimate 
that from the year 2000 onwards the average 
number of dwellings needed could fall back to 
around 25,000 a year by the end of the decade. 
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Fixed investment has grown strongly in the past 
few years, driven primarily by investment in 
buildings. While in 1994 and 1995 growth in 
investment in machinery was less than half that of 
invesunent in buildings it has since recovered and 
in 1996 and 1997 should grow by a broadly similar 
rate. Growth in investment in machinery is set to 
exceed that in buildings over the next two years, 
partly reflecting a slowdown in building 
invesunent. The growth in total investment is 
expected to average 8.1 per cent a year in volume 
terms in the period 1995-2000 inclusive. However, 
between 2000 and 2005 the slow down in housing 
investment and the slower growth in output 
between 2000 and 2005 means that growth in 
invesunent is also expected to slow to 4.6 per cent 
a year. 
Exports 
Strong export growth made a significant 
contribution to the rise in Irish GNP during the 
mid-1990s, reaching just under 15 per cent of GNP 
in 1995. ln the second half of the 1990s growth in 
the exports of goods and services is not expected to 
reach the high levels of the period 1990-95 when 
tl1e average growth was nearly 12 per cent a year. 
The rate of growth is expected to slow to just over 
8.5 per cent between 1995 and 2000 and slow even 
further to 6.8 per cent a year in tl1e period 2000 to 
2005. Despite tl1e slowdown in export growth, 
trade will continue to make a positive contribution 
to GNP over tl1e time frame of the Review. 
The strength of export growth in 1994 and 1995 
was partly tl1e result of the positive external 
environment. The forecast recovery of the main 
European economies during 1997 and 1998, 
coupled witl1 tl1e strength of the UK economy, 
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should contribute to export growth over the next 
two years. 
Agricultural exports are not expected to perform as 
well as oilier sectors. Our forecast is that, on 
average, agricultural exports will contract between 
1995-2000, partly reflecting the downturn in 
demand for beef following tl1e BSE crisis as well as 
subdued growth in agricultural output. Only a 
marginal recovery is expected between 2000-2005 
when agricultural exports will grow by just 0.7 per 
cent a year. 
Table 6.6 Exports by Sector, Average 
Annual Growth Rates(%) 
Agriculture 
Industry 
Merchandise 
Tourism 
Other 
Services 
Services 
Total Goods 
and Services 
1980- 1985- 1990- 1995- 2000- 2005-
1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 
-0.8 3.6 6.4 -1.5 0.7 1.6 
12.4 10.3 13.7 10.0 7.3 4.3 
8.8 9.1 12.7 8.9 6.9 4.2 
0.6 7.4 6.9 7.1 4.4 1.9 
7.1 7.8 1.3 6.4 7.2 5.8 
3.7 7.6 3.8 6.8 5.9 4.1 
8.1 8.9 11.7 8.7 6.8 4.2 
Tourism exports are difficult to forecast given the 
wide variety of factors on which tl1ey are based. 
Changes in competitiveness, changes in marketing, 
or changes in taste can all influence growtl1 in tl1is 
sector. Tourism exports rose rapidly in tl1e first half 
of the 1990s, averaging 7 per cent growtl1 a year 
and to date there has been no slowdown in tl1is 
sector. For the period 1995-2000 the average 
increase in tourism exports is forecast to be broadly 
similar at 7 .1 per cent a year. Our forecast for the 
period 2000 to 2005 is for a slowdown to 4.4 per 
cent a year. The forecast for exports of other 
services is for an average growth of 6.5 per cent a 
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year to 2000, and 7.2 per cent until 2005. These 
growth rates are higher than those achieved in the 
early 1990s and are more in line with average 
growth rates between 1975 and 1990. This reflects 
the growth in merchandise and tourism exports, 
both of which contribute to demand for other 
services. 
Imports 
The anticipated growth in the Irish economy over 
the forecast period, driven by high industrial output 
and growing consumer spending, implies that the 
volume increase in imports can be expected to be 
high. 
Figure 6.15: Volume of Exports and 
Imports, Percentage Change 
% 
20 ,------------------, 
15 
10 
O'-----------------' 1905 1990 1995 2000 2003 
1-.~.y,Total Exports -Total Imports I 
The volume of imports is expected to rise sharply 
over the next three years, particularly in 1998 when 
the volume of imports is expected to grow by 
almost 13 per cent. While this growth represents an 
increase on 1996 levels, it is still below the strong 
growth in import volumes experienced in 1994 and 
1995. A major contribution to the forecast surge in 
imports will be the rise in investment levels. 
Investment in machinery and equipment has a high 
import content. The rise in personal expenditure 
will also contribute to the growth in imports. 
Growth in imports is expected to average 9 per cent 
a year between 1995-2000 (Figure 6.15). For the 
remainder of the forecast period, the growth in 
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import volumes is expected to moderate, averaging 
6.2 per cent a year in the period 2000-2005. 
Net Factor Income 
The difference between GDP and GNP, accounted 
for by factor income paid abroad (profit 
repatriations, national debt interest), and interest 
and dividends received from abroad is expected to 
widen as the growth in net factor income will 
exceed that of either GDP or GNP over the forecast 
period. 
National debt interest has for a long time 
represented a drain on national resources and 
consequently has made a negative contribution to 
GNP growth. However, over the forecast period 
foreign debt is forecast to fall in absolute terms and 
as a percent of GNP. This, coupled with low 
interest rates and an improvement in the public 
finances, has reduced the amount of interest paid 
abroad thus increasing the level of GNP. 
The growth in net factor income can therefore be 
attributed to its two other elements: profit 
repatriations and other factor income. The growth 
in the level of profit repatriations in recent years 
reflects the high level of foreign ownership in the 
high technology sector and its very high growth 
rate. Profit repatriations are forecast to grow by 
over 11 per cent a year until 2000, slowing to 8 per 
cent in the period from 2000 to 2005. The net 
inflow of other factor income will rise over the 
period due to the build up in private foreign assets, 
the result of a continuing balance of payments 
surplus. 
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The contributions to GNP growth of net factor 
flows is shown in Table 6.7 on an ESA79 basis.6 
Table 6.7: Contribution to GNP Growth of 
Net Factor Flows, Percentage Points of 
GNP 
1980- 1985- 1990- 1995- 2000- 2005-
1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 
National Debt -0.48 -0.21 0.04 0.15 0.16 0.05 
Interest 
Profits etc., -0.90 -1.19 -2.01 -1.99 -1.57 -1.22 
Outflows 
Other Factor 0.03 0.29 0.47 0.43 0.20 0.34 
mcome 
GNP 
Ireland has enjoyed economic growth in recent 
years that has exceeded that of our European 
6 1his has now been superseded but consistent data are not 
available for the period shown on the new basis. 
partners. Some of the reasons underlying this 
growth have been examined in Chapter 3. Rapid 
growth in profit repatriations and other factor 
income between 1993 and 1995 meant that GNP 
growth was over one percentage point lower than 
that of GDP. While growth in profit repatriations 
will remain strong, a reduction in national debt 
interest will narrow this gap. For the period 1995-
2000 GNP growth (using the average of the output 
and the expenditure measures) will average 5.6 per 
cent a year, compared to 6 per cent for GDP. The 
changing pattern of factor flows will result in this 
gap narrowing even further, and in the second half 
of the forecast period, 2000-2005, GNP growth will 
average 5 per cent a year, compared to the figure of 
5.2 per cent for GDP. 
Table 6.8: The Terms-of-Trade Effect 
1980-1985 1985-1990 1990-1995 1995-2000 2000-2005 2005-2010 
Gross National Product,% Change 0.4 
Effect of Terms of Trade, % of GNP 0.3 
GNP Adj. for Terms of Trade, % change 0.7 
Effect of Transfers, % of GNP 0.1 
Gross National Disp Income+ Capital 0.8 
Transfers (National Resources),% change 
Gross National Disposable Income 
Gross National Disposable Income (GNDI) is the 
measure which captures the impact of the terms of 
trade and EU transfers on our standard of living. 
Based on our forecast, we expect that for the five 
year periods 1995-2000 and 2000-2005 the rate of 
growth in GNDI will be around three quarters of a 
percentage point below that for GNP. The 
downward adjustment to growth due to the terms of 
trade was particularly severe between 1990 and 
1995. Over the forecast period to 2003 it is 
expected that the effect of the terms of trade will 
3.6 4.7 5.5 5.0 4.2 
-0.1 -1.1 -0.5 -0.5 -1.1 
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3.5 3.6 5.0 4.5 3.1 
0.4 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.1 
3.9 3.2 4.8 4.2 3.0 
continue to be adverse, although not as severe as in 
the early 1990s. The deterioration forecast after 
2005 is partly due to the assumed reform of tl1e 
CAP. 
The annual rate of growth in transfers from the 
EU, which boosted growth in the 1985-90 period, 
is expected to contribute to the increasing negative 
margin between the growth in GNDI and in GNP 
in the next 10 years. This reflects the fact that in 
tlle 1990s the transfers are rising more slowly than 
GNP and after 2000 they are forecast to fall. Thus, 
tlley will no longer offset the loss on terms of trade. 
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Prices and Wages 
Inflation in Ireland is largely determined by the 
rate of inflation experienced by our main trading 
partners, as well as by movements in the exchange 
rate. In the forecast period we have assumed that 
the Irish pound will depreciate against the DM in 
1998 towards its current central rate within the 
ERM. From 1999 there is no change in the Irish 
pound-DM rate as exchange rates of EMU 
members will be fixed. The Irish pound is forecast 
to depreciate vis-a-vis sterling between 1997 and 
1999, after which it shows a small annual 
appreciation. As outlined in Chapter 5, we expect 
the rate of inflation in tl1e UK to reach an average 
of 3.6 per cent in the medium term. 
Personal Consumption 
Government Consumption 
-Total 
Investment - Building 
Investment Machinery 
Exports 
Imports - Energy 
Imports - Non-Energy 
Agricultural Output -
Gross 
Manufacturing Output -
Gross 
IndustTy 
Non-Market Public 
Admin. 
Non-Agricultural 
Table 6.9: Prices and Wages, Percentage Change 
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 1990-95 1995-00 2000-05 2005-10 
Prices, % change 
2.2 2.1 1.9 2.1 2.2 2.1 2.1 2.1 
3.9 4.9 3.1 3.9 4.3 2.9 3.5 3.4 
2.7 2.7 2.9 2.2 2.7 2.6 2.7 3.1 
1.1 1.6 1.8 2.0 1.9 1.8 1.8 1.7 
-0.4 -0.1 2.4 2.6 1.3 1.7 1.6 1.6 
10.0 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 
0.3 0.9 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 
-5 .4 -5 .1 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 -2.0 -2.0 
0.7 1.0 2.2 2.5 1.2 1.6 1.6 1.5 
Average Annual Earnings: % change 
2.5 2.1 3.7 4.7 5.2 3.5 4.2 4.2 
3.9 4.9 3.7 4.7 5.2 3.5 4.2 4.2 
2.7 2.7 3.5 4.5 5.2 3.4 4.3 4.3 
Average Growth Rate, % 
2.4 
4.9 
3.1 
3.2 
1.3 
-4.0 
2.7 
3.3 
-0.1 
2.1 
4.0 
2.6 
1.7 
1.1 
4.0 
1.3 
-1.5 
1.5 
2.1 
3.6 
3.1 
1.8 
1.6 
2.5 
1.8 
-1.4 
1.4 
Average Growth Rate,% 
4.1 
3.7 
4.2 
3.7 
4.5 
3.7 
4.3 
4.3 
4.4 
2.2 
3.8 
3.5 
1.7 
0.9 
2.5 
1.8 
-2.0 
0.6 
4.7 
4.7 
4.8 
For tlle manufacturing sector tllis means a low rate 
of growtll in output prices of approximately 1.5 per 
cent a year from 1995-2000, moderating slightly to 
1.4 per cent in the second half of tlle forecast 
period. The forecast moderate decline in real 
labour costs for the manufacturing sector should 
help to ensure tllat firms will be profitable, despite 
the low rate of growth in prices. 
developments in domestic costs, which include 
taxation. However, given our forecasts for domestic 
labour costs and our assumptions on taxation, we 
anticipate tllat the rate of inflation in tlle deflator 
for personal consumption7 will average about 2 per 
cent throughout the forecast period. Our forecast 
for inflation in consumer prices for Ireland is lower 
tllan tl1at of many of our EU neighbours. Between 
While largely determined externally, tlle rate of 
inflation in consumer prices is also affected by 
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7 Over time the consumer price index should track the deflator for 
personal consumption. 
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1995 and 2000 Ireland can expect to enjoy an 
intlation rate in line with that of Germany and 
nearly a full percentage point lower than some of 
the other main countries. Between 2000 and 2005 
Ireland's intlation performance is likely to remain 
low relative to other EU countries. 
The pattern of wage behaviour since the mid-1980s 
has been very different from the previous 25 years. 
Clearly the increased social consensus symbolised 
by successive agreements between the social 
partners has had an impact. The decline in the tax 
burden since the late 1980s has also made a 
contribution to a slow-down in wage intlation. 
Finally, as discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, the 
increase in the supply of labour has meant that 
supply side pressures in the labour market have 
been minimised. The overall effect has been to 
ensure relatively slow growth in real wage rates in 
the 1990s. 
Because of increasing pressures arising from the 
rapid growth rate we expect there to be some pick-
up in the rate of increase in average earnings over 
the rest of the decade (Table 6.9). However, the 
increase in wage inflation should still be quite 
moderate raising the increase in average earnings 
in the first half of the next decade to 4.3 per cent a 
year, just over 0.5 percentage points higher than in 
the current 5 year period. 
6.5 The Labour Market 
The most tangible evidence of the recent strength 
of the Irish economy is the turnaround in the 
employment numbers. As discussed in Chapter 3, 
the spectre of so-called jobless growth has ceased to 
haunt the Irish labour market and employment has 
been growing steadily in recent years. We forecast 
that this will continue over the medium term. 
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The total numbers in employment is forecast to 
grow at approximately 3 per cent per annum over 
the period 1995-2000, slowing to an historically 
still very high rate of 2 per cent in 2000-2005. The 
details of our employment forecast are summarised 
in Table 6.10. Overall we expect an increase in 
total employment of 233,000 between 1996 and 
2003. The bulk of this increase will be in the 
market services sector, with an increase of 167,000 
jobs; well over half of this is concentrated in the 
Other Market Services sector. The industrial sector 
accounts for most of the rest, with an increase of 
55,000 jobs distributed fairly evenly between the 
traditional, high-tech and building sectors. 
Agricultural employment is expected to fall, 
declining by 24,000 between 1996 and 2003, while 
non-market services employment will increase by 
37,000 (based on our assumptions detailed in 
Chapter 5). 
This forecast increase in employment is largely 
demand driven. The buoyant outlook for growth in 
botl1 the industrial and services sector impacts 
directly on the demand for labour in those sectors. 
Because of data limitations, within the ESRI model 
there is no differentiation made between the 
demand for different labour skills, so that these 
forecast numbers relate to an aggregate demand for 
labour. However, it is important to consider 
whether this strong demand for labour will impact 
equally on both skilled and unskilled employment 
or is likely instead to be biased towards skilled 
employment. 
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Table 6.10: Emelolment and the Labour Force, Percentage Change, Mid-Aeril 
1996 1997 1998 1999 
% 
Agriculture -4.2 -1.5 -3.0 -3.0 
Industry 1.7 5.4 4.7 2.6 
Traditional Manufacturing -2.3 4.3 3.6 2.7 
Food Processing -12.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 
High Technology 9.0 7.2 6.7 4.6 
Manufacturing 0.4 4.9 4.5 3.2 
Utilities 7.7 -7.1 -7.7 -8.3 
Building 4.9 9.0 7.0 2.4 
Market Services 7.1 3.0 5.6 4.5 
Distribution 4.0 3.6 5.0 6.4 
Transport & 5.3 2.5 6.6 4.9 
Cmmnunications 
Other Market Services 9.5 2.8 5.6 3.2 
Non-Market Services 3.0 2.5 2.3 2.3 
Health & Education 3.0 2.5 2.5 2.5 
Public Administration 3.0 2.5 2.0 2.0 
Total 3.6 3.1 3.9 2.9 
Unemployment 3.9 -5.9 -12.6 -6.7 
Labour Force 3.7 1.9 2.0 1.9 
Net Emigration, thousands -6 0 0 0 
% of Labour Force 
Unemployment Rate (ILO 11.9 10.9 9.1 8.3 
Basis) 
The demand for skilled workers has been rising 
rapidly in Ireland both because of the rising human 
capital requirements within the manufacturing 
sector and because of the generalised impact of 
computerisation and new technologies on all types 
of work. The educational and skill composition of 
the work-force has been steadily intensifying and 
demographic trends indicate that this will continue 
over the forecast period (see Chapter 2). Therefore 
m1y increases in employment are likely to be more 
skill-intensive than in the past. On a sectoral basis, 
the forecast increases in employment are 
2000 
-2.9 
0.5 
1.6 
0.0 
1.3 
1.2 
-9.1 
-0.6 
2.7 
2.1 
2.9 
3.1 
2.3 
2.5 
2.0 
1.5 
5.1 
1.9 
0 
8.6 
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2001 2002 2003 1990-95 1995-00 2000-05 2005-10 
Average growth rate% 
-2.9 -2.9 -2.9 -3.4 -2.9 -2.9 -2.9 
-1.3 0.7 2.3 1.5 3.0 1.2 1.1 
-0.6 1.5 1.6 -0.6 2.0 1.1 -0.8 
0.0 1.3 1.2 3.1 -2.7 1.0 1.2 
-3.2 1.6 3.9 2.6 5.7 1.8 2.5 
-1.8 1.5 2.7 1.4 2.8 1.4 1.2 
0.0 0.0 0.0 1.6 -5.1 0.0 0.0 
0.1 -1.4 1.4 1.5 4.5 0.6 0.8 
3.7 2.9 2.9 3.4 4.6 3.1 1.9 
2.6 1.7 1.6 1.6 4.2 2.2 1.6 
2.2 3.4 4.0 2.2 4.4 3.4 1.0 
4.8 3.5 3.4 5.1 4.8 3.6 2.4 
2.3 2.3 2.3 2.5 2.5 2.3 2.3 
2.5 2.5 2.5 2.7 2.6 2.5 2.5 
2.0 2.0 2.0 2.1 2.3 2.0 2.0 
1.5 1.7 2.2 1.8 3.0 2.0 1.5 
4.0 2.7 -2.8 1.5 -3.5 -1.8 -1.6 
1.8 1.8 1.7 1.8 2.3 1.6 1.2 
0 0 0 
1995 2000 2005 2010 
8.8 8.9 8.4 12.2 8.6 7.0 5.9 
concentrated in sectors with relatively high skill 
requirements; just under 11.8 per cent of the total 
increase of 233,000 is in the high technology 
sector, over 40 per cent in other market services, 
which is the most human capital intensive of all the 
services sectors (it includes financial services and 
professional services), and 15 .9 per cent in non-
market services. 
What about the demand for unskilled labour? In 
future a significant part of this employment is 
likely to be concentrated in part-time or casual 
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employment within the services sector (the 
distribution sector and the personal services portion 
of the other market services sector). For this type of 
work the term "unskilled" is unsatisfactory and 
possibly misleading since many of these jobs do 
require certain minimal educational qualifications 
(in contrast to a typical unskilled job within the 
manufacturing sector). The demand for such labour 
is likely to be buoyant, driven by domestic demand. 
For example almost 21 per cent of the. total forecast 
increase in employment between 1996 and 2003 is 
in the distribution sector. However, it is likely that 
the changing nature of "unskilled" work means 
that this demand will draw from a somewhat 
different pool of workers than previously. The 
traditional "unskilled" workers, with little or no 
educational qualifications, may face difficulties in 
entering this labour market, particularly given the 
general increase in the skill levels of new entrants 
to the labour market. 
Another feature masked by the aggregate numbers 
employed, is the increasing proportion of part-time 
work in total employment. Box 6.5 illustrates that 
the 1996 employment numbers overestimate 
employment by over 86,000 because the data are 
not corrected to full-time equivalents. Given that 
most of the future growth in employment is within 
the market services sector, a considerable portion 
may take the form of part-time work. 
Box 6.5: Full-Time Equivalence of Part-Time Employment 
Part-time employment has increased in importance over the period 1988 to 1995. The share of part-time 
workers in total employment rose from 7.8 per cent in 1988 to 11.5 per cent in 1996. Over the same period 
the average number of hours worked per week fell from 45.1 hours to 43.8 hours for full-time employees while 
rising from 18.2 to 18.8 hours for part-time employees. An increase in the share of part-time work in total 
employment makes it more difficult to interpret data on numbers employed; specifically we wish to avoid 
overestimating the effective level of employment. To get a first estimate of the bias in the data on total 
numbers employed as a measure of effective employment we compute full-time equivalent estimates from the 
data on full-time and part-time employment numbers in the Labour Force Survey. 
Table: Estimates of Emelo~ment Adjusted for FTEs, Thousands 
Part-Time FTE of (l) Full-Time All Jobs FTE Adjusted Difference 
(]) (2) (3) (4)=(1)+(3) (5)=(2)+(3) (5)-(4) 
1988 87.1 35.1 1024.6 1111.7 1059.7 52.0 
1989 82.2 33.3 1031 1113.2 1064.3 48.9 
1990 91.9 37.5 1059.7 1151.6 1097.2 54.4 
1991 95 39.1 1052.4 1147.4 1091.5 55.9 
1992 91.6 38.2 962.1 1053.7 1000.3 53.4 
1993 126.6 53.8 1050.9 1177.5 1104.7 72.8 
1994 136.6 58.6 1077.5 1214.1 1136.1 78.0 
1995 152.4 65.4 1115 1267.4 1180.4 87.0 
1996 151.4 65.3 1165.4 1316.8 1230.7 86.1 
Source: Annual Series of Labour Force Surveys, ILO Estimate. 
The full-time equivalence (FTE) of part-time employment is calculated by multiplying median usual hours 
worked per week by part-time employees by the total number in part-time employment to get an estimate of 
total hours worked per week by part-time employees. This is then divided by the average usual hours worked 
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by full-time employeesa to arrive at an estimate of the number of full-time jobs embodied in part-time 
employment. 
The Table above gives total numbers of persons in both full-time and part-time employment 1988-1996 
(column (4)). This is compared with total employment where part-time work is adjusted to FTE (column (5)). 
The difference, shown in column (6), is then a measure of the overestimation of employment due to the 
inclusion of unadjusted part-time workers in total numbers employed. On average between 1988 and 1996 
total employment on a full-time equivalent basis grew by 1.9 per cent a year whereas the unadjusted figure 
grew by 2.1 per cent a year. This is a measure of the distortion introduced by ignoring the growth in part-time 
work. While the difference is significant, it is still quite small and it does not alter the picture of rapid 
employment growth over the period. 
a Note that persons who have not stated the number of hours they usually work are excluded for ease of calculation purposes. 
The labour force is forecast to grow at an average 
annual rate of 2.3 per cent between 1995 and 2000, 
slowing to 1.6 per cent in the subsequent five years. 
These are very high rates of growth both in 
comparison with the recent past and with current 
EU average rates. The supply of labour in the ESRI 
model is determined by the natural increase in the 
population, participation rates and net migration 
ilows. The latter two factors are sensitive to 
employment conditions in the economy. Box 6.6 
provides full details of labour supply determination 
mechanisms within the model. 
In our forecast we assume zero net migration until 
2005. This assumption is crucial in determining 
our forecast unemployment numbers. Underlying 
this zero figure are substantial (but equal) inward 
and outward migration flows. Inward migration is 
driven by the improved domestic employment 
conditions attracting back emigrants of previous 
years and their families. In addition, it is likely that 
there will be some increase in immigration of non-
nationals, attracted by the buoyant labour market 
conditions. These inward flows will be 
counterbalanced by continued emigration of young 
workers, increasingly concentrated among those 
with some educational qualifications. In recent 
years the pattern of migration has changed 
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substantially, reflecting the rising educational 
attainment of the labour force and the growing 
integration of Ireland into the European economy, 
so that migration is no longer predominantly 
concentrated among unskilled workers (see 
Chapter 2 for a full discussion). 
In previous Reviews difficulties m forecasting 
migration flows have bedevilled our unemployment 
forecasts (see Chapter 1). Given the forecast of 
strong growth in employment, the migration 
figures presented here are likely, if anything, to err 
on the side of underpredicting inward migration 
flows. This could have consequences for our 
forecast of unemployment but it may also reflect an 
underestimate of the likely growth in employment. 
We forecast that unemployment will fall by 34,000 
between 1996 and 2003 giving an unemployment 
rate in 2003 of 8.4 per cent (on an ILO ba-;is). 
Comparing tl1is with (NIESR based) forecasts of 
unemployment rates for the major European 
economies this would substantially narrow tl1e 
differential between Irish and UK unemployment 
(from a 5.4 percentage point gap in 1996 to a 3 
point gap in 2003), while placing tl1e Irish 
unemployment rate at the same rate as Germany 
and lower than that of either France or Italy. 
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Box 6.6: A New Model of Labour Supply 
Over the past 30 years there have been radical changes in the supply of labour to the Irish economy. These 
changes have been largely determined by three factors, changes in the labour force participation rate (and in 
participation in education), changes in the demographic structure of the population, and high and volatile net 
migration flows. Over this period the participation of women in the labour force has been steadily increasing. 
The most recent version of the ESRI model has been updated to include a set of relationships governing 
participation, population of working age and migration, each disaggregated by sex. 
The Basic Model For A Given Age Group 
The basic model of labour supply determination for age group x is outlined here. The supply of labour in any 
given time period (LSr) is determined by the labour force participation rate (LFPRr), the natural increase in the 
population age group x (NGr) and net migration from this population cohort (NMA 1) as follows: 
LSr = LFPRr. Nr, LFPRr =LFrl Nr, Nr =(NGr-NMAr) + Nr-1 
where LF1 is the labour force in the x age group, and Nr is the actual population in the x age group. 
Population of Working Age 
A sharp reduction in the number of births since 1980 has significantly altered the age distribution of the 
population with a significant increase in the 25-64 group of working age and a fall-off in the child population. 
In addition to these changes in the natural increase, the actual population in different age groups in any given 
year is strongly influenced by net migration. In the ESRI model population growth is modelled separately for 
men and women for four different age groups, 0-14, 15-24, 25-64 and 65+. In each of the resultant eight 
equations actual population growth is modelled as a function of the natural increase in each age groupa and a 
sex-specific migration rate. b The results indicate that the migration effect is highest for men in the 25-64 age 
group (43 per cent of total male net migration, 36 per cent of female). 
Participation Rates 
The introduction of free education in the late 1960s has led to a marked increase in participation in education 
among the 15-24 age group. Labour force participation rates for both men and women have fallen 
dramatically in this age group between 1980 and 1995 (by over 21 percentage points for males and 14 
percentage points for females). In the model these two sex-specific labour force participation rates are treated 
as decreasing functions of time to proxy this secular increase in participation in education. 
By contrast female labour force participation in the 25-64 age group has been steadily increasing although it 
is still less than half the participation rate of men in that age group. This variable is modelled as an increasing 
function of time (a proxy for slowly changing sociological factors) and a positive function of employment 
conditions in the economy as a whole. The results indicate that female labour force participation in the 25-64 
age group is very sensitive to general employment conditions with a predicted increase of 0.5 percentage 
points given a 1 per cent increase in employment in 1994. Male labour force participation in the 25-64 age 
group is falling gradually over time. '( 
Migration by Sex 
High and volatile net migration flows also have a significant and immediate impact on the supply of labour. 
Migration is determined in the model as a function of employment conditions in Ireland relative to the UK (our 
nearest alternative labour market). Separate equations are estimated for male and female migration (in recent 
years female migration is in general lower than male). For both male and female migration it was found that a 
steady-state positive differential of 4 percentage points between Irish and UK unemployment rates will result 
in zero net migration. 
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a The natural increase (births minus deaths) in each age group in each year was calculated using the actual Census population 
figures by age and sex in 1971 and data from the life tables in 1971, 1981, 1986 and 1991. 
b The coefficients on the sex-specific net migration variable sum to one across the four sex-specific age groups. 
6.6 The Balance of Payments, 
the Public Finances and 
Savings 
The Balance of Payments 
The recent revised version of the National 
Accounts substantially alters the measured current 
account surplus on the Balance of Payments (see 
Chapter 4). On the old ESA79 basis the external 
surplus in 1996 was estimated at 4.9 per cent of 
GNP, but the revised ESA95 standard estimates 
this same surplus at 1.3 per cent of GNP. 
Figure 6.16 shows the likely future path of the 
Balance of Payments surplus, measured on the 
revised ESA95 basis. Over the medium-term the 
current account surplus is likely to fall with the 
slrnng pick up in domestic demand. 
Despite a significant reduction in magnitude, we 
forecast that the current account will remain in 
surplus throughout the forecast period, averaging 
approximately 1 per cent of GNP per annum. This 
small positive external balance is maintained 
despite slrnng growth in domestic demand. As 
discussed in Chapter 3, this reflects the current 
stability of the macroeconomic environment; a 
strong balance of trade driven by a continued 
strong export performance is sufficient to keep the 
current account in surplus despite substantial 
negative factor t1ows. (Even if shocks to the 
economy pushed the balance of payments 
temporarily into deficit this would not pose a 
problem.) 
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Figure 6.16: Balance of Payments Surplus 
1990-2003 
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 
The Public Finances 
In Chapter 5 we set out our assumptions 
concerning the different components of expenditure 
and revenue. The forecast growth in revenue and 
expenditure shown in Table 5.7 takes account of 
the development in the macro-economic aggregates 
of the Central Forecast. For example, the figures 
in that table for the growth in transfers takes 
account of the forecast drop in unemployment 
described above. 
Figure 6.17: General Government Deficit 
1990 
The interaction of our assumptions concerning 
fiscal policy and the development of the rest of the 
economy described in t11is chapter produces our 
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forecast for the likely trend in the General 
Government Deficit (the GGD which is broadly 
equivalent to the Exchequer Borrowing 
Requirement). This forecast is shown in Figure 
6.17 as a percentage of GNP. 8 The consequence of 
our assumptions concerning fiscal policy are that 
tl1e rapid growth over the next few years is likely to 
almost eliminate the government borrowing 
requirement by 1999 with a small deficit remaining 
out to 2003. The assumed gradual decline after 
1999 in EU transfers could put some pressure on 
the government finances. However, the continuing 
growth and related revenue buoyancy should allow 
tl1e government to fund a continuing major 
progrmnme of infrastructural investment. 
Figure 6.18: General Government Debt 
Ratio 
120 % of GNP and GDP 
40 ~--------------~ 
1990 1995 2000 
[-Ratio to GNP "., .. ·.Ratio to GDP [ 
The temporary rise in the debt-GNP (and debt-
GDP) ratio in 1993 (Figure 6.18) was due to a 
revaluation of tl1e debt consequent on the 
devaluation of the Irish pound in that year. Since 
that date tl1e ratios have been declining steadily. 
The precipitate nature of tl1e decline is attributable 
to the rise in the value (and volume) of GNP. If the 
economy continued to grow in line with its 
potential over tl1e next decade the debt-GNP ratio 
could fall to around 30 per cent by 2010. Such a 
reduction in debt would provide insurance against 
8111e Maastricht criterion on government b01Towing expresses the 
GGD as a percentage of GDP. 
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future liabilities arising from ilie ageing of tl1e 
population after 2010. It would also ensure tliat tl1e 
stability pact would not place any constraints on 
the stance of Irish fiscal policy in ilie future. 
The possibility iliat the public finances could (and 
ought to) move into surplus in tlle middle of tl1e 
next decade has important implications for national 
savings and how they are invested. Traditionally 
ilie personal sector has been the major saver in the 
Irish economy. Over large periods tl1is saving was 
boosted by substantial foreign borrowing (reflected 
in ilie running of a balance of payments deficit). 
The government sector absorbed a significant share 
of these savings in ilie 1980s, leaving the residual 
to fund company sector investment (see Chapter 4 
for a full discussion of this issue). However, if tl1e 
public sector turns into a net saver (or ceases 
borrowing) in the next decade, it will be adding to 
the pool of public savings. 
The household sector is projected to continue to 
save at least 10 per cent of its disposable income 
over ilie next decade. This sector has traditionally 
invested its savings in new housing and financial 
assets.9 The sector's current exceptional level of 
investment in new residential property is unlikely 
to be greatly increased (and could fall towards tl1e 
end of tl1e next decade). The present position, 
where residential investment is at an all-time high, 
me:ms tlrnt tl1is investment is absorbing an 
unusually large part of ilie sector's savings. 
However, if, as we anticipate, residential 
investment over the next 10 years does not greatly 
exceed its current level, tl1e additional savings 
becoming available will find tl1eir way into 
9Because of the inclusion in the sector of agriculture significant 
funds have also been devoted to investment in that sector. 
However, with the changing climate for agriculture we do not see 
this investment rising in the future. 
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financial assets. This will mean that private sector 
net acquisition of financial assets is likely to 
increase both in absolute terms and as a share of 
personal savings. 
An important force driving this development will 
be the desire by individuals to provide for their 
retirement through savings, especially in pension 
funds and similar assets. In the next decade with a 
very high (and rising) proportion of the population 
in employment, the bulk of them in skilled 
occupations, there is likely to be a rapid increase in 
investment to provide for old age. With only a 
small proportion of the population in the retired 
age group, savings for retirement will be rising 
rapidly. In terms of individual households, as 
people who enter the labour market obtain 
satisfact01y employment, their initial investment 
tends to be in setting up an independent household 
- residential investment. Once this is accomplished 
attention, tends to turn to other means of providing 
for their future needs, especially their likely needs 
in old age. 
In the early 1990s, though investment still 
remained profitable, the high real interest rates 
discouraged investment by the company sector. As 
a result, this sector used a higher proportion of 
t11eir own resources to repay debt and to improve 
their balance sheets than they did in the late 1980s. 
This contributed to an upward shift in national 
savings. However, with the improved outlook for 
interest rates and the rapid increase in output, it is 
likely that in the medium term the company sector 
will use most of its own resources to fund 
investment in physical capital. 
The net impact of these different forces is reflected 
in the balance of payments. As discussed above our 
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forecast envisages the balance of payments 
remaining in small surplus well into the next 
decade. However, the changing needs of the 
economy will see substantial changes in the 
direction and volume of gross flows of financial 
assets as the economy funds a continuing rapid 
growth in output and as individuals provide for 
their future retirement needs. 
6.7 Energy and the 
Environment 
Trends in Energy Consumption 
The most important sources of energy in the Irish 
economy are coal, peat, oil, gas and electricity. 
Energy consumption is driven by GDP and is 
moderated by changes in energy prices and 
technical progress. Figure 6.19 shows total energy 
consumption from 1960 to 1995 along with GDP 
measured at constant prices. 10 Apart from the oil 
price hikes of 1973-74 and 1979-80, the pattern is 
one of rapid growth when GDP is increasing 
strongly (as in the 1960s), and of little or no 
growth when GDP is static (as in the early and 
middle 1980s). 
But it is quite possible that other factors may also 
be in operation, influencing energy demand 
directly, or indirectly through altering the rates at 
which energy demand responds to GDP or price 
changes. For example, it could be argued that Irish 
industrial growth in recent years has been in less 
10Tue common unit used to combine over fuels is the TOE (Tonne 
of Oil Equivalent - the amount of fuel needed to produce the same 
amount of energy as a tonne of oil) with the "price" of aggregate 
energy also measured per TOE. 
THE CENTRAL FORECAST 
Figure 6.19: Total Final Consumption of 
Energy and GDP 1960-1995 
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energy-intensive sectors than in the past and also 
that the two great price hikes of the 1970s triggered 
the development of more energy efficient 
equipment and practices.From the operation of 
such factors it is reasonable to predict some 
permanent reduction in the energy intensity of 
growth, relative to the 1970s and earlier. However, 
it is easy to overestimate the size of such 
reductions, and also the permanence of some 
components of the reductions. 11 For example, 
improved efficiency of energy-use obtained through 
progressive changes in the fuel-mix may be 
possible only for a limited number of years. These 
problems are discussed further in Box 6.8. 
llConniffe, D., 1993. "Energy Elasticity Estimates and the 
Stability of the Relationship with GDP" in J. Fitz Gerald and D. 
McCoy (eels.), Issues in Irish Energy Policy, Dublin: The 
Economic and Social Research Institute, Policy Research Series 
No. 20, pp. 79-100. 
Table 6.11: Total Final Consumption of Energy by Fuel (thousand TOE) 1960-1995 
1960 1970 1980 1985 1990 1995 
Coal 860 31% 720 15% 750 
Oil 915 33% 3018 62% 4049 
Peat 780 28% 600 12% 580 
Electricity 170 6% 410 8% 750 
Gas 71 3% 90 2% 136 
Total 2796 4838 6265 
In Table 6.11 we show the pattern of final 
consumption of the different fuel types between 
1960 and 1995. Of the individual fuels, oil 
dominates tl1e Irish energy market, accounting for 
over half of all final consumption. Over the period 
since 1970 its position has changed considerably, 
witl1 large falls in consumption after the oil shocks 
of 1973-74 and particularly 1979-80. Indeed it was 
only in 1993 tl1at oil consumption again reached 
1979 levels. For tl1e past number of years however, 
12% 1020 16% 860 12% 380 5% 
65% 3282 53% 3875 54% 4756 60% 
9% 730 12% 760 11% 615 8% 
12% 850 14% 1030 14% 1284 16% 
2% 320 5% 605 8% 869 11% 
6202 7130 7904 
as prices have fallen considerably, oil consumption 
has resumed its upward path. Gas has seen 
extremely rapid growth in recent years, witl1 
consumption increasing four-fold during tl1e 1980s 
as natural gas replaced town gas and the network 
was expanded. Electricity too has seen significant 
growth, more or less matching growth in GDP. In 
contrast, although both coal and peat experienced 
revivals after the oil shocks, as consumers switched 
away from more expensive fuels, the pattern of 
consumption of these fuels has, in general, been 
one of slow decline. 
Box 6.8: Calculating Energy Elasticities 
The energy intensity of growth is an important parameter in assessing the implications for energy demand of 
projected economic growth. Energy intensity is best measured by the elasticity of energy with respect to GDP 
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- the percentage increase in energy consumption given a 1 per cent increase in GDP. The energy elasticity 
with respect to price is equally important in considering the impact of energy taxes or external price shocks. 
Energy elasticities have been estimated for individual fuels and for aggregate energy demand using data from 
the years 1960 to 1987.a Since then however, not only have extra years of data become available, but the 
Department of Transport, Energy and Communications in their publication Energy in Ireland 1980-1993 have 
made substantial revisions to fuel-quantity data for the 1980s.b Thus, before making any forecasts, it is 
appropriate to review the problems involved. 
Recent analysis suggests a GDP elasticity for aggregate energy of 0.9. In other words, a 1 per cent increase 
in GDP results in a 0.9 per cent increase in energy consumption. Although this may seem high in light of the 
experience of the last ten years, where high growth in GDP has not been matched by correspondingly high 
growth rates in energy (see Figure 6.19), this may be partly explained by the rapid decline in coal 
consumption, which pulled the aggregate elasticity down. There is also a deeper technical explanation for this. 
In chemical energy content terms, a unit of TOE in coal equals a unit of TOE in gas, but in combustion much 
less of the coal energy is efficiently utilised. Thus, while the fuel-mix is switching towards fuels with higher 
end-use efficiencies, an increase in GDP will require less of an increase in total energy in TOE terms than if 
the fuel-mix were unchanged. And when the mix stabilises again, the former elasticity reappears. Of course, if 
this switching were to continue for an appreciable number of years the estimate of 0.9 for the GDP elasticity 
(which ignores coal and peat) would exaggerate the actual increase in energy demand. 
Coal will continue to face the adverse combination of legislative and convenience factors and will ultimately 
vanish out of the mix if it continues to decrease by the amounts witnessed in recent years. Assuming 
substitution away from remaining coal and from peat yields an aggregate GDP elasticity for energy of about 
0.7 for 1995-1998 inclusive and 0.9 thereafter (see Table below). There may, of course, be further evolution of 
the manufacturing sector away from energy intensive industry, progress on energy conservation measures 
and perhaps technical advances improving the energy efficiency of appliances. It would, however, be unwise 
to count on such developments. 
The elasticities with respect to real GDP used in forecasting are set out in the Table below. In the case of gas 
the elasticity declines steadily over time from 1999 onwards, reflecting the assumption that the penetration of 
the market by gas will slow rapidly after that date as most major urban areas will by then have been 
connected to the network. Over the forecasting period we assume that real energy prices show only a small 
rise. 
Table: Elasticity of Final Energy Consumetion with Reseect to GDP and Price 
GDP Elasticity 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 Price Elasticity 
Coal -0.9 -0.9 -0.9 -0.9 -0.9 -0.35 
Oil 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 -0.35 
Peat -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.35 
Electricity 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 -0.35 
Gas 4.4 3.8 2.3 1.7 1.4 -0.35 
Total 0.7 0.9 0.9 0.9 -0.35 
a Conniffe, D. and S. Scott, 1990. Energy Elasticities: Responsiveness of Demands for Fuels to Income and Price Changes, 
Dublin: The Economic and Social Research Institute, General Research Series No. 149. 
b Myers, A., 1994. Energy in Ireland 1980 - 1993: A Statistical Bulletin, Dublin: Department of Transport, Energy and 
Energy Demand Forecast 
On the basis of our Central Forecast for GDP we 
have estimated the final demand for each energy 
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type, all expressed in TOEs. The results are set out 
in Table 6.12. Over the 20-year period from 1990 
to 2010 we forecast that GDP will grow by around 
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5.5 per cent a year on average. At the same time 
the demand for final energy is forecast to rise at 4 
per cent a year. The result would be that final 
energy consumption in 2010 would be around 15.3 
million TOE, more than double 1990 consumption 
levels. The growth in electricity consumption over 
the period would be around 5.3 per cent a year on 
average. Oil and, particularly, gas also see very 
large increases in demand, while final consumption 
of coal and peat fall substantially. 
Table 6.12: Forecast Final Consumption of Energy by Fuel, thousand TOE 
1990 1995 
Coal 847 380 
Oil 3875 4756 
Peat 757 615 
Electricity 1032 1284 
Gas 576 738 
Total 7087 7773 
Forecast Carbon Dioxide Emissions 
These forecasts for energy demand have significant 
implications for the environment. When fossil fuels 
hum they release carbon dioxide, the principal 
contributor to the greenhouse effect world-wide. 12 
Carbon dioxide is the most important single 
greenhouse gas emitted in Ireland. In preparation 
for the UN conference on global warming to be 
held in Kyoto in December 1997, the EU agreed a 
negotiating position in March of this year. This 
involves emissions targets for the EU and, under 
these proposals - to which the Irish government 
has given its provisional agreement - Ireland's 
greenhouse gas emissions in 2010 should not 
exceed 115 per cent of 1990 emission levels. As 
presently structured, any costs in meeting these 
targets would have to be met by the individual 
member states. 
In forecasting carbon dioxide (C02 ) emissions it is 
not enough to have total final consumption figures 
12111e greenhouse effect refers to the possible effect of changes in 
the atmosphere on temperatures throughout the world. TI1e 
presence in the atmosphere of so called greenhouse gases, such as 
carbon dioxide, tends to increase temperatures throughout the 
world. 
2000 2005 2010 Change on 1990 
288 223 180 -78.75% 
6102 7672 9331 140.80% 
512 432 375 -50.46% 
1719 2248 2828 174.03% 
1124 1838 2556 343.75% 
9745 12414 15269 115.45% 
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for the various fuels, since the emissions due to 
electricity will depend on the fuel-mix and the 
efficiency of generation. The principal adjustment 
which needs to be made in doing tl1is is in 
converting a given final consumption of electricity 
into a primary requirement for coal, oil, peat and 
gas (ignoring generation using renewable energy 
sources which does not emit carbon dioxide). 
When a tonne of oil equivalent of each fuel is 
burned, it releases a specific amount of carbon 
dioxide. The emission factors for a TOE of each 
fuel type are given below in Table 6.13. By 
multiplying the primary energy requirement of 
each fuel by the relevant emission factor we can 
derive emission figures for that fuel and build up a 
comprehensive picture of overall emission levels. 
As can be seen in Table 6.13, because coal and peat 
are dirtier fuels, their share of emissions is 
considerably higher than their share of total 
energy. Also, because much of the energy of the 
individual fuels is lost in generation, emissions 
from electricity are also disproportionately high. 
Total emissions are predicted to grow at a very 
rapid rate, even assuming that all growth in 
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electricity is generated by high-efficiency, low-
emission gas. This means that by 2010, if there 
were no change in policy, Ireland could be 
releasing over 55 million tonnes of carbon dioxide 
into the atmosphere annually, an 82.5 per cent 
increase on 1990 figures. 
Table 6.13: Total C02 Emissions by Fuel by 
Volume under Present Regime ('OOO 
tonnes) 
Emission Factor 
(lonnelfOE) 
Coal 3.70 
Peal 4.34 
Oil 3.01 
Gas 2.07 
Electricity * 
Total 
Change on 
1990 (%) 
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 
3134 1406 1064 825 665 
3285 2669 2221 1877 1627 
11664 14316 18368 23092 28086 
1192 1528 2327 3805 5290 
10512 12825 14180 16333 18694 
29787 32744 38160 46055 54362 
0.00 9.93 28.11 54.61 82.50 
*(varies with fuel mix). 
Witl10ut cmy change in policy there will be a big 
rise in energy use and emissions over the next 15 
years. On that basis it seems likely that energy 
demand will more than double by 2010 and 
emissions of carbon dioxide from energy use will 
be in the range of 175 per cent to 185 per cent of 
1990 levels. This yecu- emissions of carbon dioxide 
in Ireland are expected to be more than 15 per cent 
up on their 1990 levels. With expected GDP 
growth of over 100 per cent between 1996 and 
2010, any attempt to return to close to 1990 
emission levels for carbon dioxide is likely to prove 
very expensive. However, there remains the 
possibility of taking action to reduce emissions of 
other gases, principally methane (emitted by cattle 
and leaks in gas pipes) or taking suitable measures 
to absorb some of tl1e carbon emissions through 
aforestation. The possible effects of policy 
measures targeted at c::u-bon emissions designed to 
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meet the proposed target for Ireland ,u-e discussed 
in tl1e next section. 
6.8 Sensitivity to Shocks 
The Central Forecast provides our best estimate of 
the prospects for Ireland well into the next decade. 
However, as discussed in Chapter 1, forecasting is 
an uncertain business and tl1e margin of error 
around the figures presented above is considerable. 
Of all the potential dangers to the economy of tl1e 
Republic of Ireland probably the greatest, albeit 
latent, destabilising force is the failure to establish 
a proper peace in Northern Ireland. Of all the 
unpleasant "surprises" for the Republic in the 
future tl1e most unpleasant would be a serious 
deterioration in the economic and political 
situation in Northern Ireland. The effects of such a 
disaster are not easily quantified, but they dominate 
most of tl1e otl1er potential dangers which tl1e 
economy is likely to face over the next decade. 
To get some feeling for how the prospects for 
Ireland would be affected by some of tl1e other 
surprises which will inevitably occur over the next 
decade we examine tl1e possible effects of four 
specific shocks. While each of these shocks can be 
considered to be "an unpleasant surprise" tl1is does 
not mean that we believe all the risks to be on the 
downside. It is equally possible that our Central 
Forecast could prove to be too pessimistic as too 
optimistic, though the possible size of the error on 
the up side is smaller tlrnn the potential for the 
economy to under-perform. 
In the case of each shock we have assumed tlrnt the 
government continues to pursue tl1e long-te1m 
strategy, discussed in Chapter 5, of eliminating 
government borrowing in the next decade. Thus 
when a shock occurs taxes are assumed to be 
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adjusted to return the path of government 
borrowing to that assumed in the Central Forecast. 
As a result, each of these shocks is assumed to have 
little impact on the debt-GNP ratio by the end of 
the next decade. 
The four shocks which we consider in detail are: 
• Excessive Expectations and Congestion: In 
this scenario we consider how our forecast 
would have to be modified .if domestic 
expectations run ahead of the economy's ability 
to provide. This would involve significantly 
higher wage inflation than in the benchmark 
forecast, especially in the public sector. In 
addition, in this scenario we have assumed that 
undcrprovision of physical infrastructure 
(roads, transport facilities, housing etc.) causes 
the costs of the tradable sector to rise relative to 
other EU competitors. 
• No EMU: There remains the possibility, albeit 
small, that EMU will not go ahead for political 
or economic reasons. As financial markets and 
many individual companies have already 
assumed that it will take place, a failure to go 
al1ead now could be quite destabilising. The 
possible external economic impact of this 
scenario was discussed earlier in Box 5.2. For 
Ireland it would mean higher interest rates and 
inflation. 
.. EMU with a Sterling Depreciation: The most 
likely scenario for EMU is that it goes ahead on 
time at the beginning of 1999 with Ireland a 
member and tl1e UK remaining outside. Under 
these circumstances tl1ere remains the 
possibility of a sudden very substantial UK 
depreciation which could give rise to problems 
for tl1e Irish economy. The possible external 
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effects of such a shock are dealt with above in 
Box 5.3. Here we consider the possible 
implications for Ireland. 
• Implementation of a Quota on Carbon 
Emissions: As discussed above, without any 
change in policy the Central Forecast will 
involve a major increase in energy consumption 
and in the related emissions of carbon dioxide. 
The position agreed by tl1e EU in March would 
involve Ireland limiting emissions of 
greenhouse gases by the year 2010 to 15 per 
cent above the 1990 level. If this quota is 
tradable within the EU or if the burden of 
adjustment to tl1e EU quota is shared evenly 
across member states through a suitable tax 
instrument, the EU objective would not pose 
major problems. However, a strict 
implementation of the quota for Ireland would 
result in a reduction in the growth in output and 
employment compared to the Central Forecast. 
Excessive Expectations and 
Congestion 
The most likely way in which tl1e current boom 
could be brought to a premature halt would be 
through domestic factors raising the cost of 
production in Ireland more rapidly than we have 
envisaged. 
Since tl1e mid-1980s labour costs in the private 
sector have evolved in a moderate fashion 
providing a small but steady annual increase in real 
earnings before tax. The after tax position has been 
enhanced by tl1e favourable trend in tl1e public 
finances. The fruits of this relative moderation 
compared to the 1960-80 period have been seen in 
the growth in employment. In the 1960s and 1970s 
Irish employees sought and received a UK standard 
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of living. If in the future they sought a German 
standard of living before the economy reached a 
German level of output this would pose major 
economic problems. If the expectations of 
employees were to change leading to a rapid rise in 
pre-tax wage rates, this could have serious adverse 
effects on competitiveness and, ultimately, on 
employment. 
Even if expectations of employees do not rise 
beyond the ability of the economy to fund them 
there is also the possibility that bottle-necks of 
different kinds could result in a substantial rise in 
the domestic cost of production. This would also 
squeeze the competitiveness of firms operating in 
the tradable sector. There are a range of different 
ways in which this type of problem could arise. 
At present the rapid rise in house prices reflects the 
pressures in that market. This rise will not have a 
direct effect on the standards of living of those 
currently working in the major urban centres (who 
already own a dwelling). However, for returning 
emigrants, new immigrants or those moving 
location within Ireland this rise represents a 
significant increase in the cost of living in Ireland. 
This will tend to reduce the inflow of labour or 
encourage new labour market entrants to seek jobs 
where accommodation is cheaper outside the 
major urban centres or abroad. In turn this will 
restrict the supply of labour leading to upward 
pressure on wage rates through normal market 
forces. 
The rapid rate of growth is also putting severe 
pressure on other aspects of the physical 
infrastructure - such as roads and urban transport 
systems. This is leading to increased congestion 
which directly raises costs for the tradable sector as 
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well as reducing the attractiveness of the major 
urban centres as places to live. 
If our Central Forecast were to prove pessimistic 
and growth were to continue at the present rate 
(well over 5 per cent a year) for a number of years 
there could also be significant labour shortages 
which would themselves put upward pressure on 
costs. The shortages would be affected by the cost 
to new labour market entrants of living where the 
jobs are. This rise in costs would, in tum, bring 
growth back to a "sustainable" path, such as that 
portrayed in the Central Forecast. 
To understand the implications of this type of 
scenario incorporating increasing congestion costs 
and rising expectations we have used the Medium 
Tenn model. We have simulated the effects of a 
more rapid rise in wage rates in the public and 
private sectors than in the Central Forecast and a 2 
per cent a year additional increase in production 
costs in the tradable sector. We also assume that 
the government would stick by the medium-term 
fiscal strategy outlined in Chapter 5. To ensure that 
borrowing targets were met in the face of such a 
shock the government would have to raise taxes by 
a significant amount. As a result, by the end of the 
period (2010) instead of 18 per cent of personal 
income going in direct taxes, 20.2 per cent would 
be pre-empted in this way. In Table 6.14 we show 
the possible effects of this on the key economic 
aggregates. 
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Table 6.14: Effects of Rising Expectations 
Average Earnings 
- Industry 
Average Earnings 
- Public Sector 
GNP 
Employment 
Average Direct 
Tax Rate,% 
Unemployment 
Rate, % of Labour 
Force 
Central Effect of Congesti 
Forecast Shock on 
Forecast 
Average annual % Increase 1997-
2010 
4.5 +0.8 5.2 
4.5 +1.7 6.2 
4.4 -0.3 4.1 
2.0 -0.5 1.5 
Rate in 2010 
18.0 +2.2 20.2 
6.9 +2.7 9.6 
We have looked at the case where over the full 
period to 2010 wage rates in industry are assumed 
to rise at about 0.8 per cent a year more rapidly 
than in the Central Forecast and wage rates in the 
public sector rise by an additional 1 per cent a year 
over and above the rise in the rest of the economy. 
When combined with the effects of congestion on 
the cost of doing business in Ireland, the effect of 
this would be to reduce the annual growth rate of 
GNP by around 0.3 per cent and to reduce the 
growth in employment by over 0.5 per cent a year. 
The ultimate effect of this would be to tum the 
forecast of small net immigration over the period 
into significant net emigration and simultaneously 
to raise the unemployment rate by 2.7 percentage 
points above the level in the Central Forecast by 
the end of t11e period in 2010. 
For those who managed to hold their jobs over the 
period, especially those in the public sector, their 
standard of living in terms of pre-tax wages would 
be substantially higher. However, after tax the 
benefits would be lower as tax rates would be 
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substantially raised to pay for the higher level of 
unemployment and the revenue buoyancy lost 
through lower growth. For those who would be 
unemployed or who would have to emigrate as a 
result of such an outtum their loss of welfare would 
be obvious. This scenario illustrates how dependent 
the Central Forecast's favourable outtum is on the 
continued pursuit of sensible policies domestically. 
No EMU 
In Box 5.2 we considered the possible impact on 
the rest of the EU of a failure to go al1ead with the 
EMU from the start of 1999. 13 Here we consider 
the possible impact on Ireland of such a failure 
assuming little prospect of EMU taking place in the 
foreseeable future. As outlined in the last chapter 
the initial impact could result in a significant rise 
in the DM against all other potential candidates for 
the EMU. Because such a rise might be expected to 
continue well into the next decade there would be a 
consequential rise in Irish interest rates. The 
changed circumstances would also probably see an 
enhanced risk margin payable on Irish pound 
assets, along the lines of that experienced in the 
1980s.14 While this margin might eventually 
narrow, the initial disturbance could be expected to 
have an effect on Irish interest rates continuing 
over a number of years (Figure 6.22). 
13If it were delayed rather than abandoned and if the public were 
convinced that the delay was trnly temponuy then the adverse 
effects would not be too serious. However, it would be difficult to 
convince people that in the face of all the obstacles to EMU, the 
commitment to go ahead would be implemented. 
14 Honohan, P., and C. Conroy, 1994. Irish Interest Rate 
Fluctuations in the European Monetary System, Dublin: The 
Economic and Social Research Institute, General Research Series 
Paper No. 165. 
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Figure 6.20: Benchmark Lending Rate -
Percentage Change Compared to Central 
Forecast 
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If EMU were not to start this would also have 
negative effects on the EU growth rate by reducing 
the demand for Irish goods at a time when 
competitiveness was adversely affected by the rise 
in interest rates. The combined effect of the shock 
coming through a number of different channels , 
would be a reduction in the level of GNP by over 2 
per cent hy 2001. Thereafter, as the shock began to 
unwind there would he some recovery in the level 
of GNP (Figure 6.21). 
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Figure 6.22: Employment - Percentage 
Change Compared to Central Forecast 
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Figure 6.23: Unemployment - Percentage 
Change Compared to Central Forecast 
The reduction in the growth rate between 1998 and 
2001 would have a detrimental effect on 
employment growth. The reduction in employment 
would reach a maximum in 2001 at over 2.5 per 
cent compared to the Central Forecast (Figure 
6.22). There would also be adverse effects on the 
UK labour market which would stem some of the 
increase in emigration from Ireland which would 
otherwise take effect. This would aggravate the 
likely rise in unemployment in Ireland so that the 
level of unemployment would peak at around 1.5 
percentage points above the benchmark. The fall in 
the unemployment rate after 2001 would be partly 
accounted for by the slow recovery in employment 
and also partly by continuing emigration. 
Higher interest rates would put pressure on the 
government sector's finances. This would 
necessitate some tightening of fiscal policy to keep 
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them on the smne track that they would have 
followed under the Central Forecast. Initially there 
would still he some deterioration in the borrowing 
requirement but in the longer term this would be 
eliminated by the tighter stance of fiscal policy. 
Because of the effect of higher interest rates in 
generating higher savings the balance of payments 
surplus would show a small increase, though this 
would not be very significant. 
The possible effects of an abandonment of EMU, as 
outlined here, show some similarities to the effects 
of German unification on tl1e Irish economy, 
described in an earlier Review. 15 The crucial 
importm1ce of very high real interest rates in 
slowing down investment and growth in Ireland, 
and elsewhere in the EU, would mirror the 
experience of tl1e early 1990s. This scenario 
illustrntes how sensitive the Irish economy is to 
external shocks, especially shocks which raise real 
interest rates. 
Sterling Shock, Ireland in EMU 
In the previous chapter (Box 5.3) we considered the 
possible external effects of a sudden depreciation of 
sterling where Ireland and many other EU 
members are part of a monetary union. Here we 
consider the possible implications for our forecasts 
of a sudden 10 per cent depreciation of sterling. 
The discussion here is based on the simulations 
descrihed in Baker, Fitz Gerald m1d Honohan, 
1996. 16 
" Bradley, J., J. Fitz Gerald and D. McCoy, 1992, Medium-Tenn 
Review: 1991-1996, Dublin: '111e Economic and Social Research 
Institute. 
16 Baker T., J. Fitz Gerald and P. Honohan (eels.), 1996, Economic 
Implications for Ireland of EMU, Dublin: '111e Economic and 
Social Research Institute, Policy Resem-ch Series No. 28. 
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In practice the changes which would occur in the 
UK economy would be tempered by whether the 
UK economy was already in equilibrium before the 
policy change (whether sterling is overvalued or 
undervalued). In 1992 sterling was clearly 
overvalued, and without a change in parity within 
the EMS it faced a significant period of deflation to 
bring prices and wages into line with their long-
run equilibrium relationship to prices and wages in 
the rest of Europe. This is again the position today 
as a result of the rise of sterling since the middle of 
last year. If sterling were today suddenly to fall by 
10 per cent against all other currencies, because of 
its overvaluation, the change in the value of 
sterling itself would accomplish some or all of the 
potential adjustment towards equilibrium with the 
result that prices and wages would show little 
effect. In this case there would be little effect on the 
Irish economy: firms in Ireland have not yet 
exploited their gain in competitiveness as a result 
of sterling falling from 1.04 per pound Irish to 0.95 
so that they would not suffer significantly from a 
reversal of this situation in the immediate future. 
However, if the UK economy had adjusted fully to 
this higher valuation of sterling (tluough reducing 
inflation of wages and prices) and subsequently 
suffered a shock through a devaluation, in that case 
there would be a significant impact on the Irish 
economy. It is tl1is type of shock, beginning from a 
situation where currencies are "c01rectly" valued, 
which we consider in this section. 
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Figure 6.24: Change in Consumer Prices 
under a Sterling Shock 
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Figure 6.25: Change in Wage Rates under a 
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Using a quarterly model of UK and Irish wages and 
prices, Figure 6.24 shows Ireland and the UK as a 
result of a lO per cent devaluation of sterling. (All 
prices are shown in Irish pound terms.) Initially 
UK consumer prices would fall to a level 8.3 per 
cent below the benchmark. With rising inflation in 
!11e UK they would still be 7 per cent below the 
benchmark after one year (expressed in Irish 
pounds). Irish prices would fall slowly within the 
first year so that, as shown in Figure 6.24, a year 
after the shock Irish consumer prices would be 2 
per cent below the benchmark. This would leave a 
gap of on average 5 percentage points between 
Irish and UK consumer prices in year one. In the 
second year the gap would approximately halve to 
an average of around 2.3 percentage points while 
!11e bulk of the remaining gap would be eliminated 
by !11e end of the third year. A little under half the 
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adjustment could be expected to occur through 
lower inflation in Ireland and the remainder 
through higher inflation in the UK. 
In Figure 6.25 we show the adjustment in wage 
rates in the UK and Ireland. Once again part of the 
acljustment would occur through lower wage 
inflation in Ireland with the remainder (over halt) 
occurring through higher wage inflation in the UK. 
For wage rates the gap would remain significant 
for the first four years indicating tl1at the 
competitiveness effects of the shock could be quite 
persistent. 
To understand the wider effects of the implied 
change in competitiveness we use tl1e Medium-
Term Model. So far we have concentrated on prices 
and wages in Ireland and tl1e UK but for many 
firms !11eir important markets lie elsewhere and 
competitiveness must be viewed in a wider context. 
To estimate the likely competitiveness effects of the 
sterling shock, the adjustment path for prices and 
wages, derived from the quarterly model, was 
imposed on the Medium Tenn Model. The 
resulting simulations where sterling was shocked 
provide an initial estimate of ilie potential effects of 
such a sterling shock on Irish output and 
employment. 
The depreciation of sterling would mean that firms' 
output prices would fall putting a squeeze on their 
profit margins. This squeeze would persist for four 
years until wage rates in Ireland and ilie UK 
adjusted. The result would be a substantial loss of 
employment in ilie manufacturing sector. The 
effects on building would also be negative but the 
fact that interest rates did not change as a result of 
the shock would reduce the impact on tl1at sector 
below what it would otherwise be (still a loss of 
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between 4,500 and 8,000 jobs). After the second 
year the disruption from the shock would be 
reduced as wages and prices in both the UK and 
Ireland began to adjust (Table 6.15). If firms 
survived the shock, all the adverse effects would 
have been eliminated after four years and 
employment would be back to where it would have 
been without the shock. 
Table 6.15: Macroeconomic Effects of a 
Sterling Shock 
Year 1 2 
GNP,% -0.7 -0.8 
Employment, Industry, -8.7 -12.4 
('OOO) 
Employment, Total, -9.8 -14.0 
('OOO) 
Obviously if the sudden devaluation in sterling 
were more than 10 per cent the cost to the Irish 
economy would be increased. If past experience is 
anytJ1ing to go by shocks of up to 20 per cent could 
occur, though where such large shocks have 
occurred in the past a significant part of the change 
in parity served to eliminate an existing 
overvaluation or undervaluation of sterling. 
What this simulation shows is that the cost in 
terms of employment is likely to be quite 
substantial from such a shock and, unlike the 
others considered in this chapter, the worst 
problems are faced immediately after the shock. 
The adverse effects disappear gradually over a 4 
year period. 
Quota on Carbon Emissions 
As described earlier, on unchanged policies Irish 
energy consumption and the related carbon 
emissions are likely to grow quite rapidly over the 
next 15 years. This growth will be driven by the 
rapid increase in living standards in Ireland. While 
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there must be considerable uncertainty about tJ1e 
precision of the forecasts it is clear from tJ1is 
analysis that a very substantial increase in 
emissions is almost certain to take place unless 
major policy changes are implemented. 
In the light of this forecast, the EU negotiating 
position, involving Ireland limiting emissions of 
greenhouse gases to 115 per cent of 1990 levels by 
2010, has significant implications for growth. If 
the EU is serious about making a contribution to 
halting global warming it is vital that they do so in 
a way which minimises the cost to the EU in terms 
of lost output and employment. This would 
probably best be achieved through levying a tax at 
an appropriate rate across all EU members, the tax 
being related to emissions and levied at the same 
rate in all member states. If, as currently appears 
likely, this is unacceptable to EU members, then 
tJ1e best alternative would be to impose quotas 
which are tractable between countries. 
By tractable we mean that within the EU individual 
countries would have the right to emit more than 
their quota if they paid other countries to emit less 
than their quota: in other words, they can buy 
quota. This would mean that the cost of reducing 
emissions at the margin would be the same in all 
EU members and the loss of output and 
employment within the EU would be minimised. 
This approach, in contrast to the tax route, could 
involve substantial transfers of resources from 
some EU members to others. On the basis of the 
very limited information available, it would appear 
that the rapid growth in Ireland, when combined 
with the proposed quota, would make Ireland a 
major net buyer of quota from other member states. 
That is because the cost of making a very large 
reduction in emissions in Ireland would be much 
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greater than making a small reduction in certain 
other member states. 
If tractable quotas were introduced it is likely that 
tl1e Irish growth potential would not be greatly 
reduced below our Central Forecast. However, the 
Irish standard of living, measured by Gross 
National Disposable Income, could be significantly 
reduced as payments for quota might partially 
offset remaining EU transfers under the CAP and 
the Structural Funds. 
The worst case scenario for Ireland would be the 
introduction of non-tradable quotas. In this case 
there could be large costs to reducing emissions to 
the limits set. For example, if the bulk of the 
reduction had to be made through reducing carbon 
emissions in the electricity sector this could result 
in a major increase in electricity prices. This would 
reduce the growth potential of the economy below 
the benchmark. Part of the task of reducing 
emissions would have to be met by restricting 
growth. The lower growtl1 rate, would, in turn, 
result in emigration and the diversion of industrial 
growth to other regions of the EU. Ironically, this 
would result in increased emissions in other 
countries. 
However, if the Irish government is allowed to use 
fiscal instruments (including taxes) across all the 
emitters of greenhouse gases to ensure that the 
burden of adjustment is shared efficiently, the cost 
of meeting the target could be much lower. The use 
of fiscal instruments would ensure that the 
adjustment costs need not be concentrated on a 
single sector or a single form of pollution. 
However, without an efficient form of burden-
shcu-ing between countries Ireland could still find 
itself penalised with higher costs than might be 
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imposed on the economies of our neighbours with 
whom we are in direct competition. 
At this stage it is not clear how the EU will 
eventually implement the reductions in emissions 
being proposed. However, if the restrictions on EU 
emissions are taken seriously, then the method by 
which they are implemented will he very important 
for Ireland. The worst case scenario of non-tradable 
quotas could require a different growth path for the 
Irish economy over the next 15 years. While we 
have not been able to quantify the effects of such a 
strategy, it is possible that the reduction in output 
and employment could be similar to those 
estimated for the otl1er possible shocks discussed 
above. 
In evaluating tl1e Central Forecast in this Review, 
regard should be had to the fact tlrnt no allowance 
has been made for the need to restrict growth, by 
whatever means, in order to limit emissions of 
gases which contribute to the global warming 
process. 
6.9 Conclusions 
One of the key lessons of the analysis of the past 
performance of tl1e Irish economy in Chapter 3 is 
tl1at the record growtl1 rates of the 1990s have a 
ready explanation in the changing structure of the 
economy. The combination of favourable 
demographic trends, a rapid rise in tl1e supply of 
human capital, and the underlying competitiveness 
in fast growing sectors of the tractable economy 
have brought us to where we are today. It is no 
accident tl1at the economy is growing at over 5 per 
cent a year. 
This understanding of the past gives a certain 
confidence to our Central Forecast for the Irish 
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economy over the next decade which, by the 
standards of earlier publications, could be 
considered optimistic. However, we feel that it 
represents the single most likely outcome within 
quite a wide range of possible outturns. There is as 
much likelihood that the actual performance of the 
economy could prove superior to what we have 
envisaged as that it should disappoint. 
The experience of fast growing centres in the US 
suggests that it is possible for regions to show 
sustained rapid growth under favourable 
circumstances. If the economy does exceed our 
expectations within the forecast time horizon it is 
likely tlrnt this would come about because the 
supply of labour has been boosted through an even 
more rapid rise in female labour force participation 
than we have assumed or because of substantial net 
immigration. If immigration should prove to be an 
essential ingredient for even more rapid growth it 
would place increasing pressure on the physical 
infrastructure of the economy and the wider 
environment. 
The combination of factors which give rise to the 
prospect of rapid growth represent a window of 
opportunity; they will not last indefinitely. This 
makes it especially important that the benefits of 
this growth are not frittered away. For this reason 
fiscal policy should aim at rapidly reducing our 
indebtedness over the next decade. It is this need to 
invest the "demographic dividend" which will 
place a constraint on future fiscal policy, not the 
needs of the EMU "stability pact". 
The analysis in the preceding section gives some 
feeling for how the benign scenario of the Central 
Forecast might come unstuck. The most obvious 
domestic mechanism would involve expectations, 
149 
in terms of living standards, rising faster than the 
ability of the economy to deliver on them. Such a 
development could well be compounded by the 
impact of rising congestion costs. Together these 
two possible adverse developments could seriously 
damage competitiveness, greatly reducing the 
growth potential of the economy. In the simulation 
described in the previous Section we assumed tlrnt 
such a deterioration might occur over a long 
period. If, instead, all the problems of that scenario 
were concentrated into a four or five year period of 
rising expectations, then the rate of growth of the 
economy might be reduced to around 3.5 per cent a 
year. Such a reduction in performance would 
necessitate a tougher fiscal stance to ensure that 
budgetary targets were met and this would, in turn, 
necessitate higher taxation. Such a set of events 
could go some way to reproducing the type of 
vicious circle the Irish economy experienced in the 
first half of the 1980s. 
With the natural decline in tl1e potential growtl1 of 
the economy after 2005 such an under-performance 
could result in tlle unemployment rate in 15 years 
time being not very much below its present level, in 
spite of a return to emigration. For those who held 
on to tl1eir jobs and realised tl1eir rapid rise in wage 
expectations, tl1is scenario might seem superficially 
attractive, but when tl1e effect of the shock on tax 
rates was taken into account its advantages would 
seem less clear cut. What the simulation points to 
is that the disappointment of any failure to realise 
unrealistic expectations will be unevenly shared; 
the higher numbers unemployed or emigrating 
would bear most of the costs while tl1e potential 
beneficiaries might find that any gains from tl1e 
change in behaviour failed to realise their 
expectations. 
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The simulations in the last section also indicate 
tliat the cumulative loss of output which might 
misc from the types of external shock we examined 
are likely to be less than the losses we can impose 
on ourselves. However, if a range of unfavourable 
shocks were to occur together, the growth in the 
economy could he further reduced. 
Looking over the time horizon of the forecast it 
seems likely that the scope for higher growth than 
forecast is more limited than is the possibility that 
the economy will under-perform. As a result, it 
seems probable l11at growth in Irish GNP over the 
period to 2003 will fall within l11e range 3.5 per 
cent a year, at the lowest extreme, up to 6 per cent 
a year if everyt11ing goes right. Within this broad 
range of possibilities tl1e Central Forecast of 
somel11ing over 5 per cent a year seems the most 
probable outturn. If realised this will see major 
progress in reducing unemployment, though tl1e 
remaining unemployment will still be concentrated 
among t11ose with tl1e lowest levels of educational 
attainment. 
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CHAPTER 7 
Conclusions and Implications 
David Duffy, John Fitz Gerald, Ide Kearney, Brian Nolan, Sue Scott, and Fergal Shortall 
7 .1 Introduction 
The demographic changes currently under way will 
continue to affect the economy and tl1e wider 
society for tl1e next decade. The benefits of tlle 
rising educational attainment of those leaving 
school today will take many years to have tlleir full 
impact. The falling dependency ratio represents a 
window of opportunity of up to 20 years. 
As described in Chapter 3, tl1e interpretation of tlle 
underlying causes of tlle most recent period of 
strong growtl1 is complex. A wide range of 
different factors have been put forward by various 
commentators including tlle tightening of fiscal 
policy; the successive national pay agreements 
from 1987 onwards, tl1e devaluation of 1986, 
improvements in competitiveness, tlle increasing 
level of average educational qualifications and tlle 
inflow of structural funds. We argue tllat no one of 
these factors can in isolation explain tlle economic 
turnaround. But much of what has happened can be 
captured by a relatively simple schematic story 
which takes account of these main elements. This 
focuses on tl1e mutually reinforcing effect of 
different domestic forces operating over quite 
different time-scales. There is tlle gradual 
accumulation of human capital - education and 
training - and the effects of demographic change 
on tJ1e supply of labour; tlle political and social 
consensus which emerged from tlle economic crisis 
of the 1980s which, in turn, resulted in an 
important institutional shake-out; tlle impact of tlle 
achievement of fiscal control and maintenance of 
wage competitiveness. These domestic causal 
factors have interacted favourably witll several 
external forces: tlle progressive shift in tlle 
premium which the market pays for such 
characteristics as adaptability, problem-solving and 
communication skills (in which Ireland may be 
held to be strong); the contribution of tlle structural 
funds and wider developments in tl1e EU; and tl1e 
favourable conjunction of demand growtll in our 
major trading partners when tllis was needed to 
kick-start tlle recovery. 
These factors, domestic and external, will continue 
to fuel Ireland's economic growtl1 over tl1e next 
decade. On tllis basis, in Chapter 6 we have set out 
a detailed Central Forecast of what tl1e Irish 
economy can achieve in tlle medium term. The 
Irish economy looks set to grow at more tllan 5 per 
cent a year over tlle next decade raising tlle 
standard of living to at least tl1e EU average. We 
can also expect a substantial fall in tl1e rate of 
unemployment from 12 per cent of tl1e labour 
force1 in 1996 to under 7 per cent in 10 years time. 
1 On an ILO basis. 
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This turnaround in the labour market is likely to be 
achieved, not through emigration as in the past, but 
ratl1er because of a continuing buoyant growth in 
employment well into the next decade. Once tl1e 
growth in the supply of skilled labour begins to 
slow down from the middle of the next decade a 
more general change in economic tempo can be 
expected. However, by then the Irish economy will 
have come of age. 
If tl1e changes projected in the Central Forecast 
come to pass, the Ireland of 2010 will be a rather 
different country than any of us expected 10 years 
ago. The long-standing cliche of Ireland as a small 
vulnerable economy on tl1e periphery of Europe is 
already looking a little threadbare. 
This window of opportunity will probably not be 
permanent. It can be viewed as similar in character 
to the wasting nature of the major Norwegian asset 
oil. As with Norway, it is appropriate to use the 
opportunity which it presents to run a higher rate 
of saving than would otherwise be the case. This 
may happen naturally as the young adult 
population makes provision for its retirement 
through saving. It will also involve the public 
sector reducing and possibly eliminating its debt. 
In this context tl1e Maastricht guidelines and the 
stability and growth pact are unlikely to be a 
binding constraint on fiscal policy in the medium 
term. 
While we feel that the relatively benign picture 
painted in the Central Forecast is a likely prospect 
for the Irish economy over the next decade, there 
remains the possibility tl1at any of a number of 
events could occur which would push the economy 
off course. In Chapter 6 we reviewed how a variety 
of such shocks or changes in assumptions might 
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alter the picture. Of all the factors which could go 
wrong the most likely seem to be the ones which 
are, to some extent, within our control: if 
expectations in terms of living standards were to 
rise more rapidly than tl1e economy's ability to 
meet them or if domestic congestion, broadly 
defined, were to make Ireland a less pleasant place 
to live or do business, then the next decade could 
prove a disappointment rather than an opportunity. 
The simulation results in Chapter 6 suggest that 
such a combination of circumstances could see the 
unemployment rate at the end of the decade being 
between 2.5 and 3 percentage points higher than in 
the Central Forecast witl1 significantly higher net 
emigration over the period. 
The second section of tl1is concluding chapter 
concentrates on policy actions needed to maximise 
the chances of Ireland achieving its economic 
potential in the next decade. Section 3 tl1en 
discusses what new opportunities will open up if 
tl1e Central Forecast comes to pass. The decline in 
tl1e numbers unemployed and the rapid fall in the 
dependency ratio should provide an opportunity to 
tackle effectively some of our m~tior social and 
economic problems. 
In considering economic strategy for the next 
decade a critical objective for Ireland from an 
economic point of view must be the development of 
a stable and peaceful society in Nortl1em Ireland. 
While the Republic has not suffered too much 
damage from tl1e last 30 years of turbulence in 
Northern Ireland there is no guarantee that we 
could always remain as insulated as in the past. In 
Section 4, we discuss some other issues concerning 
economic strategy looking beyond the forecast time 
horizon. 
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7 .2 Making it Happen 
The last chapter stressed the uncertainty which 
necessarily surrounds any forecast of the future. 
While there is a wide range of factors outside our 
control which could have an adverse impact on our 
economic prospects it is worthwhile concentrating 
on the more limited set of areas which we can 
influence. The scenario on excessive expectations 
and congestion, discussed in Chapter 6, highlights 
some of the potential problems which could result 
in the Central Forecast coming unstuck. Here we 
consider briefly some policies which could help 
make the Central Forecast a reality: 
• public finance and social partnership; 
• policies for minimising congestion; 
• institutional reform; 
• the continuing role of education and training; 
• policy on the environment; and 
• preparing for EMU membership. 
Public Finance and Social 
Partnership 
We have seen how the development of a 
partnership approach to wage formation in the 
private sector has coincided with a new pattern of 
moderate wage formation. This has played a most 
important role in turning economic growth into 
employment growth. The disciplines of the market 
have contributed to the success of this approach 
and these restraints will continue to operate in the 
future in the private sector. However, rising 
expectations in the public sector could meet a weak 
budget constraint resulting in an excessive rise in 
labour costs in that sector. Rising expectations, in 
terms of the provision of public services, could also 
pose problems for fiscal responsibility. 
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If public sector labour costs were to rise out of line 
with developments in the private sector this would 
pose a serious inflationary threat. The threat to 
future prosperity from such an overrun would come 
through a number of channels. An excessive rise in 
labour costs in the public sector would pre-empt 
resources which are needed to expand investment 
in physical infrastructure. It would also pre-empt 
resources which could be used to reduce taxation 
and enhance the overall competitiveness of the 
economy. The resulting failure to reduce taxation 
could put at risk private sector pay agreements. 
Finally, it would have a knock-on effect through 
raising employee expectations in the private sector. 
This latter effect may be weaker than in the past 
but it still represents a serious danger. 
One strategy which could be applied in some areas 
of the public service would be to contract out the 
production of certain public goods. The state would 
still remain responsible for their provision to the 
public but their production would be subject to 
competitive pressures. Already we have seen this 
approach adopted successfully in some state 
enterprises as well as in the production of some 
goods and services for local authorities and central 
government. There are a wide range of activities, 
still currently undertaken by local authorities, 
which might be treated in such a manner. From the 
point of view of the wider public, which benefits 
from these public goods and services, the quality of 
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services should at worst be unaltered as a result of 
these changes and in many cases an improvement 
in service could be expected. 
In our Central Forecast we have assumed a steady 
reduction in the 36 per cent rate of corporation tax 
applicable to most firms outside the manufacturing 
sector. This assumed reduction is probably a 
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necessary part of the strategy to preserve the 
advantage conferred by a relatively low rate of 
corporation tax in the manufacturing sector in the 
very long term. This ret1ects the general tendency 
in Europe for rates of corporation tax to fall. It is 
probable that the final rate, applicable to all sectors 
after 2010, could be somewhat higher than the 
current 10 per cent rate, but the overall cost of this 
change, built into the Central Forecast, is still 
likely to be significant. 
As discussed in Chapter 5, we have assumed that 
some of the demographic dividend is paid back to 
taxpayers in the form of a reduction in personal tax 
rates. In tum, the gradual reduction in tax burden 
will help reinforce the assumed moderate path of 
wage formation, maintaining the country's 
competitive position. 
Congestion 
While Ireland's standard of living, measured as 
income per head, is rapidly approaching the EU 
average, the physical infrastructure of the country 
is still much less developed than in other countries 
such as the UK, Germany, or France; the contrast 
is apparent to anyone who has visited those 
countries in recent years. It is difficult to identify 
the direct link between infrastructure and economic 
development, but the frustrations of congestion are 
easily understood by all citizens. 
Here we are considering a very broad definition of 
infrastructure, incorporating housing and the 
physical requirements for cultural and sporting 
activities, as well as the more traditional elements 
of roads, transport, telecommunications and energy 
infrastructure. The growth in economic activity is 
putting the existing infrastructure under huge 
pressure. In some cases, such as housing, this is 
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apparent from the rise in prices. In others, where 
the price mechanism is not operative, such as 
roads, the pressures are apparent from traffic jams 
and other forms of congestion. 
The costs of this congestion may not be obvious but 
they are none the less real. The rise in house prices 
in Dublin, Galway and certain other parts of the 
country is making Ireland a less attractive location 
for returning emigrants. They will seek higher 
wages than heretofore to return. Similarly, where 
young people are making their initial choice about 
where they will work, they too will be affected in 
their decision by the cost of accommodation. 
Through this indirect mechanism the high and 
rising cost of accommodation will translate into 
higher labour costs and a loss of competitiveness. 
The increasing congestion on our roads has a direct 
effect on the costs of the tradable sector through 
increasing transport costs. However, business is 
only a minor user of most road-space and a very 
large part of the cost of traffic jams caused by 
motorists is borne by commuters using private or 
public transport. The absence of a satisfactory 
urban transport system in Dublin aggravates the 
problem there. The result of the deterioration in the 
quality of life will be rather similar to the possible 
impact of rising housing prices - people will not 
wish to live in congested surroundings and this will 
tend to reduce labour supply locally. In tum, this 
will raise labour costs as firms have to pay more to 
attract labour to their locality. 
What can be done about these problems of success? 
Much of our physical planning, which is currently 
being implemented, was undertaken in the context 
of very different expectations about Ireland's 
future. However, even in the context of the 
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information available when they were drawn up, 
these plans lacked vision and the planning process 
itself suffers from serious sclerosis. Today it is 
clear that these plans do not cope adequately with 
even the current needs of the rapidly evolving 
economy and society. Some of the blame for this 
failure of foresight attaches to economic 
forecasters! However, it is important that we 
reassess our plans for infrastructural investment 
and revise them in the light of the likely greater 
demands which the economy and society of the 
next decade will impose. 
The first way of tackling the problems of 
congestion is to increase our investment in new 
infrastructure. In a number of key areas, such as 
energy and telecommunications, the market system 
will produce a satisfactory solution if it is allowed 
to operate. In the case of energy there will be a 
need for major new investment over the next 
decade but this can be undertaken through a range 
of different mechanisms and in all cases the 
funding of it will ultimately be done by energy 
consumers. In telecommunications further 
liberalisation may facilitate the necessary 
investment and, once again, the cost of the 
investment will, ultimately, be borne by consumers. 
There may be some case for state intervention to 
help expand the penetration of new technology, 
such as the provision on a wide scale of a broad-
band telecommunications network. The state's role 
is also likely to be crucial in the transport sector, at 
least in planning and co-ordinating investment. 
Unless existing plans are re-examined and revised 
by the appropriate state bodies we may find 
ourselves underprovided with transport 
infrastructure in the next decade. These plans may 
well involve major investment in urban transport to 
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make life in our major urban centres acceptable to 
new labour market entrants. The funding of this 
investment will certainly require major state 
expenditure. The Central Forecast takes account of 
this likely pressure on the public finances and 
provides for a substantial volume increase in 
expenditure over the medium term. However, it 
may well be desirable to involve private funding in 
some of the investment projects. The reason for this 
will not be a "shortage" of finance but rather the 
additional discipline which private sector funding 
may impose in charging appropriately for use of 
infrastructure. 
The second possible approach to the problems of 
congestion is to price scarce infrastructure 
appropriately. In the existing context where the 
road infrastructure is under-priced at point of use, 
in terms of both infrastructure use and 
environmental effects, demand is too high. This is 
particularly the case in towns, where certain 
aspects of urban quality are deteriorating 
noticeably. The rapid increase in car ownership of 
the last few years is expected to continue with 
rising disposable incomes. Road pricing has been 
an unpopular option but the failure to tackle this 
problem leaves uncorrected the underlying excess 
demand for private transport in general. 
There are other ways of dealing with particular 
forms of congestion such as the problems in the 
housing market. In the latter case the key 
constraint leading to rapid inflation is the shortage 
of building land. This calls for an overdue reform 
of land use policy and planning procedures. This is 
. not an easy problem to resolve as there is a 
potential conflict between the desire to expand 
resources for building and a desire to protect the 
environment. Land, countryside, scenery and built 
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heritage are already under pressure from 
development, in particular from ribbon 
development and dereliction of traditional 
buildings. These problems are aggravated by 
inappropriate fiscal incentives for new building and 
inadequate legislation on land use. However, there 
is also an urgent need to ensure the housing of our 
population at a reasonable cost. Reconciling these 
two objectives of public policy - preserving the 
environment and housing a growing population -
will not be easy. 
Institutional Reform 
As discussed in Chapter 3, the development of a 
political consensus in the 1980s on tackling 
Ireland's critical fiscal problems, was very 
important in the ultimate success of the Irish 
economic recovery. This was mirrored in the 
development of a growing social consensus. The 
social partnership approach to wage bargaining 
and to the development of public policy has been 
an important ingredient in delivering employment 
growth and rising living standards. However, there 
are signs that this approach is coming under 
pressure from the very success of the strategy in the 
past. Rising expectations could run ahead of the 
ability of the economy to deliver and this could 
seriously endanger the prospective rapid growth in 
output and employment in the future. 
The EU Structural Funds process was one of a 
number of factors which brought about significant 
changes in the way we plan our future. It 
encouraged the development of medium-term 
planning of investment and it helped develop an . 
evaluation culture. In the past the main criterion on 
which investment projects were examined on 
completion was: "was the money spent as voted?" 
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Today increasing attention is paid to: "did it make 
a difference?" The development of management 
structures generally, and forward planning in 
particular, across a wide range of sectors needs 
further development. 
There are many areas in the private and the public 
sectors where lack of competition contributes to 
excessive costs. The state can intervene either 
through regulation of existing monopolies or 
through enforcing competition to try and ensure 
that consumers get a fair deal. Where possible the 
latter - competition - is likely to be the most 
successful route. In general, developments at EU 
level have been beneficial in pushing reform in 
Ireland. However, there are cases where 
derogations granted have not been in the best 
interests of consumers or the economy as a whole, 
the telecommunications sector, for instance. While 
possibly unexciting to the media, the area of 
competition policy is likely to be very important in 
the future in putting downward pressure on costs 
and improving the competitiveness of the economy 
as a whole. 
Education and Training 
This Review has stressed the contribution which 
improved education has made in enhancing the 
potential growth rate of the economy in the past, a 
role which it will continue to play in the future. 
However, it is not a very effective instrument for 
dealing with short-term capacity problems. These 
are probably better dealt with by an increased 
provision of suitable training by finns themselves. 
It seems likely that the economy will continue to 
develop rapidly in the future and it would be very 
unwise to try and predict what will be the precise 
Skill needs Of the economy more fh,:m " r1"~ 0 A~ :_ 
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advance. Instead, the role of the education .system 
is to produce citizens who have a broad enough 
education that they will be able to adapt to the ever 
changing needs of a rapidly evolving society and 
economy. Those providing the necessary training 
in specific skills can build on this firm foundation. 
As discussed later, the priority for the educational 
system should be the children who have particular 
problems and who are likely to leave the system 
with minimal or no qualifications. 
The Environment 
This Review's forecast economic growth of over 5 
per cent in the five-year period, 1997 to 2003, can 
not but have noticeable effects on the environment. 
The extent to which these effects will add to or 
detract from the quality of life - the fundamental 
aim of growth - will depend on the choice and 
balance of policies for environmental protection. In 
addition to the need for properly functioning 
protective laws where appropriate, economic 
instruments will need to be at centre stage if we are 
not to burden the economy with unnecessary costs 
of protection.2 
The single most important environmental issue, 
which could have an important impact on Ireland's 
growth potential in the medium term, is how the 
EU handles the problem of global warming. There 
is a fair degree of acceptance that it would be 
prudent for the EU to take the initiative in 
promoting world-wide action to reduce emissions 
of so called green-house gases. From an Irish point 
of view this seems a wise approach to an 
2Bmrett, A., J. Lawlor and S. Scott, 1997. The Fiscal System and 
the Polluter Pays Principle -A Case Study of Ireland, Avebury/ 
Ashgate, Alderhsot, Rants. 
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intractable problem. However, as outlined in the 
last chapter, any approach which involved binding 
national quotas on emissions of green-house gases 
is potentially dangerous for Ireland. If the quotas 
were not tradable they could impose substantial 
costs on the Irish economy, costs which would 
reduce Ireland's potential for future growth. If 
implemented in this form the result would be 
higher unemployment and emigration than in the 
Central Forecast. The costs to Ireland would be 
increased by the current policy on the use of peat 
for electricity generation. 
While the current EU negotiating position, 
involving an Irish offer to limit increases in 
emissions to 15 per cent of 1990 levels by 2010, 
may seem reasonable, if the limit were to become a 
binding quota it could prove much more costly for 
Ireland than for many otl1er EU members. As a 
result, for Ireland it is essential that the burden of 
the adjustment necessary to reduce the danger of 
global warming should be shared equally by EU 
members through the use of appropriate fiscal 
instruments. 
The best means of ensuring such an outcome would 
be a common tax on pollution across the EU. If tl1is 
is not acceptable to member states tl1e next best 
alternative would be national quotas which are 
tradable. While this might involve a transfer of 
resources from Ireland to other EU members, tl1is 
transfer would not be nearly as costly as 
implementing non-tradable quotas. The resolution 
of this issue must depend on the strength of 
argument by Ireland in EU fora in favour of a 
regime which would achieve the desired reduction 
in emissions, while maximising EU output and 
employment. Such a regime would be unlikely to 
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impose excessive burdens on any individual 
member state or region of the EU. 
The environment is a resource which provides 
services to the economy, such as scenery and waste 
absorption by air, land and water. What makes the 
environment vulnerable is that many of its services, 
like countryside and waste absorption, are not 
owned and are largely free, except where society 
intervenes to impose protective laws or charges. If 
these safeguards are not adequate, or are applied in 
the wrong way, environmental degradation or 
needless cost will be incurred. 
Production of waste and demand for water services 
are strongly correlated with economic activity and 
income levels. Furthermore, peak demands for 
water services can be expected to rise 
disproportionately in tourist regions. Add to this 
the higher standards of drinking water, waste water 
treatment and landfill conditions required by the 
EU, and the result is not merely a heavy capital 
bill, but a heavy regime of running costs. The 
marginal cost of higher standards rises steeply. In 
such circumstances it is worthwhile gearing the 
standard to what the surroundings require and to 
the benefits expected to ensue. It is also worthwhile 
implementing efficiency pricing to encourage 
rational use and to give price signals that are 
correct in relation to other options facing 
"polluters". A policy consisting solely of 
"command and control" combined with capital 
subsidies is not the least-cost approach, and will 
use up societal resources that could be spent on 
other worthwhile environmental improvements. 
Water quality and quantity are particular aspects of 
concern in some areas of Ireland. In such areas it is 
not just the large users that should be metered and 
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correctly charged on a volume basis. Ireland can be 
expected to become au increasingly attractive 
location for water-using industry so that the 
opportunity cost of water in some areas can be 
expected to rise. The capital cost of meter 
installation will therefore become increasingly 
justified at lower levels of consumption. 
Water quality is also closely connected to 
agricultural activity, and the over-application of 
fertilisers and inadequate management of farm 
wastes are a source of concern. The result is excess 
nutrient run-off to waterways, eutrophicatiou and 
damage to aquatic life, water sports and tourism. 
This problem is one of the more important 
environmental issues to be dealt with over the next 
decade and it will require the use of both fiscal 
instruments and of regulatory methods to achieve 
an appropriate improvement. 
Preparing for EMU 
As part of our Central Forecast we have assumed 
that Ireland will join Economic and Monetary 
Union (EMU) as part of the first wave. While 
Ireland seems set to qualify under the convergence 
criteria, it is important that qualification is not 
considered automatic. The Irish economy must also 
adapt with a view to operating successfully within 
economic and monetary union. 
One of the most often expressed worries is how the 
economy will deal with external shocks as a 
member of EMU. Once EMU commences, national 
economic policy will no longer have the option of 
using either interest rates or exchange rates to 
remedy the impact of an external shock. For the 
most part it is hoped that this will not be an issue, 
i.e., that any shocks will affect the whole euro zone 
more or less equally and thus that the European 
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Central Bank's response will be as appropriate for 
Ireland as for other members. However, it would 
not be prudent to ignore how the Irish economy 
must adapt to cope with shocks that are specific to 
our economy - change will be required by all 
sectors. 
Part of the preparations may involve the 
development of a more flexible approach to wage 
determination in the private sector firms which 
could, potentially, suffer from shocks under EMU. 
A single currency will lead to transparency of wage 
costs between different countries and wage 
bargaining needs to take this into account. 
External shocks are not the only driving force for 
change. A single currency will lead to transparency 
of prices and costs across the euro zone. Irish 
companies must ensure that they are in a position 
to be competitive once this occurs. Costs of raw 
materials and final products will come under 
examination as transnational comparison becomes 
easier. 
7.3 The Fruits of Growth 
The next fifteen or twenty years represent a 
window of opportunity to make progress on some 
of the major social problems which have dogged 
the country in recent years. There is a huge range 
of possible worthy projects and while the resources 
available in the next decade will be greater than in 
the past they will still be strictly limited. It is 
essential that the problems to be tackled should be 
prioritised and that competing demands which 
merit a low priority be kept in check. Already there 
are disturbing signs that the prospect of continued 
economic growth is encouraging wholly unrealistic 
demands for increases in public expenditure. If 
these demands were met this would pre-empt the 
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resources which should be used instead to deal with 
our urgent social problems. 
Will the Rising Tide Lift All Boats? 
On the basis of the central forecast outlined here, 
the next decade or so will be a period of 
exceptionally rapid economic growth and 
improving living standards, the benefits of which 
can be widely shared. As well as sustained 
increases in real after-tax incomes for those in 
work, the scale of the expected increase in 
employment is such that the unemployment rate 
projected towards the end of the forecast period is 
only about half the 1996 rate of 12 per cent, which 
would itself compare favourably with the figure of 
almost 16 per cent seen as recently as 1993. This 
would be a remarkable achievement, and would in 
itself make very substantial inroads into current 
levels of poverty and social exclusion. But this 
forecast is highly contingent, as repeatedly 
emphasised, and the increase in employment in 
particular depends on continued wage moderation. 
The first priority from a poverty perspective is thus 
to ensure that this reduction in unemployment 
comes about. 
It is also necessary to consider, against the 
background of this macroeconomic forecast, what 
other priorities can be identified at this point if the 
fruits of economic growth are to be widely spread. 
This Review is not tl1e place for an in-depth 
examination of these issues, but some implications 
of the scenario it sketches can be highlighted. The 
first point to be made is that the substantial number 
currently on state schemes, such as Community 
Employment, are now counted as being in 
employment. As in many other European countries, 
the underlying level of unemployment at present is 
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thus a good deal higher than it would be in the 
absence of these schemes. The forecast essentially 
assumes that the scale of provision of these 
schemes continues, so this would be equally true at 
the end of the forecast period. But even taking this 
into account, the scale of the projected reduction in 
unemployment remains extremely impressive. 
Particularly in this light, a crucial issue is the 
distribution of the projected increase in 
employment, and the extent to which long-term 
unemployment can be reduced. Even in a buoyant 
job market, those with poor education and low skill 
levels may find it very difficult to escape from 
long-term unemployment into a job, and the tax 
and social welfare systems can exacerbate the 
problem. Certain groups could be excluded from 
the benefits of employment growth, remaining 
unemployed for lengthy periods or drifting out of 
meaningful participation in the labour market. This 
would have serious consequences for their children, 
given the strength of forces transmitting 
unemployment and poverty from one generation to 
another. There is a pressing need for measures 
aimed specifically at improving the skill levels of 
the long-term unemployed, for reform of the tax 
and welfare systems to improve incentives, and for 
policies attacking the processes producing inter-
generational cycles of disadvantage. The favourable 
macroeconomic scenario being presented does not 
make these :my less necessary, but rather makes the 
prospects of successful implementation very much 
greater than in a context of static employment and 
rising unemployment. 
To take an important example, the long-term 
problems created by early school leaving have now 
been recognised and progress is being made in 
reducing the numbers who leave before the end of 
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compulsory schooling. There is, however, a 
continuing need to focus on ensuring that those 
who do complete compulsory schooling acquire 
basic numeracy and literacy skills, as well as a 
need for intensive recovery programmes aimed at 
the diminishing group who continue to leave before 
that stage. Breen and Shortall, 1992,3 showed that 
the state could expect a very good rate of return 
from successful intervention in this area of the 
educational system. 
Within both education and training, greater 
flexibility is required so that progression from one 
level to another is facilitated rather than obstructed, 
and more effective targeting of the long-term 
unemployed, or those about to enter that situation, 
is required. 
Reform of the tax and welfare systems has been 
much debated, but a consensus has been growing 
that priority should be given to reducing the tax 
burden on the low paid and de-coupling income 
support for children from the labour market 
situation of their parents. For example, the recent 
report of the Expert Group on the Integration of the 
Tax and Social Welfare Systems saw increasing the 
level of personal tax allowances over a number of 
years and reforming child income support as 
crucial elements in easing the transition from 
unemployment to work and increasing work 
incentives. 
The provision of support for housing costs was also 
identified by the Expert Group as a particular area 
of concern, and reform in this area is likely to 
3 Breen R., and S. Shortall, 1992. "'The Exchequer Costs of 
Unemployment Among Unqualified Labour Market Participants". 
in J. Bradley et al. eds. The Role of the Structural Funds. Dublin: 
The Economic and Social Research Institute, Policy Research 
Paper No. 13. 
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become even more important given the expected 
pressure on housing over the forecast period. 
Because of the success in dealing with this aspect 
of poverty in the 1980s it has fallen from view as a 
social priority in the 1990s. However, the rapid 
growth in the number of households is already 
putting severe pressure on the housing market and 
the way social housing needs are tackled in the 
future will be an important issue determining the 
economic position of tl10se with low earning power 
in the next decade. 
Finally, the implications of the forecast scenario for 
the level of social welfare support which can be 
provided to those outside the labour force should be 
highlighted. The scale of economic growth 
projected, with the associated fall in numbers 
unemployed, is such as to allow the incomes of 
tl1ose depending on social welfare payments to 
increase in line with other incomes without 
unbalancing the public finances. For groups such 
as the elderly, for whom work incentive effects are 
not relevant, tl1e opportunity thus exists to ensure 
that, by linking support levels to average incomes, 
they do not become detached from ordinary living 
standards over the forecast period. 
Investing the Demographic Dividend 
We are facing a period of up to 20 years of low 
dependency which will provide a demographic 
dividend. This low dependency ratio will not last 
indefinitely although, as Fahey and Fitz Gerald, 
1997, op. cit., have shown, the dependency 
problems that will face Ireland in the distant future 
may well be less than those faced in the past, or 
currently being faced elsewhere in Europe. 
However, it is probably appropriate that we invest 
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some of the dividend to provide for future 
requirements to support an ageing population. 
In the case of the public sector we have suggested 
that a gradual elimination of the debt over the next 
20 years would be appropriate. This would enhance 
the scope for future governments to deal with rising 
pension and dependency burdens. For the future, 
the tax revenue currently devoted to national debt 
interest would be available to fund the increasing 
financial burden which rising old-age dependency 
might impose on the state. It might conceivably be 
necessary for the state eventually to invest abroad 
( once debt is repaid) in order to fund some of any 
future pension liabilities. The strategy of debt 
repayment should be used to supplement the 
traditional pay-as-you-go metl10d of funding 
pensions if it seems likely that the future would 
eventually produce exceptional periods of 
demographic burden. However, from the vantage 
point of our knowledge of the demographic 
structure today, it seems unlikely that over the next 
30 years Ireland will suffer from tl1e kind of 
problems of old age dependency which are 
currently in prospect for some EU members. 
With a rapidly rising number of people in skilled 
employment earning high incomes there will be 
increasing demand to provide additional cover for 
retirement over and above the limited state 
pension. This demand is likely to arise naturally 
and the private sector will be in a position to meet 
it. The state's role will be to regulate tl1e business 
to ensure that investors' pensions are secure and 
that the costs of provision are transparent. 
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Regional Implications and Northern 
Ireland 
Future regional success will depend as much on 
where people want to live as on where the jobs are. 
The changing educational composition of the 
population has important implications for regional 
policy. With an ever increasing share of the young 
adult population having at least a Leaving 
Certificate, their expected productivity and earning 
power is also increased. However, rising 
educational attainment also tends to change 
people's behaviour in terms of consumption 
patterns and life-style, whether because of 
education itself or because of the higher standard of 
living which it can buy. 
The changing expectations of the population affect 
the type of jobs which they are prepared to accept. 
It also affects tl1e type of lifestyle which they will 
seek. Rising living standards and the move to a 
society where a high proportion of the adult 
population is in the labour force leads, for example, 
to an increased demand for eating out and 
convenience foods, entertainment, and a range of 
otl1er services which were previously considered 
luxuries. To tl1e extent that these goods and 
services are more easily provided in urban areas it 
will put pressure on population in rural 
communities. However, the pressures arising from 
increasing congestion will tend to operate in the 
otl1er direction, making the life-style available 
outside major urban centres more attractive. 
In tl1e days when industry employed predominantly 
unskilled labour, firms could expect to find all their 
employees on the local labour market. However, 
rising human capital requirements mean that firms 
now require a very wide range of skills, not all of 
which can be found locally. This implies that firms, 
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if they are to be successful in a region, must be able 
to attract labour to that region from elsewhere in 
the country. The ability to get accountants, legal 
staff, logistics experts, etc. to relocate depends not 
,only on the rates of remuneration but also on the 
standard of living, broadly defined, which is 
available locally. In an economy which may be 
suffering from increasing congestion costs this will 
provide some incentive to both employers and 
employees to move to better endowed cities or 
towns. 
Third-level education not only enhances the human 
capital of those who graduate from it but also 
increases their mobility. In many cases young 
adults have had to migrate to attend third-level 
institutions and this tends to reduce their 
attachment to their local district. While Irish third-
level graduates have traditionally shown signs of 
the "homing pigeon" instinct, returning to Ireland 
from all over the globe, they do not necessarily 
return to the location where they grew up. With 
around 50 per cent of the school-leaving cohort 
continuing to third-level education this means that 
increasingly rural and urban areas have to compete 
to attract young labour market entrants. 
In the past the principal instrument of regional 
policy may have been government intervention 
through different kinds of subsidies to encourage 
firms to relocate to less desirable or sought after 
locations. In the future this is unlikely to be as 
successful as in ilie past. Instead, among the factors 
which will determine where economic activity 
prospers will be where the young labour market 
entrants of tomorrow wish to live. The promotion 
of a balanced regional development must rely more 
on policies which enhance a region's attractiveness 
to young adults: for example, the provision of 
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affordable housing, entertainment for the 
increasingly varied tastes of that cohort, and 
satisfactory infrastructure, ranging from transport 
systems to child-minding facilities. 
It is instructive to consider how the past 30 years 
appear to have thrown up a random pattern of 
successes and failures in Irish regional policy. The 
notable success of Galway and, more recently, the 
soutl1 west stand out, while the relative failure of 
Waterford to prosper until recently also carries 
lessons for future policy. It will be necessary to 
study these relative successes and failures to 
understand how policy can best promote balanced 
regional development in the future in a society 
where the bulk of the population is highly 
educated, with expectations and needs which are 
different from those of earlier generations. 
Finally, in considering the regional dimension to 
the changes under way in the economy it is 
important to consider what implications they have 
for economic relations between the Republic and 
Northern Ireland over the next decade. Much of the 
concentration of interest in North-South economic 
relations has turned on trade. While the rapid 
growth in tl1e Republic will enhance its attraction 
as a market for Northern firms, in a context of 
global markets this will not greatly affect economic 
prospects in Northern Ireland. 
A more subtle effect may come through the labour 
market effects of the changes in the economy of the 
Republic. The rapid growth in employment and the 
demand for skilled labour may see costs rising. 
This could initially prove attractive to residents of 
Northern Ireland. However, the increase in 
congestion costs in the Republic will tend to reduce 
its competitiveness over time. If Northern Ireland 
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can transform itself into an attractive location for 
people to live, it could attract an overflow of 
investment from the Republic. 
Currently the economy of Northern Ireland is a 
more attractive location for investors employing 
relatively unskilled labour, because of lower labour 
costs there. This may well result in some increase 
in employment growth North of the border through 
a diversion of investment from the Republic. 
However, in the longer term the Northern 
economy, like that of the Republic, faces 
competition from many low cost producers outside 
the EU. The lesson of the Republic's recent history 
is that in the longer-term investment in the skills 
and education of the population as a whole may 
prove the best way forward. 
7 .4 Beyond 201 O 
In looking beyond the forecast time horizon it is 
worthwhile to consider some other aspects of an 
economic strategy for the future. 
The fact that the our level of output is rapidly 
approaching the average for the EU, as currently 
constituted, will itself change our relationship with 
the outside world. While we may continue to be a 
net beneficiary from the EU for some time to come, 
at some stage in the next decade Ireland is likely to 
become a net contributor to the EU budget. 
Probably the most painful change will not be the 
gradual phasing out of the Structural Fund 
payments, but rather the reform of the Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP), which will be an 
essential precursor to a number of Central 
European countries joining the EU. If this involves 
some renationalisation of funding of agriculture it 
could prove politically divisive in what is now an 
increasingly urban society. 
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The driving force behind the expansion of the EU 
to the East is the need to extend the current zone of 
stability in Europe. In this Ireland, along with 
other EU members, has a very direct interest. The 
expansion will pose a potential economic challenge 
to Ireland. The probability that the Structural Fund 
transfers to Ireland will begin to fall in importance 
from 2000 onwards, whether or not there is an 
expansion in membership of the EU to the East, 
must have some effect on Ireland's attitude to 
enlargement. While enlargement around 2005 
could see Ireland's relative standard of living 
within the EU rising by 5 percentage points,4 by 
tl1en Ireland's expectation of net transfers under the 
Structural Funds would already be low. It is the 
necessity which enlargement will present for a 
revolution in the CAP and for a change in the 
administrative structure of the EU which will pose 
more serious problems for Ireland within the EU 
over ilie next decade. 
Although the costs and problems which 
enlargement will entail are easy to enumerate, the 
benefits, which may well more than offset the costs, 
are less easily quantified. As the study by 
Matthews, 1994, op. cit., indicates, the benefits to 
Ireland from policy changes which result in an 
expansion of trade (in that case the GATT 
agreement) can be very beneficial for the economy 
as a whole. Already 3 of the top 200 multinational 
investors in Poland are Irish and the inclusion in 
the Union of what will hopefully be rapidly 
growing markets will be a new opportunity for 
Irish domestic producers. 
4 Because the lower standard of living in the new members would 
pull down the cmTent EU average. 
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While the economy as a whole is certainly not 
"hooked" on transfers from the EU, since accession 
the agricultural sector has become very heavily 
dependent on them. In recent years transfers from 
the EU under the CAP were equal to between 50 
per cent and 60 per cent of agricultural incomes. 
The heavy dependence of the sector on the CAP 
support raises important strategic issues. 
The current CAP may be radically overhauled 
because of budgetary difficulties before the end of 
the decade. Even if this does not happen, the 
declining numbers of fanners in the EU, the 
economic inefficiency of the CAP at the level of the 
EU, and the prospects of a number of Central 
European states joining the EU early in the next 
decade, all suggest that the CAP will undergo a 
revolution within the next 10 years. The dependent 
nature of ilie sector and its importance to the 
economy at large is a cause for concern. 
Current EU policy on the CAP, restricting output 
while maintaining high prices, may not be in the 
best interests of Irish agriculture in the long term. 
This can be seen in the Central Forecast for 
agriculture, where relative living standards are 
forecast to rise over the next decade in spite of the 
assumed freeing of trade from 2002 onwards. This 
is on the basis that Irish agriculture today is 
potentially competitive in a free market for 
agricultural produce, but current policies could 
damage this position. In so far as domestic policy 
can int1uence the future development of the sector 
it should aim at preparing it for an increasingly 
competitive global market some time in the next 
decade. 
Whatever change occurs in the CAP after 2000, it 
is vital for Ireland that EU transfers to the 
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agricultural sector are maintained well into the 
next decade. Any attempt to "nationalise" the 
transfers - shifting responsibility for funding to 
national governments - would be very serious if it 
occurred at the same time as the phasing out of the 
Structural Funds. 
Since joining the EU in 1973 Irish policy has been 
directed to maximising the size of the EU budget. 
This policy has been pursued in the expectation 
that Ireland would be a substantial net beneficiary 
of the budget for the foreseeable future. With this 
in mind Ireland supported the MacDougall report 
of 1977 and in subsequent debates on the budget, 
as recently as the Edinburgh summit of 1992, 
Ireland has been at the forefront in pushing for 
increased resources for the budget. 
However, as we look into the next decade, it is 
likely that progress in terms of convergence and 
the possibility of a major expansion of the EU to 
the East will mean that this policy of maximising 
the budget will become less vital to Irish interests, 
as increases in budgetary resources may not bring 
concomitant benefits for Ireland. While, because of 
a firm commitment to the process of building 
solidarity in the Union, it is appropriate for Ireland 
to maintain its policy on the budget for the 
foreseeable future, it is certainly necessary to think 
out carefully our longer-term approach to this 
topic. For the future our policy must be founded 
less on our limited self-interest than on developing 
the Union as a whole, which is in the long-term 
interests of Ireland and the other member states. 
Recent changes in the Irish economy and in society 
generally have seen the development of increased 
self-confidence. This is apparent at many levels: 
among firms operating increasingly on a world 
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stage; among Irish labour market entrants moving 
to (and returning from) labour markets throughout 
the world. This contrasts with previous periods 
when immediate crises dominated thinking at the 
expense of more strategic planning for an uncertain 
future. This development also calls for a change in 
our policy towards the Third World. We are about 
to become one of the elect - the rich nations of the 
world. As in the past we have argued that this 
position carries responsibilities; to be consistent we 
must now prepare to shoulder some of these 
burdens. To some extent this is already reflected in 
a rising share of our GNP being devoted to aid. 
This trend may be expected to continue. 
Looking into the distant future the changes will 
bring new problems. In the past in Ireland we have 
seen ourselves as potential emigrants arguing for 
free access to desirable labour markets in the 
developed world. We are rapidly becoming just 
such a labour market and we will have to face the 
issue of how we handle immigration by people who 
are not Irish citizens, both from EU and non-EU 
countries. This could have important implications 
for the future development of Irish society. In this 
regard we can learn much from the different 
experiences of other European countries, where 
immigration has been a feature of society for many 
decades, and where a large body of research on 
immigration has accumulated. In particular we can 
learn to avoid policies which have proven counter-
productive and divisive elsewhere. 
The Irish population at present is a comparatively 
homogenous group, both in cultural and linguistic 
tenns, so that the introduction of diverse ethnic 
groups will pose new challenges for policy-makers 
and for the wider society. Research in other 
countries suggests that education is the most 
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obvious policy area which requires careful 
planning so as to ensure that immigrants are 
accorded equal treatment with the native 
population. This will help maximise the potential 
for mutual respect and social integration between 
the native and immigrant communities. 
The final area which we consider is the stance of 
what we have te1med our industrial policy. It is 
indisputable that the policy of attracting in foreign 
multinationals within the manufacturing sector has 
brought very substantial real benefits to the 
economy and these are likely to continue in the 
future. There have been direct benefit<; in terms of 
output, export and employment growth. In addition 
there have been significant indirect benefits in 
terms of access to global developments in existing 
and new technologies. Since most of the high-
technology, foreign-owned industry in Ireland is 
concentrated in a few specific sectors, there have 
also been many indirect spill-over benefits (more 
technically, economies of scale). These indirect 
benefits are manifested in the build-up of specific 
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human capital and in the sprouting of niche 
indigenous firms within these sectors. 
However these same "benefits" of sectoral 
concentration within manufacturing also signal the 
level of exposure which such concentration 
involves. The concentration is especially notable in 
the electronics (software), pharmaceuticals, and 
instrument engineering (health care) sectors. The 
products of these sectors face rapidly growing 
markets so that there is no obvious reason why 
there would be a downturn in the demand for these 
goods. Nevertheless the extent to which the 
manufacturing sector is dependent on foreign direct 
investment in these particular sectors, and the 
increased orientation of skills in the work-force 
towards these sectors, does highlight the degree of 
dependency within manufacturing on the future 
success of these sectors. The experience of 
Northern Ireland in the 19th century was that they 
got 100 good years out of shipbuilding and linen. 
However, we cannot expect the same life-span for 
the sectors on which we are currently concentrating 
and we must plan accordingly for tl1e future. 
Appendix 
This appendix conatins a set of tables giving additional details of the Central Forecast discussed in Chapter 
6. These tables are also available on disk in spreadsheet form with data from 1960 to 2010. 
Table A.1: Exeenditure on GNP 
1997 Volume Price 1998 Cont. to Volume Price 1999 Cont. to 
£M % % £M Growth% % % £M Growth o/o 
Personal Consumption 25605 7.0 1.9 27915 4.3 6.1 2.1 30259 3.8 
Public Consumption 6768 3.0 3.1 7188 0.4 2.9 3.9 7689 0.4 
Fixed Investment 7657 8.4 2.5 8512 1.5 6.6 2.2 9272 1.2 
Building 4925 7.3 2.9 5435 0.8 5.3 2.2 5848 0.6 
Machine1y 2732 10.4 1.8 3070 0.7 8.7 2.0 3404 0.6 
Final Domestic Demand 40030 6.7 2.2 43614 6.2 5.8 2.4 47219 5.4 
Stock Building 330 220 -0.3 234 0.0 
Agricultural 20 0 -0.1 0 0.0 
Intervention 100 0 -0.3 0 0.0 
Non-Ag1icultural 210 220 0.0 234 0.0 
Total Domestic Demand 40360 6.2 2.2 43834 5.9 5.8 2.4 47453 5.4 
Total Exports 35365 10.5 2.4 40018 9.9 8.4 2.6 44479 8.3 
Merchandise 31868 10.8 2.5 36188 9.3 8.6 2.6 40331 7.8 
Services 3497 7.5 1.9 3830 0.6 6.0 2.1 4148 0.5 
Total Demand 75725 8.4 2.2 83852 15.8 7.1 2.4 91932 13.7 
Total Imports 28627 12.8 1.9 32894 9.0 9.2 1.9 36591 6.9 
Gross Domestic Product 47098 5.8 2.3 50959 6.8 5.7 2.7 55341 6.8 
Net Factor Income -6784 5.4 1.4 -7255 -1.0 7.4 1.6 -7916 -1.3 
Gross National Product 40270 5.8 3.3 44031 5.8 5.4 3.3 47977 5.4 
1999 Volume Price 2000 Cont. to Volume Price 2001 Cont. to 
£M % % £M Growth% % % £M Growth% 
Personal Consumption 30259 3.1 2.2 31876 1.9 4.2 2.1 33927 2.6 
Public Consumption 7689 3.3 4.3 8284 0.4 3.4 2.9 8816 0.4 
Fixed Investment 9272 4.9 2.5 9969 0.9 4.1 2.4 10622 0.7 
Building 5848 4.1 2.7 6253 0.5 3.0 2.6 6607 0.3 
Machine1y 3404 6.2 1.9 3684 0.4 5.8 1.8 3967 0.4 
Final Domestic Demand 47219 3.5 2.6 50129 3.3 4.1 2.3 53365 3.8 
Stock Building 234 245 0.0 257 0.0 
Agricultural 0 0 0.0 0 0.0 
Intervention 0 0 0.0 0 0.0 
Non-Ag1icultural 234 245 0.0 257 0.0 
Total Domestic Demand 47453 3.5 2.6 50375 3.3 4.1 2.3 53622 3.8 
Total Exports 44479 6.7 1.3 48116 6.8 4.7 1.7 51216 4.8 
Merchandise 40331 6.8 1.3 43634 6.4 4.6 1.6 46392 4.4 
Services 4148 5.7 2.2 4482 0.5 5.4 2.1 4824 0.5 
Total Demand 91932 5.2 1.9 98490 10.1 4.4 2.0 104838 8.6 
Total Imports 36591 5.8 1.8 39414 4.5 4.0 1.8 41732 3.1 
Gross Domestic Product 55341 4.8 1.9 59076 5.6 4.7 2.1 63106 5.5 
Net Factor Income -7916 5.1 0.4 -8351 -0.9 8.4 0.7 -9116 -1.5 
Gross National Product 47977 4.7 2.5 51470 4.7 4.0 2.7 54948 4.0 
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Table A.1 (cont'd}: Exeenditure on GNP 
2001 Volume Price 2002 Cont. to Volume Price 2003 
£M % % £M Growth% % % £M 
Personal Consumption 33927 -34.6 -17.3 18358 -21.4 1.7 1.9 19011 
Public Consumption 8816 -22.4 -29.2 4844 -2.9 1.1 7.1 5248 
Fixed Investment 10622 -44.3 -20.8 4688 -8.1 -2.1 3.2 4734 
Building 6607 -43.0 -22.1 2931 -4.8 -5.9 2.1 2817 
Machinery 3967 -46.2 -17.7 1757 -3.3 4.1 4.9 1918 
Final Domestic Demand 53365 -34.8 -19.8 27890 -32.4 0.9 3.0 28994 
Stock Building 257 -95 -0.7 -138 
Agricultural 0 83 0.2 
-1 
Intervention 0 -373 -0.9 -61 
Non-Agricultural 257 195 -0.1 -76 
Total Domestic Demand 53622 -35.4 -19.8 27796 -33.1 0.7 3.1 28856 
Total Exports 51216 -56.8 -14.7 18859 -59.1 9.6 6.4 21988 
Merchandise 46392 -58.4 -14.5 16505 -55.8 10.1 7.1 19460 
Services 4824 -39.2 -19.8 2354 -3.3 5.9 1.5 2528 
Total Demand 104838 -46.7 -16.6 46654 -92.2 4.5 4.3 50844 
Total Imports 41732 -53.4 -18.1 15920 -42.0 6.1 4.4 17631 
Gross Domestic Product 63106 -42.2 -15.7 30734 -50.3 3.7 4.3 33213 
Net Factor Income -9116 -60.1 -12.2 -3196 11.4 14.8 6.4 -3902 
Gross National Product 54948 -38.8 -18.1 27538 -38.8 2.3 4.1 29310 
Table A.2: Outeut 
1997 Volume Price 1998 Cont. to Volume Price 1999 Cont. to 
£M % % £M Growth% % % £M Growth o/o 
Agriculture 2850 1.0 1.0 2909 0.1 1.0 1.1 2969 0.1 
Industry 16960 6.0 2.5 18436 2.9 5.6 3.5 20139 2.6 
Manufacturing 13652 5.9 2.3 14795 2.3 5.9 3.7 16245 2.3 
Utilities 823 8.5 1.9 910 0.2 7.2 2.8 1003 0.2 
Building 2485 5.4 4.2 2731 0.3 3.0 2.8 2890 0.2 
Market Services 18133 7.4 3.1 20080 3.2 6.7 3.1 22088 2.9 
Distribution 4277 8.4 1.9 4723 0.9 7.7 1.7 5172 0.8 
Transport & Communications 2498 8.4 0.9 2733 0.5 7.0 2.5 2999 0.5 
Other Market Services 11359 6.7 4.1 12624 1.7 6.2 3.8 13917 1.6 
Non-Market Services 5922 2.6 3.5 6287 0.3 2.6 4.5 6738 0.3 
Health & Education 3838 2.5 3.7 4081 0.2 2.5 4.7 4381 0.2 
Public Administration 2085 2.7 3.1 2206 0.1 2.7 4.1 2357 0.1 
Ac\justment for Fin. Services (-) 1835 8.6 2.8 2048 0.4 7.9 3.3 2284 0.4 
GDP at Factor Cost 42030 5.7 2.8 45663 6.0 5.3 3.3 49650 5.6 
Taxes on Expenditure 7064 7.1 1.6 7686 1.1 6.1 2.2 8331 1.0 
Subsidies 2040 2.9 -1.8 2062 0.1 2.7 -1.4 2088 0.1 
GDP at Market Prices 47054 6.0 2.9 51287 7.1 5.4 3.4 55893 6.5 
Net Factor Income -6784 5.4 1.4 -7255 -1.0 7.4 1.6 -7916 -1.4 
GNP at Market Prices 40270 6.1 3.1 44031 6.1 5.1 3.7 47977 5.1 
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Table A.2 (cont'd}: Outeut 
1999 Volume Price 2000 Cont. to Volume Price 2001 Cont.to 
£M % % £M Growth% % % £M Growth% 
Agriculture 2969 1.0 1.1 3030 0.1 1.0 1.1 3093 0.1 
Industry 20139 5.0 1.5 21454 2.4 4.7 2.8 23084 2.3 
Manufacturing 16245 5.6 0.9 17311 2.2 5.1 2.8 18704 2.0 
Utilities 1003 5.6 3.2 1094 0.1 4.3 1.5 1159 0.1 
Building 2890 1.1 4.3 3049 0.1 1.7 3.9 3221 0.1 
Market Services 22088 5.0 3.0 23905 2.2 4.6 3.1 25769 2.0 
Distribution 5172 4.7 1.7 5505 0.5 3.6 1.2 5769 0.4 
Transport & Communications 2999 5.3 2.8 3249 0.3 4.8 1.6 3461 0.3 
Other Market Services 13917 5.1 3.6 15152 1.3 4.9 4.0 16538 1.3 
Non-Market Services 6738 2.6 5.0 7254 0.3 2.6 3.3 7683 0.3 
Health & Education 4381 2.5 5.2 4725 0.2 2.5 3.5 5013 0.2 
Public Administration 2357 2.7 4.5 2529 0.1 2.7 2.8 2670 0.1 
Adjustment for Fin. Services(-) 2284 6.5 2.5 2494 0.3 6.1 2.9 2720 0.3 
GDP at Factor Cost 49650 4.4 2.5 53149 4.7 4.1 2.9 56908 4.3 
Taxes on Expenditure 8331 3.2 2.7 8834 0.5 4.3 2.0 9396 0.7 
Subsidies 2088 1.7 1.9 2163 0.1 2.0 1.5 2240 0.1 
GDP at Mm-ket Prices 55893 4.3 2.6 59821 5.1 4.2 2.8 64064 5.0 
Net Rlctor Income -7916 5.1 0.4 -8351 -1.0 8.4 0.7 -9116 -1.6 
GNP at Market Prices 47977 4.2 3.0 51470 4.2 3.4 3.3 54948 3.4 
2001 Volume Price 2002 Cont. to Volume Price 2003 Cont. to 
£M % % £M Growth% % % £M Growth% 
Agriculture 3093 -3.0 -16.0 2519 -0.2 -8.0 11.2 2576 -0.8 
Industry 23084 -49.0 -13.1 10225 -24.0 4.6 2.9 11005 1.8 
Manufacturing 18704 -50.1 -12.2 8188 -20.4 4.1 4.2 8883 1.3 
Utilities 1159 -38.8 -9.7 640 -0.9 5.6 -1.6 666 O. l 
Building 3221 -45.7 -20.2 1397 -2.7 7.5 -3.0 1456 0.4 
Market Services 25769 -41.5 -22.8 11634 -18.6 6.1 5.3 13001 2.5 
Distribution 5769 -39.0 -15.7 2968 -4.4 10.1 3.6 3385 1.1 
Transport & Conummications 3461 -40.1 -22.8 1601 -2.7 4.4 2.6 1715 0.3 
Other Market Services 16538 -42.4 -25.9 7066 -11.3 4.5 7.0 7902 1.1 
Non-Market Services 7683 -20.2 -30.2 4283 -2.4 3.0 9.3 4825 0.5 
Health & Education 5013 -21.1 -30.8 2739 -1.6 3.6 10.6 3136 0.3 
Public Administration 2670 -18.6 -29.0 1544 -0.8 2.1 7.2 1689 0.1 
Adjustment for Fin. Services (-) 2720 -43.3 -20.0 1235 -2.2 8.8 5.6 1419 0.4 
GDP at Factor Cost 56908 -40.3 -19.3 27426 -42.9 3.6 5.6 29988 3.6 
Taxes on Expenditure 9396 -33.3 -23.7 4781 -5.5 0.3 2.2 4901 0.1 
Subsidies 2240 29.0 -49.0 1474 0.8 -5.4 20.3 1677 -0.3 
GDP at Market Prices 64064 -41.0 -18.7 30734 -49.2 3.5 4.4 33212 4.0 
Net Factor Income -9116 -60.1 -12.2 -3196 12.1 14.8 6.4 -3902 -1.9 
GNP at Market Prices 54948 -37.1 -20.3 27538 -37.1 2.1 4.2 29310 2.1 
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Table A.3: National lnciome and National Product, £Million 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Ag1icultural Incomes 2475 2475 2426 2467 2509 2552 2596 2671 2748 
Non-Ag. Wage Income 17932 19277 20530 22240 24056 25808 27203 28974 31003 
Non-Ag. Profits Net 13229 15049 16528 18344 20378 21926 24065 26334 28938 
Non-Ag. Profits Gross 13628 15299 16778 18676 20723 22255 24405 26680 29287 
Adjustment for Stock Appreciation 399 250 250 332 346 329 339 346 348 
Adjustment for Financial Services 1588 1707 1835 2048 2284 2494 2720 2981 3279 
Domestic Income 32048 35094 37649 41003 44659 47792 51144 54998 59409 
Depreciation 3672 4038 4381 4660 4991 5357 5764 6200 6662 
GDP (Factor Cost) 35720 39132 42030 45663 49650 53149 56908 61198 66072 
Taxes on Expenditure 6067 6484 7064 7686 8331 8834 9396 10003 10704 
Domestic 5580 6050 6648 7244 7858 8333 8863 9438 10105 
EC 487 434 416 442 473 501 533 565 599 
Subsidies (-) 1650 1940 2040 2062 2088 2163 2240 2316 2396 
Domestic 404 460 500 522 548 569 591 643 702 
EC 1246 1480 1540 1540 1540 1594 1650 1672 1695 
GDP (Market Prices) 40137 43676 47054 51287 55893 59821 64064 68886 74379 
Net Pactor Income -5465 -6151 -6784 -7255 -7916 -8351 -9116 -9851 -10529 
Gross National Product 34672 37525 40270 44031 47977 51470 54948 59035 63851 
Table A.4: Personal Income and Personal Exeenditure, Current Prices, £Million 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Agricultural Incomes 2475 2475 2426 2467 2509 2552 2596 2671 2748 
Non-Ag. Wage Income 17932 19277 20530 22240 24056 25808 27203 28974 31003 
Transfer Income 5875 6310 6776 7004 7321 7761 8194 8650 9073 
Domestic 5639 6229 6630 6849 7155 7585 8007 8452 8863 
Foreign 236 81 146 155 166 176 187 198 210 
( )ther Personal Income 5434 5711 6104 6734 7513 8178 8955 9668 10607 
Non-Ag. Profits etc. 13628 15299 16778 18676 20723 22255 24405 26680 29287 
Adj. for Financial Services(-) 1588 1707 1835 2048 2284 2494 2720 2981 3279 
National Debt Interest 1985 1930 1930 1834 1798 1799 1729 1721 1710 
Net Factor Income -5465 -6151 -6784 -7255 -7916 -8351 -9116 -9851 -10529 
Government Traci. & Inv. Inc.(-) 406 517 437 478 521 559 596 641 693 
Other Private Income 8154 8854 9652 10729 11801 12651 13701 14928 16495 
Undistributed Profits(-) 2721 3143 3548 3995 4288 4473 4746 5260 5888 
Personal Income 31716 33773 35835 38445 41399 44300 46948 49963 53431 
Taxes on Personal Income 6387 6874 7239 7770 8147 8882 9251 9904 10593 
Personal Disposable Income 25329 26900 28596 30675 33252 35418 37697 40059 42838 
Personal Consumption 22055 23930 25605 27915 30259 31876 33927 36053 38554 
Personal Savings 3274 2970 2991 2761 2993 3542 3770 4006 4284 
Tax Ratio(% Pers. Income) 20.14 20.35 20.20 20.21 19.68 20.05 19.70 19.82 19.83 
Savings Ratio (% Disposable Income 12.93 11.04 10.46 9.00 9.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
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Table A.5: Balance of Payments, £Million 
ESA 79 Basis 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Expmt~ - Total 29945 32199 35365 40018 44479 48116 51216 55680 60897 
Merchandise 27012 29008 31868 36188 40331 43634 46392 50466 55239 
Services 2933 3191 3497 3830 4148 4482 4824 5213 5658 
Imports Total 23871 25885 28627 32894 36591 39414 41732 44980 49009 
Balance of Trade 6074 6315 6738 7124 7887 8701 9484 10700 11888 
as% of GNP 17.52 16.83 16.73 16.18 16.44 16.91 17.26 18.12 18.62 
International Transfers 
EC Subsidies 1246 1480 1540 1540 1540 1594 1650 1672 1695 
EC Taxes(-) 487 434 416 442 473 501 533 565 599 
Capital 511 490 520 546 573 390 302 211 118 
Government Payments (-) 206 267 355 383 414 442 471 503 539 
Government Receipt~ 323 330 335 375 400 420 441 463 486 
Private Transfers 236 81 146 155 166 176 187 198 210 
Net International Transfers 1623 1680 1770 1791 1793 1637 1576 1477 1371 
Factor Income Flows -5465 -6151 -6784 -7255 -7916 -8351 -9116 -9851 -10529 
National Debt Interest(-) 1014 934 887 839 808 766 694 646 584 
Profits etc. Outflows (-) 5644 6652 7540 8196 9019 9641 10573 11466 12330 
Other Factor income 1193 1435 1643 1779 1911 2056 2151 2262 2385 
Current Account Balance 2232 1844 1724 1660 1764 1988 1945 2326 2731 
as% of GNP 6.44 4.91 4.28 3.77 3.68 3.86 3.54 3.94 4.28 
ESA 95 Basis 
Cunent Account Balance 850 461 342 155 124 227 69 305 539 
as% of GNP 2.51 1.26 0.87 0.36 0.27 0.45 0.13 0.53 0.87 
Table A.6: National Debt, Current Prices, £Million 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Total Government Securities: 16258 17250 17950 18260 18610 18981 19383 19871 20436 
Other Bmrnwing from C.Bank -947 -828 -913 -660 -420 -192 -205 -220 -238 
Small Savings 4438 4760 5000 5519 6079 6729 7448 8295 9261 
Total Debt Held Domestically 15398 15812 15737 16819 17970 19218 20326 21645 23158 
Total £Ir Debt 19749 21182 22037 23119 24270 25518 26626 27945 29458 
Foreign Debt: 
Foreign Currency 10916 8719 8501 7852 7041 5849 4979 3906 2542 
Government Secutities 4351 5370 6300 6300 6300 6300 6300 6300 6300 
Total Foreign Debt 15267 14089 14801 14152 13341 12149 11279 10206 8842 
Total National Debt 30665 29901 30538 30970 31311 31367 31605 31851 32000 
General Government Debt 32749 32084 32721 33153 33494 33550 33788 34034 34183 
Debt Ratios (% of GNP) 
Total National Debt 88.4 79.7 75.8 70.3 65.3 60.9 57.5 54.0 50.1 
General Government Debt 96.9 87.7 83.4 77.2 71.6 66.9 63.1 59.1 54.9 
Total Domestic Debt 44.4 42.1 39.1 38.2 37.5 37.3 37.0 36.7 36.3 
TotalForeign Debt 44.0 37.5 36.8 32.1 27.8 23.6 20.5 17.3 13.8 
Total £Ir Debt 57.0 56.4 54.7 52.5 50.6 49.6 48.5 47.3 46.1 
Total Foreign Currency Debt 31.5 23.2 21.l 17.8 14.7 11.4 9.1 6.6 4.0 
Debt Ratios (% of GDP) 
Total National Debt 76.4 68.5 64.8 60.8 56.6 53.1 50.1 47.1 43.9 
General Government Debt 81.6 73.5 69.5 65.1 60.5 56.8 53.5 50.3 46.9 
Total foreign Debt 39.5 33.5 32.7 28.9 25.1 21.4 18.6 15.7 12.6 
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Table A.7: Public Authorities Accounts, Current Prices, £Million 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Taxes on Income and Wealth 7552 8320 8773 9341 9774 10653 11110 11897 12721 
Company 1165 1446 1534 1572 1627 1771 1859 1993 2128 
Personal 6387 6874 7239 7770 8147 8882 9251 9904 10593 
Taxes on Expenditure 5580 6050 6648 7244 7858 8333 8863 9438 10105 
Net Trading & Investment Income 406 517 437 478 521 559 596 641 693 
Tramfers H·om Abroad 323 330 335 375 400 420 441 463 486 
Tota[ Current Receipt~ 13861 15217 16193 17438 18553 19965 21010 22439 24006 
Subsidies 404 460 500 522 548 569 591 643 702 
National Debt Interest 1985 1930 1930 1834 1798 1799 1729 1721 1710 
Other Transfer Payment~ 5845 6496 6985 7232 7569 8027 8478 8955 9402 
Public Consumption 5883 6296 6768 7188 7689 8284 8816 9430 10086 
Total C\1rrent Expenditure 14117 15182 16183 16776 17603 18680 19613 20749 21899 
Public Authorities Savings (net) -256 35 10 663 950 1285 1397 1691 2108 
Total Capital Receipts 1130 953 969 1008 1048 890 826 759 689 
Total Capital Expenditure 1507 1578 1660 1879 2077 2274 2480 2706 2957 
Borrowing for Capital Purposes -377 -625 -691 -871 -1029 -1384 -1654 -1947 -2267 
Total Borrowing -633 -590 -681 -209 -78 -99 -257 -256 -160 
as% of GNP -1.83 -1.57 -1.69 -0.47 -0.16 -0.19 -0.47 -0.43 -0.25 
Buclegtiu-y definitions 
Exchequer Bonowing -627 -437 -637 -165 -35 -56 -213 -213 -116 
as% of GNP -1.81 -1.16 -1.58 -0.37 -0.07 -0.11 -0.39 -0.36 -0.18 
Current Budget Deficit -362 292 193 845 1133 1467 1580 1873 2290 
as% of GNP -1.04 0.78 0.48 1.92 2.36 2.85 2.88 3.17 3.59 
EU Definitions 
Ci0neral Government Deficit 773.0 439.5 639.5 167.5 37.1 58.1 215.6 215.1 118.6 
as %of GDP 2.00 1.05 1.41 0.34 0.07 0.10 0.36 0.33 0.17 
as% of G!';'P 2.29 1.20 1.63 0.39 0.08 0.12 0.40 0.37 0.19 
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